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Getting lost in an infinite design space is no solution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2024

Mario Gollwitzer Open the ORCID record for Mario Gollwitzer [Opens in a new window]  and
Johannes Prager Open the ORCID record for Johannes Prager [Opens in a new window]
Mario Gollwitzer*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany mario.gollwitzer@psy.lmu.de jo.prager@psy.lmu.de https://www.psy.lmu.de/soz_en/team/professors/mario-gollwitzer/index.html https://www.psy.lmu.de/soz_en/team/academic-staff/prager/index.html
Johannes Prager
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, München, Germany mario.gollwitzer@psy.lmu.de jo.prager@psy.lmu.de https://www.psy.lmu.de/soz_en/team/professors/mario-gollwitzer/index.html https://www.psy.lmu.de/soz_en/team/academic-staff/prager/index.html
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Almaatouq et al. argue that an “integrative experiment design” approach can help generating cumulative empirical and theoretical knowledge. Here, we discuss the novelty of their approach and scrutinize its promises and pitfalls. We argue that setting up a “design space” may turn out to be theoretically uninformative, inefficient, and even impossible. Designing truly diagnostic experiments provides a better alternative.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e44
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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