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There are no shortcuts to theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2024

Berna Devezer Open the ORCID record for Berna Devezer [Opens in a new window]
Berna Devezer*
Affiliation:
College of Business and Economics, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID, USA bdevezer@uidaho.edu https://webpages.uidaho.edu/bernadevezer/
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Almaatouq et al. claim that the integrative experiment design can help “develop a reliable, cohesive, and cumulative theoretical understanding.” I will contest this claim by challenging three underlying assumptions about the nature of scientific theories. I propose that the integrative experiment design should be viewed as an exploratory framework rather than a means to build or evaluate theories.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e38
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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