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The power of the weak: When altruism is the equilibrium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 May 2023

Rachel Barkan Open the ORCID record for Rachel Barkan [Opens in a new window]  and
Yaron Lahav Open the ORCID record for Yaron Lahav [Opens in a new window]
Rachel Barkan
Affiliation:
Department of Business Administration, Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 8410500, Israel barkanr@bgu.ac.il; https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/fom/BusinessDep/pages/staff/RachelBarkan.aspx ylahav@bgu.ac.il; www.yaronlahav.com
Yaron Lahav
Affiliation:
Department of Business Administration, Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva 8410500, Israel barkanr@bgu.ac.il; https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/fom/BusinessDep/pages/staff/RachelBarkan.aspx ylahav@bgu.ac.il; www.yaronlahav.com
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Abstract

A rational economic analysis complements Grossmann's fearful ape hypothesis. Two examples of mixed-motive games with strong inter-dependence (i.e., weak chirping nestling, boxed pigs) demonstrate that signaling weakness is a dominant strategy. Weakness elicits cooperative, caring response, comprising the equilibrium of the game. In extensive form, a reliable reputation of weakness elicits caring as a sequential equilibrium.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e54
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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