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On intuitive versus institutional accounts of ownership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2023

Aidan Feeney Open the ORCID record for Aidan Feeney [Opens in a new window]  and
Robin Hickey
Aidan Feeney
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, Queen's University Belfast, Northern, Ireland a.feeney@qub.ac.uk; https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/persons/aidan-feeney
Robin Hickey
Affiliation:
School of Law, Queen's University Belfast, Northern Ireland r.hickey@qub.ac.uk; https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/persons/robin-hickey
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Abstract

We contrast Boyer's intuitive account of ownership with formal legal accounts based on institutions of ownership. Boyer's emphasis on social aspects of ownership intuitions may have a bearing on recent arguments that property institutions are justified by their capacity to promote human flourishing. Moreover, Boyer's account of property intuitions facilitates the study of acquisition and mental representation of formal ownership concepts.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e334
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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