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Autonomy, the moral circle, and the limits of ownership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2023

Christina Starmans Open the ORCID record for Christina Starmans [Opens in a new window]
Christina Starmans*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada christina.starmans@utoronto.ca
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Abstract

Why can't we own people? Boyer proposes that the key consideration concerns inclusion in the moral circle. I propose an alternative, which is that specific mental capacities, especially the capacity for autonomy, play a key role in determining judgments about human and animal ownership. Autonomous beings are viewed as owning themselves, which precludes them from being owned by others.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e350
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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