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Reciprocal contracts – not competitive acquisition – explain the moral psychology of ownership

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2023

Jean-Baptiste André ,
Léo Fitouchi Open the ORCID record for Léo Fitouchi [Opens in a new window]  and
Nicolas Baumard
Jean-Baptiste André
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France jeanbaptisteandre@gmail.com leo.fitouchi@gmail.com nbaumard@gmail.com
Léo Fitouchi
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France jeanbaptisteandre@gmail.com leo.fitouchi@gmail.com nbaumard@gmail.com
Nicolas Baumard
Affiliation:
Institut Jean Nicod, Département d’études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France jeanbaptisteandre@gmail.com leo.fitouchi@gmail.com nbaumard@gmail.com
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Abstract

We applaud Boyer's attempt to ground the psychology of ownership partly in a cooperative logic. In this commentary, we propose to go further and ground the psychology of ownership solely in a cooperative logic. The predictions of bargaining theory, we argue, completely contradict the actual features of ownership intuitions. Ownership is only about the calculation of mutually beneficial, reciprocal contracts.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e324
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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