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Limitations of the Dirac formalism as a descriptive framework for cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Artem Kaznatcheev
Affiliation:
School of Computer Science, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1B1, Canada. artem.kaznatchee@mail.mcgill.ca http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~akazna/ Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1B1, Canada. thomas.shultz@mcgill.ca http://www.tomshultz.net/
Thomas R. Shultz
Affiliation:
School of Computer Science, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1B1, Canada. artem.kaznatchee@mail.mcgill.ca http://www.cs.mcgill.ca/~akazna/ Department of Psychology, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1B1, Canada. thomas.shultz@mcgill.ca http://www.tomshultz.net/

Abstract

We highlight methodological and theoretical limitations of the authors' Dirac formalism and suggest the von Neumann open systems approach as a resolution. The open systems framework is a generalization of classical probability and we hope it will allow cognitive scientists to extend quantum probability from perception, categorization, memory, decision making, and similarity judgments to phenomena in learning and development.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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