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Quantum probability and conceptual combination in conjunctions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

James A. Hampton
James A. Hampton*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, City University London, City University, Northampton Square, London EC1V OHB, United Kingdom. Hampton@city.ac.uk www.staff.city.ac.uk/hampton
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Abstract

I consider the general problem of category conjunctions in the light of Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B)'s quantum probability (QP) account of the conjunction fallacy. I argue that their account as presented cannot capture the “guppy effect” – the case in which a class is a better member of a conjunction A^B than it is of either A or B alone.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 290 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

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