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Quantum probability, intuition, and human rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 May 2013

Mike Oaksford
Mike Oaksford*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London, London WC1E 7HX, United Kingdom. mike.oaksford@bbk.ac.uk http://www.bbk.ac.uk/psyc/staff/academic/moaksford
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Abstract

This comment suggests that Pothos & Busmeyer (P&B) do not provide an intuitive rational foundation for quantum probability (QP) theory to parallel standard logic and classical probability (CP) theory. In particular, the intuitive foundation for standard logic, which underpins CP, is the elimination of contradictions – that is, believing p and not-p is bad. Quantum logic, which underpins QP, explicitly denies non-contradiction, which seems deeply counterintuitive for the macroscopic world about which people must reason. I propose a possible resolution in situation theory.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 303
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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