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People are intuitive economists under the right conditions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

Alan Jern
Alan Jern*
Affiliation:
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, Terre Haute, IN 47803. jern@rose-hulman.eduhttps://wordpress.rose-hulman.edu/jern/
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Abstract

Boyer & Petersen (B&P) argue that a “rudimentary exchange psychology” is responsible for many of people's folk-economic beliefs that are at odds with the consensus views of economists. However, they focus primarily on macroeconomic beliefs. I argue that the same rudimentary exchange psychology could be expected to produce fairly accurate microeconomic intuitions. Existing evidence supports this prediction.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e171
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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