Boyer & Petersen (B&P) argue that folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) are formed when people elaborate on and explain intuitions that stem from universally present adaptive and automatic inference systems. This mechanism is in line with how developmental psychologists think about the mind: Cognition results from interactions between nature and nurture. Applying a developmental psychology lens to FEBs can shed light on (1) the initial inference systems that feed into resulting FEBs, and (2) how experiences activate and shape specific FEBs. The target article excellently acknowledges the first area, but we suggest that future research considering the second would be profitable.
B&P lay out five systems that underlie FEBs: detecting free-riders, choosing social partners, engaging in communal sharing, creating and affiliating with coalitions, and reasoning about ownership. Recent developmental psychology research provides evidence that components of each of these abilities are present early in development. As example, children care about partiality when evaluating resource distribution (e.g., Liberman & Shaw Reference Liberman and Shaw2017; Shaw Reference Shaw2013), which could be an output of the cheater detection system. Additionally, infants are selective in whom they choose as social partners (e.g., Hamlin et al. Reference Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom2007; Kinzler et al. Reference Kinzler, Dupoux and Spelke2007; Mahajan & Wynn Reference Mahajan and Wynn2012) and form expectations about which people will engage in positive social relationships (e.g., Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Kinzler and Woodward2014), indicating active psychologies for partner choice and coalitional affiliation. Indeed, evidence suggests that the relevant inference systems that underlie FEBs evolved early in human phylogeny and ontogeny, and emerged before (and outside of) markets (sect. 4.1).
Although the inference systems that support FEBs are early emerging and likely universally present, FEBs themselves are neither consistent nor coherent. That is, different people can hold different FEBs, and a person can hold seemingly contradictory FEBs. As B&P assert, “The beliefs in question may well vary between social classes, cultures, age-groups, and so on” (sect. 2.1, para. 10).
We argue that understanding how people go from A (inference system) to B (FEB) and how this developmental trajectory unfolds in different contexts – how social class, culture, and age-group impact upon thinking – will be important going forward. Although research by developmental psychologists and behavioral economists who study biases in decision-making rarely cross-fertilizes, these fields could be mutually extended to understand how different environments may shape FEBs.
B&P discuss psychological essentialism as an example of how reflexive beliefs can be incoherent. In our view, essentialism also serves as a good case study for understanding how initial inferences and later intuitions that support FEBs may emerge differently in different environments.
For instance, although essentialist beliefs likely arise from elaborating on an adaptive system for categorization, people do not imbue all categories with essences (e.g., Bloom Reference Bloom1996). Indeed, “social essentialism” (essentialist beliefs about groups of people) are more stable for some social categories: Adults' categorization by race (but not gender) can be disrupted when coalitions cross category boundaries (e.g., Kurzban et al. Reference Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides2001), and children develop gender essentialism before racial essentialism (e.g., Rhodes & Gelman Reference Rhodes and Gelman2009). Indeed, the amount that people essentialize the same category can vary based on age and social experience (e.g., Kinzler & Dautel Reference Kinzler and Dautel2012; Pauker et al. Reference Pauker, Ambady and Apfelbaum2010). For example, children from rural and non-diverse environments grow to develop higher levels of racial essentialism (Pauker et al. Reference Pauker, Xu, Williams and Biddle2016; Rhodes & Gelman Reference Rhodes and Gelman2009). We hypothesize that this variation is due to children having an inference system for social categorization, where the specific parameters that activate coalitional cognition may vary based on the child's early cultural experiences (e.g., Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward and Kinzler2017).
Similarly, different experiences may lead to different likelihoods activating the inference systems that underlie a particular FEB. As example, living in a diverse community may decrease activation of cheater-detection mechanisms towards immigrants, whereas living in poverty may increase activation of these same mechanisms (e.g., if poor people perceive immigrants as opponents in a zero-sum competition for resources, see Esses et al. Reference Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong2001). Supporting these ideas, people are more in favor of welfare policies for people who are unemployed persons but actively pursuing a job, likely because they do not view such persons as cheaters (Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides and Tooby2012). Additionally, people who are lower in socioeconomic status, more politically right-wing, and who attend church regularly (van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot1998), and countries that are poorer and have a strong focus on meritocracy (van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2006), are more likely to be conditional in terms of who is viewed as deserving of welfare (e.g., by supporting giving to the elderly but not to the unemployed). Therefore, knowledge about a person's social identity, background, and experiences can provide predictive power of which FEBs that person might hold.
Indeed, changing a person's experiences may change their endorsement of a particular FEB. As example, economic stability versus variability could trigger different psychologies (Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides and Tooby1994), such that experiencing prolonged unrest (e.g., a civil war) or an acute disturbance (e.g., a natural disaster) could cause people to be more likely to activate zero-sum reasoning and cheater-detection mechanisms. Even smaller changes could impact FEBs: positive exposure to diversity, or interventions that highlight how poverty is due to systematic structural inequality could make people more supportive of broader welfare policies.
We think that the examples above are very much in line with B&P's argument – for instance, their acknowledgment that reflective FEBs can change rapidly in different sociocultural contexts (sect. 6.2, para 5). We aim this commentary to serve as a call to arms for research to investigate the developmental trajectory by which FEBs may emerge predictably in different early sociocultural environments. Furthermore, the impact of social contexts at different points in ontogeny may be differentially important.
In sum, although B&P suggest that it is not important to determine whether FEBs are “correct,” they acknowledge that these beliefs have profound political consequences. Thus, understanding how FEBs are activated and revised would have impressive real-world impact. Societies can harness the knowledge gained by investigating the emergence of FEBs across varied developmental factors to construct effective social policies.
Boyer & Petersen (B&P) argue that folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) are formed when people elaborate on and explain intuitions that stem from universally present adaptive and automatic inference systems. This mechanism is in line with how developmental psychologists think about the mind: Cognition results from interactions between nature and nurture. Applying a developmental psychology lens to FEBs can shed light on (1) the initial inference systems that feed into resulting FEBs, and (2) how experiences activate and shape specific FEBs. The target article excellently acknowledges the first area, but we suggest that future research considering the second would be profitable.
B&P lay out five systems that underlie FEBs: detecting free-riders, choosing social partners, engaging in communal sharing, creating and affiliating with coalitions, and reasoning about ownership. Recent developmental psychology research provides evidence that components of each of these abilities are present early in development. As example, children care about partiality when evaluating resource distribution (e.g., Liberman & Shaw Reference Liberman and Shaw2017; Shaw Reference Shaw2013), which could be an output of the cheater detection system. Additionally, infants are selective in whom they choose as social partners (e.g., Hamlin et al. Reference Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom2007; Kinzler et al. Reference Kinzler, Dupoux and Spelke2007; Mahajan & Wynn Reference Mahajan and Wynn2012) and form expectations about which people will engage in positive social relationships (e.g., Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Kinzler and Woodward2014), indicating active psychologies for partner choice and coalitional affiliation. Indeed, evidence suggests that the relevant inference systems that underlie FEBs evolved early in human phylogeny and ontogeny, and emerged before (and outside of) markets (sect. 4.1).
Although the inference systems that support FEBs are early emerging and likely universally present, FEBs themselves are neither consistent nor coherent. That is, different people can hold different FEBs, and a person can hold seemingly contradictory FEBs. As B&P assert, “The beliefs in question may well vary between social classes, cultures, age-groups, and so on” (sect. 2.1, para. 10).
We argue that understanding how people go from A (inference system) to B (FEB) and how this developmental trajectory unfolds in different contexts – how social class, culture, and age-group impact upon thinking – will be important going forward. Although research by developmental psychologists and behavioral economists who study biases in decision-making rarely cross-fertilizes, these fields could be mutually extended to understand how different environments may shape FEBs.
B&P discuss psychological essentialism as an example of how reflexive beliefs can be incoherent. In our view, essentialism also serves as a good case study for understanding how initial inferences and later intuitions that support FEBs may emerge differently in different environments.
For instance, although essentialist beliefs likely arise from elaborating on an adaptive system for categorization, people do not imbue all categories with essences (e.g., Bloom Reference Bloom1996). Indeed, “social essentialism” (essentialist beliefs about groups of people) are more stable for some social categories: Adults' categorization by race (but not gender) can be disrupted when coalitions cross category boundaries (e.g., Kurzban et al. Reference Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides2001), and children develop gender essentialism before racial essentialism (e.g., Rhodes & Gelman Reference Rhodes and Gelman2009). Indeed, the amount that people essentialize the same category can vary based on age and social experience (e.g., Kinzler & Dautel Reference Kinzler and Dautel2012; Pauker et al. Reference Pauker, Ambady and Apfelbaum2010). For example, children from rural and non-diverse environments grow to develop higher levels of racial essentialism (Pauker et al. Reference Pauker, Xu, Williams and Biddle2016; Rhodes & Gelman Reference Rhodes and Gelman2009). We hypothesize that this variation is due to children having an inference system for social categorization, where the specific parameters that activate coalitional cognition may vary based on the child's early cultural experiences (e.g., Liberman et al. Reference Liberman, Woodward and Kinzler2017).
Similarly, different experiences may lead to different likelihoods activating the inference systems that underlie a particular FEB. As example, living in a diverse community may decrease activation of cheater-detection mechanisms towards immigrants, whereas living in poverty may increase activation of these same mechanisms (e.g., if poor people perceive immigrants as opponents in a zero-sum competition for resources, see Esses et al. Reference Esses, Dovidio, Jackson and Armstrong2001). Supporting these ideas, people are more in favor of welfare policies for people who are unemployed persons but actively pursuing a job, likely because they do not view such persons as cheaters (Petersen et al. Reference Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides and Tooby2012). Additionally, people who are lower in socioeconomic status, more politically right-wing, and who attend church regularly (van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot1998), and countries that are poorer and have a strong focus on meritocracy (van Oorschot Reference Van Oorschot2006), are more likely to be conditional in terms of who is viewed as deserving of welfare (e.g., by supporting giving to the elderly but not to the unemployed). Therefore, knowledge about a person's social identity, background, and experiences can provide predictive power of which FEBs that person might hold.
Indeed, changing a person's experiences may change their endorsement of a particular FEB. As example, economic stability versus variability could trigger different psychologies (Cosmides & Tooby Reference Cosmides and Tooby1994), such that experiencing prolonged unrest (e.g., a civil war) or an acute disturbance (e.g., a natural disaster) could cause people to be more likely to activate zero-sum reasoning and cheater-detection mechanisms. Even smaller changes could impact FEBs: positive exposure to diversity, or interventions that highlight how poverty is due to systematic structural inequality could make people more supportive of broader welfare policies.
We think that the examples above are very much in line with B&P's argument – for instance, their acknowledgment that reflective FEBs can change rapidly in different sociocultural contexts (sect. 6.2, para 5). We aim this commentary to serve as a call to arms for research to investigate the developmental trajectory by which FEBs may emerge predictably in different early sociocultural environments. Furthermore, the impact of social contexts at different points in ontogeny may be differentially important.
In sum, although B&P suggest that it is not important to determine whether FEBs are “correct,” they acknowledge that these beliefs have profound political consequences. Thus, understanding how FEBs are activated and revised would have impressive real-world impact. Societies can harness the knowledge gained by investigating the emergence of FEBs across varied developmental factors to construct effective social policies.