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Fear of economic policies may be domain-specific, and social emotions can explain why

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

Avijit Chowdhury  and
Rongjun Yu
Avijit Chowdhury
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, Singapore117570. e0046902@u.nus.edupsyyr@nus.edu.sghttp://www.rongjunyu.org
Rongjun Yu
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore, Singapore117570. e0046902@u.nus.edupsyyr@nus.edu.sghttp://www.rongjunyu.org
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Abstract

People are social animals who value social goods uniquely. In discussions about how economic policies are evaluated by the layperson, it is essential to consider how they may evoke repulsive social emotions such as disgust and anger. We propose that fear of economic policies is not general and that it is specific to items where markets tend to assault certain social values.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e166
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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