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Folk-economic beliefs as moral intuitions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 August 2018

Neil Malhotra
Neil Malhotra*
Affiliation:
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. neilm@stanford.eduwww.stanford.edu/~neilm
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Abstract

Although Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e179
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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