Over the last decade, a range of international actors has moved away from direct forms of intervention to protect civilian populations in favor of “bottom-up” approaches that emphasize external support for civilian self-protection (CSP). While this indirect action is often perceived to be less costly, more legitimate, and potentially more effective, we argue that external support for CSP is a “risky business” that presents a significant dilemma for international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Drawing on literature from sociology, economics, and civil war studies, we conceptualize and categorize the risks of unintended consequences that could accompany external support for CSP and suggest why they are likely to arise in this context. We then empirically explore whether and how these risks manifest with an in-depth study of four purposively selected organizations supporting CSP in their programming. We also assess whether and how organizational type matters for the prevalence of these consequences and how the risk of their occurrence is managed. Our analysis shows that, across a range of conflict settings, all four organizations encountered unintended consequences of three main kinds: increased vulnerability and insecurity for local communities, challenges to organizational mandates and values, and strained relations with key protection stakeholders. International actors supporting CSP thus confront the dilemma of seeking to enhance their effectiveness and legitimacy by “localizing” protection, but potentially create new challenges and perverse effects and/or compromise their organizational identity in the process. While this dilemma is inherent in all external protection assistance, our study highlights the importance of actor embeddedness: organizations that are more proximate to the communities they work with are in a better position to minimize these unintended consequences and manage the risks associated with supporting CSP. These findings contribute to ongoing debates about civilian protection in comparative politics, international relations, and humanitarian studies, but also offer concrete insights for practitioners engaged in support for CSP. More broadly, our study could have implications for other policy areas where the legitimacy of so-called top down approaches is being questioned and where these approaches are giving way to the empowerment of local actors and processes.

That someone like me could serve as president of the American Political Science Association is a testament to one story about America. It is a story of success that we celebrate, even as such stories erase and conceal other stories about the United States.

Where, when, and why do civilians organize during war? We propose a research agenda that expands the scope of variation in civil organizing and identify mechanisms to explain its emergence and evolution. Drawing on a large-scale original dataset of public Facebook posts produced by Syrian organizations from 2011 to 2020 and qualitative case studies based on 10 months of field research among Syrian activists in Turkey and Jordan, we systematically examine geographic, temporal, and substantive variation in civil organizing. We find that civil organizing can persist in the face of ongoing violence and displacement, focusing not only on concerns of protection and survival, but also on governance and even contentious politics. This organizing increasingly shifts from within Syria to border states, with translocal organizations—operating both inside and outside Syria—playing a particularly active role. This work contributes to literature on conflict processes and contentious politics by emphasizing the importance of organizations, centering refugees and civilians as agential and strategic actors, and using novel evidence to describe variation in wartime organizing over time and space.

After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) issued new domestic rules across a variety of financial services. Different politics and policy-making processes generated regulatory incompatibilities, and conflicts emerged as each side insisted the other adapt to its approach. Yet our original data covering eleven sub-sectors show that in a predominant cluster of cases, the two jurisdictions had by 2020 made adjustments and adopted integrationist regulation, which fosters cross-jurisdictional interoperability for financial companies through harmonization (increasing similarity and compatibility) or deference (accepting the regulation of other jurisdictions). The pattern has broad and surprising implications for the future of global finance in an era of rising economic nationalism and populist politics. Why, then, did Washington and Brussels move beyond the standoffs? What accounts for the integrationist turn? Our novel explanation features a “mutual accommodation” causal mechanism driven by the development in both jurisdictions of “border-policing” capacities, builds on a new generation of IPE research that is attentive to complexity and temporal process in accounting for global governance outcomes, and provides a pathway for qualitative researchers seeking to balance many new methodological and transparency demands.

Do populist governments bend their economic policies to the preferences of bondholders? Populist governments should be a “least likely” case for the market discipline hypothesis. Populist parties typically run on platforms that scapegoat wealthy elites as “enemies of the people” and hence should be more resistant to changing policy positions in the face of market pressure, given their reluctance to alienate their base. Employing most-different case studies of the Five Star Movement/Lega coalition in Italy and Viktor Orbán’s government in Hungary, we find that populists do bend to market pressure but that this “disciplining effect” does not stem primarily from foreign investors. Rather, it was the inaction of domestic investors in bond auctions that caused these governments to reverse course on headline economic policies. Because domestic investors served as both governments’ “buyers of last resort,” they needed to maintain their favor amidst foreign capital flight.

More autonomous humanitarian international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) have greater capacity to determine who receives aid among conflict- and crisis-affected populations than their donor-following counterparts. The latter are more likely to become instruments of states seeking geostrategic influence in places like Syria and Ukraine. Drawing on more than 120 interviews with INGO and donor agency workers, 10 months of political ethnography among INGOs working with refugees in Lebanon and Jordan after the war in Syria, and content analysis of organizational documents, this article investigates the ways that INGOs secure autonomy from donors. In a theory-building exercise, it introduces the concept of negotiation experience to explain why some INGOs develop skills and strategies that allow them to resist donor demands. It also identifies some of the tactics used by experienced negotiators to do so. The findings have implications for who controls and is accountable for humanitarian policy and practice, as well as the abilities of state donors to influence humanitarian behavior. They call into question expectations that INGOs “scramble” for funds under conditions of funding scarcity.

Monetary and financial integration has been shown to increase the pressure on states to liberalize social and labor market policies. If structures do not come with instruction sheets, how do monetary regime pressures translate into policy? Through a case study of the euro area, we show that central banks play an underappreciated role in this process. Using mixed methods to analyze a large amount of data, including the complete corpus of speeches, we trace the evolution of the European Central Bank’s advocacy for structural reforms between 1999 and 2019. To explain the ECB’s activism in a policy area beyond its mandate, we theorize the ECB as navigating a dilemma between governability and legitimacy. Handed a monetary regime under which flexible labor markets were seen as a condition for governability, the ECB saw no alternative but to push governments toward structural reforms, despite the reputational risks. The ECB ended its advocacy when increasing political backlash coincided with a structural regime shift from an inflationary to a deflationary environment.

While a growing number of refugees is in need of humanitarian protection, most states are reluctant to admit them. For more than two decades, scholars have thought to understand this intricate challenge of international governance through the prism of collective action theory and the concept of refugee protection as an international public good. However, the specific benefits that states gain from refugee protection and that are assumed to constitute the public good remain surprisingly vague and under-specified. In this Reflection, we make three contributions to address this issue. First, we take stock of the literature and assess the evolution of the collective action theory in asylum governance. Second, we identify and conceptualize legitimacy, security, reputation, and development as four types of benefits that states derive from refugee protection. Third, we discuss the limitations of the dominant rational-choice approach and contend that the nature of refugee protection in the international realm is the product of international and domestic politics based on the contestation of interests and norms. These insights result in a series of recommendations for future research of refugee protection as a collective action problem.

Russia’s 2014 seizure of parts of Ukraine, notably the Crimean Peninsula, set in motion a flurry of legal activity. Ukraine’s “lawfare” strategy, which aims to fight Russia via international legal means, included explicit encouragement of Ukrainian investors to file disputes under the Ukraine-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty. We consider the resulting Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) arbitrations, the first instances of ISDS in which state parties to the treaty are actively engaged in armed conflict. Although Ukrainian actors have consistently won at ISDS arbitrations, Ukraine moved to formally withdraw from the treaty a year after the full-scale Russian invasion of 2022. Developments before and since the invasion point to the diverging interests between commercial actors and their home states, the weakness of ISDS as a tool during wartime, and a reconsideration of treaty-based commitments to international investor protections. We highlight the implications of these events for several literatures in international relations.

Animals routinely suffer violence by humans, especially during war, but it is unclear how much people in conflict environments express concern for animal welfare. Based on a 2,008-person survey in Ukraine in May 2024, we find that respondents are anthropocentric, prioritizing human over animal suffering; biocentric, regarding both as important; or, in a small minority, zoocentric, emphasizing animal over human suffering. Experimental priming on violence against animals during the Russia–Ukraine war has limited effect on changing attitudes toward animal welfare, but it does increase resource allocation to animal relief organizations. A war crimes punishment experiment also shows that while respondents sanction perpetrators of human suffering more severely than perpetrators of animal suffering, violence against animals is still strongly penalized, indicating appreciation for animal rights, justice, and accountability. We reflect on the implications of our findings for speciesist versus posthumanist understandings of suffering during war.

In the age of post-neoliberal globalization, complex interdependence has resulted in the integration of many economies and the industries within them and led to varied national and subnational political and economic responses. These forces have enabled the rise of a new political economy that requires the contextualized comparative sector approach (CCSA). This article advances a research agenda that contends theoretical and empirical leverage for explaining heterogeneity and assessing generalizability is gained by taking contextualized comparisons to the sector level of analysis. The CCSA identifies the multidimensional effects of sectors, uncovering new sites of inquiry connected to sectoral structural attributes, context-specific sectoral organization of institutions, and social and political constructions of sectors. Sectors are thus contexts that are embedded in multilevel contexts involving state and nonstate actors alike. Scholarship on industrial policy, technology and innovation, environmental transition, and regulation and governance demonstrates the analytical power and theoretical value of combining contextualized comparisons and sectoral analysis, which have been overlooked by the overly macro- or micro-level studies dominant in international and comparative political economy. The various strategies of the approach and a stepwise discussion of a research design underscore the possibilities for theory development and testing, adjudication of competing explanations, and case-specific discoveries.

The political status of Washington, D.C., is a longstanding question in American political thought. Intervening in that debate, I argue that Washington, D.C. deserves democratic equality. Democratic equality entails that, at a minimum, D.C. residents should have the power to vote for representatives in national and local legislatures (like residents of the several states), that their vote should have equal weight to others, and that D.C.’s elected legislative representatives should have power to vote on what the law is. This ideal of democratic equality for D.C. is only possible via D.C. statehood. Drawing on original archival research, the article provides a historical overview of D.C.’s democratic disenfranchisement, outlines three principal forms of democratic inequality faced by D.C. residents, and imagines what democratic equality for D.C. might look like. It concludes by sketching a broader research agenda about the democratic injustices accorded to those Americans living outside the several states.

In communities throughout Latin America, criminal organizations provide basic order and security. While multidisciplinary research on criminal governance (CG) has illuminated its dynamics in hundreds of site-specific studies, its extent remains understudied. We exploit novel, nationally representative survey data, validated against a compendium of qualitative sources, to estimate CG prevalence in 18 countries, and explore its correlates at multiple levels. Overall, 14% of respondents reported that local criminal groups provide order and/or reduce crime, corresponding to some 77–101 million Latin Americans experiencing CG. Counterintuitively, CG is positively correlated with both respondents’ perceptions of state governance quality and objective measures of local state presence. These descriptive results are consistent with multiple causal pathways, including case-specific findings that state presence—rather than absence—drives criminal governance. We offer suggestions for both more precise data collection on CG itself and, given its pervasiveness, its inclusion in broader research on economic development, demography, and politics.

Indigenous communities have long been marginalized and underrepresented in democracies, yet we know little about how publics evaluate Indigenous people who are thinking of running as candidates. Using two experimental surveys with nationally representative samples of Australian adults, we examine how citizens assess the personality traits of eight women and men who are interested in running for office. All eight have identical biographies, other than the fact that they are from White, Chinese, and both dark-skinned and light-skinned Indigenous Australian backgrounds. Surprisingly, we find an inverted hierarchy of bias, moderated by respondent ideology, in which darker-skinned Indigenous potential candidates fare better than all others. Although this may be due to a positive violation of expectations, our results have implications for theories about how people view Indigenous and ethnic minority aspirant politicians. They also point to the need for further research globally into how the public and parties evaluate Indigenous candidates.

This article examines how drug gangs establish commitments of silence (CS) with communities in Montevideo, Uruguay. CS involve tacit agreements through which communities exchange silence—that is, not reporting illicit gang activities to the authorities—for gang-provided tranquility, thus ensuring relative stability. Unlike previous research that has focused on contexts of low state presence, this study explores a context, Montevideo, with higher state presence, emphasizing the increased importance of CS when states can receive reports of criminal activity and respond; that is, in low-corruption and high-capacity settings. Gangs use various methods from forced violence to negotiated loyalty to secure community silence. I argue that the structure of local reciprocity networks, characterized by long-term exchange ties, influences the type of CS established and determines prevalent strategies for maintaining community silence. Homegrown gang members embed the CS within the community’s existing reciprocity network. The argument is developed through case studies in Montevideo’s Casavalle neighborhood, using a process-tracing design based on interviews, press articles, and historical records to uncover the logics behind drug gang operations and their relationship with the local community.

Reparations for African Americans reflect both material concerns aimed at eliminating the Black–White racial wealth gap and symbolic political aspirations, including the end of structural racism. But do material or symbolic considerations drive policy evaluations across racial and partisan divides? What knowledge and experiences undergird processes through which individuals weigh the symbolic importance of a policy against its actual benefits? Leveraging a set of forty-one in-depth interviews with Black and White residents of Evanston, Illinois—the first municipality in the United States to approve a publicly-funded reparations-related ordinance—we highlight a mechanism through which individuals develop their opinions about reparations: political socialization. Black interviewees linked their understanding of reparations to robust financial compensation while White Democrats viewed their support for Evanston’s policy as symbolic of their longstanding, affective commitments to racial equality. Drawing from these observations, we present a framework highlighting policy attributes that frame how different constituencies respond to reparations-related policies. We test this framework using a conjoint experiment about reparations policies fielded in the 2022 Cooperative Election Study. We find Americans—especially White Republicans—possess less familiarity about reparations and remain strongly opposed to these policies, regardless of the form they take. While White Democrats are more familiar with reparations and more supportive of policies mirroring Evanston’s, Black Americans—those who are most familiar with reparations—support direct cash payments regardless of their political identification.

How does ideology affect relations between armed groups within a state? While existing research has underscored how ideological proximity can foster alliances among armed groups, this article posits that ideological proximity can also breed hostility among them. When organizations share foundational narratives, they gain access to each other’s ideational resources, which can, in turn, pose challenges to these groups’ cohesion and leadership status. These challenges manifest in the form of questioning the sincerity and authenticity of each other’s beliefs, thereby threatening the group’s survival, sometimes overshadowing the risks posed by their shared ideologically distant adversaries. Focusing on Iran’s Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), this article highlights its evolution as one of the first armed groups to transform Islam into a potent ideology before transitioning to Marxism and later reverting to Islamism. It examines how the organization’s ideological proximity with other Islamist and Marxist actors led to conflict and outbidding violence instead of cooperation. Drawing upon a trove of the MKO’s secret documents, this article reveals how a significant portion of the rhetoric and actions of armed groups is directed at outperforming their ideologically similar rivals, rather than confronting ideologically distant adversaries.

Criminal actors are widely assumed to maintain a low profile, exerting power through coercion and clandestine networks. Scholarship addressing public action by criminal actors focuses largely on visible violence. However, an ample empirical record demonstrates that criminal actors also communicate publicly to broad audiences. To better understand this practice, my study focuses on campaigns of narco-messaging in Mexico. I ask: how do criminal actors represent themselves when they speak publicly? How does such self-portrayal interact with other practices of criminal governance and control? I identify three patterns of self-representation: Ruler of territory, Scourge of enemies, and Guardian of people. Overall, public communication expands the repertoires of criminal actors, offering ways to modify public perceptions of better-known practices such as costly signaling through violence. Different representations are deployed strategically in the contexts of establishing regimes of governance, maintaining regimes, and fighting criminal wars.