While climate adaptation has been widely viewed as a local problem, more national government strategies are also needed to achieve more favorable policies. We seek to direct attention to the impacts of national government adaptation policies on attitudes of vulnerable citizens. Specifically, we argue that responses to different forms of climate disaster, such as flooding (as opposed to drought), can more readily reduce citizens’ trust in government. Examining extreme weather victim views in Guatemala, one of the world’s most vulnerable nations, we consider differences in the impacts of flood-related extreme weather and drought-related extreme weather. Using a 2023 national survey with flood and drought over-samples, we show that flood zone respondents, especially those reporting firsthand climate impacts, have a more negative view of government adaptation performance than those suffering “slow harms” droughts which respondents did not as readily attribute to climate change.

Do voters take into account the deaths of family members and close friends when evaluating the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic—particularly when that response is problematic or even negligent—as in the case of Mexico under the Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) administration? Using data from the 2021 Mexican Election Study, this research shows that opposition partisans who lost close friends or relatives to COVID-19 are more likely to evaluate the government’s response to the pandemic negatively. In contrast, National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) partisans do not hold accountable their co-partisan government. They are no more likely to evaluate the government’s response negatively, even when they experience the same losses. Experimental evidence further shows that MORENA partisans do not lower their evaluations of government performance after being informed about the country’s high COVID-19 mortality. They are also more likely to underestimate the number of COVID-19 deaths in the country, even after being presented with official mortality figures. These findings underscore how partisanship can cloud accountability, leading some voters to dismiss objective information and to judge government performance primarily through the lens of partisan loyalty. Partisanship can distort the accountability mechanism at the core of retrospective voting even during a major health crisis.

Why are some legislators more effective than others in fragmented presidential systems? I argue that in Brazil’s fractionalized party system, legislative member organizations (LMOs) supply policy and political information that parties often lack, enabling lawmakers to advance bills. I test this claim using novel legislative effectiveness scores (LESs) for sponsors and rapporteurs in Brazil’s lower chamber. Quantitative results show that LMO affiliation is associated with higher effectiveness, but only in highly structured organizations. Public security LMOs boost both sponsorship and rapporteurship, while agribusiness LMOs increase rapporteurship effectiveness. Weakly organized LMOs show null effects. Party affiliation matters, but parties do not consistently provide information and coordination. Qualitative data identify two mechanisms by which strong LMOs operate: placing aligned members in key positions and leveraging expertise to shape agendas and voting cues. These findings recast effectiveness in Brazil as a function of cross-party informational networks rather than parties alone and identify scope conditions under which LMOs matter in other multiparty presidential democracies.

This article estimates separate individual and partisan incumbencyeffects in Uruguay’s regional elections (1971–2020). It contributes tothe limited evidence on incumbency effects in developing countries andto the emerging Differences-in-Discontinuities (Diff-in-Disc)literature, which addresses endogeneity and disentangles candidatefrom party effects within the same institutional setting. Exploitingconstitutionally mandated term limits and strong electoralenforcement, we identify clean causal effects using close electionsunder open and closed races. Results show a large and statisticallysignificant individual incumbency effect of approximately 74%,alongside non-significant partisan effects. These findings suggestthat incumbency in Uruguay is primarily personal rather thanparty-based. The results contribute to debates on personalization ofpolitics, proportional representation, and institutional developmentin Latin America, highlighting how strong democratic institutions cancoexist with highly individualized electoral dynamics.

Although conditional cash transfers are a cornerstone of Latin American welfare states, little is known about the public opinion dynamics that sustain or challenge their long-term viability. Drawing on original, nationally representative surveys conducted in 2022 in seven Latin American democracies (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru), this article examines public support for cash transfers toward children across three dimensions: existence (yes/no), breadth (who should receive them) and adequacy (benefit levels). Across all countries, we find widespread support for such transfers, challenging the notion that only universal policies can create broad social support. However, preferences for expansion vary significantly across countries, with only partial alignment with existing coverage: support is highest in countries with extensive and minimal program coverage. Logistic regression models reveal that gender and household composition (living with children and being of reproductive age) are strong predictors of individual preferences, in addition to ideology and income. These findings contribute to existing scholarship by highlighting the role of gender and household composition in shaping social policy preferences.

We examine the relationship between partisan social media messages and voters’ support for undemocratic transgressions against the president and Congress. Our survey experiments in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia randomly exposed respondents to partisan messages about contentious and consensus issues such as inflation, abortion, crime, and protests. We then assessed whether these messages increased support for undemocratic transgressions. Our findings reveal distinct inter-party differences: opposition voters were more inclined to support presidential impeachment, while incumbent voters were more predisposed to dissolve Congress. However, contrary to our initial pre-registered hypotheses, exposure to partisan social media messages did not consistently augment these tendencies. This implies that while voters often endorse undemocratic measures in line with their partisan leanings, such preferences are not heightened by exposure to partisan discourse on social media.

How does the form of community dissent shape public support for coercive state policies? This article addresses this question through a vignette experiment on coca forced eradication in Colombia. Participants were randomly assigned to scenarios in which communities either verbally objected to or mobilized against coercive eradication efforts. Exposure to mobilization, compared to verbal objection, reduces support for both unconditional eradication and outright opposition. By contrast, it increases support for eradication conditioned on community consent. These effects are consistent across racial frames, suggesting that the impact of dissent form may transcend ethnic boundaries. We interpret these findings as evidence that visible, organized community dissent can shift public preferences toward more community-centered and conditional approaches. These findings contribute to research on protest, state coercion, and public opinion by showing that the form of dissent shapes support for coercive state interventions.