Competition regulation plays a key role in determining firm size, market structure, and what firms can do with their market power. In this paper, we explore how competition regulation in many countries has largely tolerated rising industry concentration and market power in harmful consumer product industries, which, in turn, has likely facilitated an increase in preventable death and disease associated with such industries (ie. industrial epidemics). One important reason for this tolerance has been the rise of the ‘consumer welfare’ standard, which contends that competition regulators should only focus on a narrow set of concerns mostly relating to consumer price and output. Yet, recent developments shed light on potential avenues through which competition regulation could work more synergistically with public health policies and programmes. While discussions on how to leverage competition regulation along these lines are invariably contested and complex, we argue that it is critical that public health advocates engage with these discussions.

While the literature has largely focused on legal challenges to public healthcare rationing decisions, claims against private insurance companies in voluntary health insurance (VHI) schemes have received less attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by analysing a representative sample of 1,547 court of appeal decisions related to treatment funding claims filed against private insurance companies in Brazil from 2018 to 2021. Courts decided 83.6% of cases in favour of patients, ordering VHI companies to fully fund the claimed treatment. Patients´ rate of success is even higher (96%) in the cases in which insurance companies denied coverage on the grounds that the claimed treatment was not listed in the benefits package mandated by regulation. Court decisions present additional challenges to setting priorities through health technology assessment and explicit packages in the VHI sector. This has broader implications for health care equality and access in Brazil.

The standard analytical framework of insurance markets by Einav and Finkelstein (EF) focuses on the problem of welfare loss for low-risk individuals. A key assumption of this framework is that demand and cost curves are tightly linked, meaning that people are willing to pay a price equal to their expected cost plus a risk premium. Using data from the German risk-adjustment system we show that the distribution of expected health care costs is extremely skewed. We show that incorporating the extreme skewness of predictable individual health care expenses in the EF framework has important welfare consequences, which are typically overlooked when using this framework for analysing the negative welfare effects of voluntary health insurance markets with asymmetric information. Rather than the welfare loss of low-risk individuals due to underinsurance, the main problem of voluntary health insurance markets is the welfare loss of high-risk individuals not getting access to health insurance and affordable health care. We discuss that among the policy approaches to reduce this problem, mandatory health insurance with mandatory cross subsidies is likely to be the most effective, which is typically not recognised when focusing primarily on the welfare loss for low-risk individuals.

In health care systems based upon the principles of managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care. Consumers are expected to switch between insurers based upon the performance of insurers in this role. Yet, the Dutch experience shows that trust of consumers in health insurers is low and that switching consumers focus primarily on price. The question arises if consumers do in fact perceive and trust insurers as prudent buyers of care. We addressed this question by using a mixed-method approach. The results show that most people know that insurers buy health care and feel that the purchasing tasks suit their role. They even have reasonable, though fragile, trust in the purchasing competencies of the insurer. However, the results also revealed that consumers have insufficient information to cast a judgement about insurers as purchasers and incorrectly think that insurers are commercial organisations. Hence, improving the public information about insurers and their purchasing role seems to be crucial. Given the inherent complexity in the system, it remains to be seen if this objective can be reached in the (near) future. For that reason, policymakers should also consider additional measures to encourage that insurers will take integral purchasing responsibility.

In the Dutch health care system of regulated competition, health insurers are assigned the crucial role of prudent purchasers and expected to critically contract providers based on the quality and prices of their services. Thus far, however, these organisations have struggled to fulfil this role. This study sheds new light on the purchasing behaviour of Dutch health insurers. We examine how insurers perceive the context in which the value-based purchasing of hospital care should take shape, and we draw on insights from institutional theory to frame our analysis. Our findings are based on a series of semi-structured interviews (n = 18) with employees and representatives of several insurer companies whose combined market shares add up to over 90 per cent of all premium payers. Our analysis highlights an environment in which market mechanisms are tangled up with historically rooted budgeting practices, where insurers are pressured to sustain rather than critique hospitals, and where self-regulating medical professionals are firmly supported by society’s deep-seated belief in the quality of their services. Like many other organisations, Dutch health insurers tend to conform to their institutional environment. While this conformity may aid them in organisational stability and survival, it also restricts their ability to purchase prudently.

This article discusses the results and prospects of the market reform in Dutch health care which came into force in 2006. Attention is paid to the results of the health insurance reform, the experience with the shift from passive to active purchasing and the impact of the reform on healthcare provision and cost control respectively. Other topics discussed are the consequences of the reform for administrative costs, institutional trust in health insurance, and the power balance in health care after reform. The central message is that the high expectations of the market reform have not come true. Dutch health care features a high degree of hybridity and there are indications that the system is becoming ever more hybrid: the system operates much less market-like than the market frame suggests. Currently, the policy narrative on the reform is changing. Policymakers and policy documents underscore the need for cooperation in provider networks and more state direction. The Dutch experience with health care reform illustrates the pendulum theory. After a period of a belief in competition and less state direction the pendulum in policymaking swings back to a belief in cooperation and a pro-active role of the state.