Captivity, migration, and labor markets—rather than “civilizing” missions or anarchic state evasion—defined the southwest frontier of the Ming Empire. Reframing James C. Scott’s Zomia thesis, this article shows that communities in the inhospitable highlands did not simply flee the Ming state; they competed with it by acquiring people, labor, and expertise. Obtained via forceful capture, targeted recruitment, or voluntary defection, some newcomers were valuable for their manual labor, others for their military or reproductive capacities or knowledge of statecraft. This article uses two case studies to illustrate this labor economy. Duzhang, initially acephalous, turned to regime-building through large-scale raiding in the sixteenth century, absorbing Han and non-Han captives and defectors who supplied it with skills and legitimacy. Bozhou, long ruled by tributary chieftains (tusi), drew willing Han migrants and advisers; the Ming countered not just with arms but with litigation, weaponizing law to fracture the Bozhou polity before the decisive war of 1599–1600 that ended with its “barbarization.” Across the frontier, Miao mercenaries leveraged their military prowess to secure valuable resources like land, women, and silver from the highest bidders. The result was a hybrid political field where coercion and consent were blurred, migration surged, and rival regimes—imperial and indigenous—vied fiercely for control of human labor. Ming imperial expansion emerges not as an inevitable conquest but as a pragmatic, improvised, and contingent reaction to relentless competition for labor at its margins.