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Concepts, core knowledge, and the rationalism–empiricism debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 June 2024

Eric Margolis Open the ORCID record for Eric Margolis [Opens in a new window]  and
Stephen Laurence Open the ORCID record for Stephen Laurence [Opens in a new window]
Eric Margolis*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada eric.margolis@ubc.ca https://philosophy.ubc.ca/profile/eric-margolis/
Stephen Laurence
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Hang Seng Centre for Cognitive Studies, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK S.Laurence@sheffield.ac.uk https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/philosophy/people/academic-staff/stephen-laurence
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

While Spelke provides powerful support for concept nativism, her focus on understanding concept nativism through six innate core knowledge systems is too confining. There is also no reason to suppose that the curse of a compositional mind constitutes a principled reason for positing less innate structure in explaining the origins of concepts. Any solution to such problems must take into account poverty of the stimulus considerations, which argue for postulating more innate structure, not less.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e137
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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