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Core knowledge, visual illusions, and the discovery of the self

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 June 2024

Marlene D. Berke Open the ORCID record for Marlene D. Berke [Opens in a new window]  and
Julian Jara-Ettinger
Marlene D. Berke*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA marlene.berke@yale.edu; julian.jara-ettinger@yale.edu marleneberke.github.io; compdevlab.yale.edu
Julian Jara-Ettinger
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA marlene.berke@yale.edu; julian.jara-ettinger@yale.edu marleneberke.github.io; compdevlab.yale.edu
*
*Corresponding author.
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Abstract

Why have core knowledge? Standard answers typically emphasize the difficulty of learning core knowledge from experience, or the benefits it confers for learning about the world. Here, we suggest a complementary reason: Core knowledge is critical for learning not just about the external world, but about the mind itself.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 47 , 2024 , e122
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

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