International trade occupies a prime place in the economies of all countries. Developing countries are particularly eager to promote their trade with a view to earning much-needed foreign exchange for financing imports of the latest technology, scientific know-how and sophisticated goods and services from economically and industrially advanced countries. Apart from economic factors, which are no doubt important, the development of international trade on a sustained and enduring basis primarily depends on the confidence and familiarity of international traders with the commercial, legal and arbitration systems of the countries of their trading partners. It is also essential to ensure the proper and timely execution of trade contracts without disputes or disruption in the best interests of the business community. Different countries have differing legal and arbitration systems. Conflict of laws and disparities in the dispute settlement procedures in different jurisdictions have posed practical hurdles in the way of the smooth and swift flow of international trade. Therefore, efforts have been made time and again at the international level to overcome such difficulties and problems through harmonisation and unification of arbitration law and procedures in different parts of the world.

Arbitration establishes a web of contracts between the parties, arbitral institutions and arbitrators. International arbitration cases involve private commercial disputes and arbitral decisions are not binding on third parties.

While Donald Trump's ruthless, reckless, aggressive, multi-pronged assaults are threatening American democracy in unprecedented ways, India nevertheless stands out when viewed against broader trends of democratic backsliding (Haggard and Kaufman 2021). Since 2014, liberal democracy in India has come under increasing pressure from Hindu nationalism. Commentators and scholars who are sympathetic to liberal democracy express grave concern, if not alarm, about the state of Indian democracy: ‘The blaze is at our door’ (A. Roy 2022) and ‘The Hindu Rashtra [Hindu Nation] is … indeed underway’ (Jaffrelot 2019a, p. 64). One writes that ‘India's Democracy Is Dying’ and notes that democracy watch organizations now classify India as a ‘hybrid regime’, an ‘electoral autocracy’ or a ‘flawed democracy’ (Tudor 2023).

Electoral democracy remains intact in India, but civil freedoms, minority rights, and institutional constraints on executive power have been substantially weakened (Varshney 2022), and ‘India's standing as an inclusive, diverse nation with an independent judiciary, rule of law and free media was degraded’ (Patel 2021, p. 460).

During the past decade, prime minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government has ‘tethered religious nationalism to right-wing populism’ (Basu 2021, p. 278) and prioritized Hindu nationalism over the Indian constitution, as ‘an ideology that promotes the idea that Hinduism is the authentic religious and cultural identity of the Indian people’ (Yilmaz and Morieson 2023, p. 185). ‘The BJP has thus moved Hindutva beyond right-wing nationalism and toward a civilisational struggle between Hindus and “others”’ (ibid., p. 198).

Hindu–Muslim antagonism is one of the main, if not the main, features of the Sangh Parivar's politics. For a long time, this antagonism was considered merely in religious terms. Despite the presence of extensive literature on the economic features and implications of contemporary Hindutva (Bobbio 2017; Chacko 2019; Desai 2011; Gopalakrishnan 2009, 2006; Iwanek 2014; Karat 2014; Kaul 2017; Kumar 2018; Nanda 2011; Patnaik 2019; Saxena and Sharma 1998; Siddiqui 2017; Sinha and Nayak 2021; Spodek 2010), there is a widespread tendency among scholars to consider the Hindu–Muslim rivalry as connected to identity, religious, or communal factors. This chapter aims to prove that an intimate connection between communal and economic factors existed from the colonial period and that communal strife was not determined by religious but by economic causes. It adds to Gyanendra Pandey's (1999) masterly demonstration of how the British constructed communalism by leveraging economic forces. However, Pandey examines only the economic and social transformations brought about by colonization, but does not consider the interrelation between economic and identity factors as part of the colonial game that I foreground in this chapter.

The chapter explains how the British colonizers deliberately targeted Muslim rulers, who throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were the main political and economic competitors of the East India Company (EIC), and that, in order to undermine the powers of the Muslim rulers, they implemented both economic and cultural devices, as well as military and political ones.

The Congress Medical Mission to Malaya was the last Indian non-state relief initiative that was sent abroad to provide humanitarian aid during late colonial rule and in the early postcolonial years. Whereas South Asian humanitarian initiatives had provided comprehensive aid for Indian and Allied soldiers at various fronts during the world wars and had given assistance to war victims in China and Malaya, the summer of 1946 became a turning point for their work when in mid-August, Calcutta was ravaged by the communal violence that broke out between Hindus and Muslims. Trapped in the riotous city for a few days was Dr C. Siva Rama Sastry, who was part of the Congress Medical Mission that had just returned from Malaya. When Sastry was finally able to return home to south India, he had to leave all his belongings behind.

After the so-called Great Calcutta Killings, the violence spread throughout British India, leading to riots and massacres in East Bengal, Bihar, Bombay, the United Provinces, Punjab and in other places before reaching its climax with partition. The end of colonial rule with the formation of two new nation states, India and Pakistan, in August 1947, was accompanied by large-scale violence that may have caused up to 1 million deaths and led to the displacement of approximately 12 million people.3 The unfolding humanitarian catastrophe in South Asia, however, did evoke a mixed international response. Several non-state humanitarian organisations from around the globe forwarded aid in cash and kind; some also sent relief workers to South Asia or already had volunteers on-site.

With the removal of boundaries and consequent flourishing of free trade and commerce, arbitration has become the most important method of dispute resolution in international transactions. Bolstered by international conventions, arbitration is now seen as more effective than litigation before a national court. Commercial arbitration, whether national or international, has different features when compared to litigation in ordinary courts. It enables the parties to exercise a high degree of control over the proceedings, terms of reference and composition of the tribunal. In its role as an alternative to national courts, arbitration has proved to be considerably successful. Parties entering into economic agreements often include arbitration clauses in their contracts to ensure that any dispute can be resolved without recourse to expensive and time-consuming litigation. The significance of the study of commercial arbitration, especially international commercial arbitration, lies in the fact that in the contemporary world of changing economic dimensions, it has become a sophisticated mechanism for consensually dealing with international disputes. Beyond its practical importance, international arbitration is worthy of attention because it involves a framework of international rules and institutions. With remarkable success, this provides a fair, neutral, expert, durable and efficient means for resolving difficult transactional problems. These rules have evolved over time in multiple countries through the joint efforts of governments and large corporations. The driving and dominant force of international commercial arbitration comes from a number of factors.

That the decade of untrammelled power Narendra Modi enjoyed before losing his majority in his 2024 victory so humiliatingly represented a new phase in the ruinous advance of Hindutva is clear. What is less clear is where the novelty lies. For some, it lies in the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) parliamentary majority, the first for any party since 1984; the centrality of Modi's personality; and the combination of populism, nationalism, majoritarianism, and authoritarianism (Chatterji, Hansen, and Jaffrelot 2019, p. 1). For others, it lies in the Modi regime being a ‘governmental formation with considerable institutional heft that converges with wider global currents and enjoys an unprecedented level of mainstream acceptance’ (Hansen and Roy 2022, p. 1).

These assessments appear staggeringly placid. Under the Modi regime, minorities—Muslims throughout India, Christians in the north-east and Adivasi lands—and dissident intellectuals are systematically persecuted, often to death; working people are assailed by wilfully brutish experiments—demonetization and draconian COVID-19 lockdowns to take the most egregious—leaving lasting damage. Meanwhile, the topmost corporate capitalist class rejoices in sympathetic legislation, light oversight (if any), and aid in foreign operations. To get power and keep it, the government displays ‘unprecedented’ and ‘sweeping disregard for the constitution’, particularly its federalism (Savera 2019), and razes political institutions—the Supreme Court, the Central Vigilance Commission, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)—with the bulldozer of its parliamentary majority.

Motivated by the advantages of arbitration over ordinary litigation before the domestic courts, countries across the world have started to reach a consensus to ensure uniform principles for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards under the guidance of the UNCITRAL. At the same time, it should be noted that the arbitration process is not free from certain inherent legal issues. Unlike domestic arbitration, international arbitration involves issues related to different countries. Generally, international arbitration rules permit the parties to choose the substantive law that will govern their disputes. The legality of the arbitral award mainly depends on the propriety of the law applied. A detailed study on the legality of arbitral awards and the scope of challenging awards based on legality is taken up in this chapter. The chapter further analyses the fairness of arbitral awards and the court's power to determine the validity of an arbitral award as regards its fairness. The illegality of arbitral awards as a ground for challenge mainly revolves around the issue of choice of law; which law is to be made applicable to the arbitration of a particular dispute has many a time become a serious question for arbitrators. A situation may arise when parties fail to agree on the law to be applied in an international commercial arbitration; then the tribunal will have to identify a law that suits the intention of the parties. The process of this choice presents a significant problem. Even when the parties have chosen a law for arbitrating their dispute, a question may arise as to whether the tribunal has made use of it properly. Here the problem of interpretation of the law will come into play.

Ambrose of Milan’s funerary oration for Valentinian II (392 ce) confronts violence, civil war, and imperial authority, ultimately redefining the emperor’s body as a collection of relics. The oration’s ambiguity regarding the circumstances of Valentinian II’s premature and violent death was not merely a matter of political expediency; it also served as a rhetorical strategy to support Ambrose’s innovative treatment of the emperor’s corpse. By weaving passages from the Song of Songs into his oration, Ambrose evoked imagery resonant with same-sex desire, while presenting himself as the emperor’s guarantor – but in his very own way: as a “womanly” father and a lover mourning his beloved. In portraying Valentinian II as a selfless soldier-martyr, Ambrose rehabilitated an emperor who may have died by suicide and without the sacrament of baptism, while also redefining key imperial virtues at a time when they – and the empire – faced mounting challenges from both internal and external forces.

Introduction

In an essay written some twenty-five years ago, Indian thinker Ashis Nandy describes popular Indian cinema as ‘the slum's point of view of Indian politics and society and, for that matter, the world’ (Nandy 1998, p. 2). The slum, a term for the urban lower-class settlements that constitute a significant portion of the landscape of every major Indian city, embodies the complexities of Indian society. It both aspires to and contrasts with the genteel urbanity of the upper-middle classes who are physically proximate to but separate from their slum-dwelling compatriots. The slum carries in it something of the rural and village worlds of migrants who make their home in it. It represents the profound social dislocation and alienation wrought by Indian modernity upon large sections of its population as well as new kinds of social relations that emerge as a result of these shifts and disruption. A physical space inhabited by Indian lower-middle classes and emerging middle classes but also a symbol of their aspirations, the slum is the beating heart of Indian political life. Nandy argues that the ‘passions of, and the self-expressions identified with, the lower-middle class—for that matter, the middle class as a whole—now constitute the ideological locus of Indian politics’ (ibid., p. 6). Inasmuch as it is a kaleidoscopic portrayal of the universe of the slum, Indian popular cinema, then, far from being an escapist fantasy or irrelevant lowbrow art, is an essential cultural form encapsulating the central concerns of Indian political and social life.