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I address an overlooked question about the structure of the cognitive/conative model of the mind that underlies much of the work in economics, psychology and philosophy: namely, whether conative states are fundamentally monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like). I argue that two seemingly promising sets of theoretical considerations – namely, the structure of Rational Choice Theory, and considerations of computational efficiency – are unable to resolve this debate. Given this, I suggest that a consideration that speaks in favour of the preference-based view is the fact that it makes it easier to explain certain empirically observed patterns in decision making.
We propose to strengthen Popper’s notion of falsifiability by adding the requirement that when an observation is inconsistent with a theory, there must be a ‘short proof’ of this inconsistency. We model the concept of a short proof using tools from computational complexity, and provide some examples of economic theories that are falsifiable in the usual sense but not with this additional requirement. We consider several variants of the definition of ‘short proof’ and several assumptions about the difficulty of computation, and study their different implications on the falsifiability of theories.
This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion is much more generally applicable than Schubert's criterion of ‘opportunity to learn’.
Climate change is a global environmental problem which has been addressed primarily at the multilateral level. However, national, supranational, and even subnational action on the issue has also sprung up. At the subnational level, California (United States) and Acre (Brazil) offer an interesting example of how domestic policies may be linked in order to address climate change. Based on a memorandum of understanding concluded in 2010, these two states have been working towards the possible linkage of their respective climate change policies, in essence providing a pathway for using emissions offset credits that are generated in Acre through reductions of forest-based emissions in the Californian cap-and-trade programme. Taking into account that this is an ongoing process, this commentary provides a general overview of the issue from the perspective of international law.
Why do some countries adopt constitutional environmental rights while others do not? This article uses qualitative content analysis of interviews conducted in Kathmandu (Nepal) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) to analyze the cases of Nepal, which adopted a constitutional environmental right in the 2007 Interim Constitution, and Sri Lanka, which has not enacted such a right in any of its governing charters. It finds that the presence of a constitutional environmental right in Nepal and the absence of such a right in Sri Lanka can be best explained directly with reference to domestic political conditions and structures, and indirectly in terms of the international normative environment in which the constitution was written. The article outlines a research agenda which focuses on evaluating the impacts of constitutional environmental rights. This research provides important insights into the process of constitutional design in developing states and the translation of international norms in domestic contexts.
This paper examines a metaphonic chain shift in Servigliano (Italo-Romance), in which /ɛ, ɔ/ raise to [e, o] and /e, o/ raise to [i, u] when stressed and followed by inflectional /i, u/. The paper also explores pre-tonic metaphony, whereby /ɛ, ɔ/ raise all the way up to [i, u] when followed by a stressed high vowel. First, an analysis of the data is developed using Optimality Theory with Candidate Chains (OT-CC), taking as a starting point the parallel OT analysis developed in Mascaró (2011). Second, it is shown that OT-CC causes one analytical problem and no gain in terms of economy. On the one hand, the metaphony-triggering constraint Agree(+high,+ATR) proposed in Mascaró (2011) needs to be split into two different constraints, one of which needs a more complicated formulation that requires a conditional clause. On the other hand, positional faithfulness is needed, as in the parallel OT analysis by Mascaró (2011b), to explain the asymmetry between one-step metaphony and fell-swoop pre-tonic metaphony; OT-CC provides no inherent advantage in explaining this asymmetry.
Since the 1990s, a number of local and regional governments around the world have started to engage in a real international or ‘paradiplomatic’ climate agenda. While the multilevel governance approach has advanced the examination of the actors and levels involved in climate governance, there is within this body of literature a limited consideration of the legal capacity of non-state actors to act across scales. This article addresses this gap and examines the potential limitations imposed on subnational diplomacy by international and domestic legal orders. The article draws upon the example of Brazil where, despite constitutional limitations on the involvement of subnational governments in international relations, paradiplomacy has been termed ‘federative diplomacy’ and institutionalized within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and within the Presidency of the Republic. The article shows that the diplomatic activity of local and regional governments is still constrained by international and domestic legal frameworks. If cities and regions are to help in addressing the inadequacies of the international climate regime, then domestic and international legal frameworks will need to further accommodate subnational diplomatic activities.