The integration of gender as a vibrant stream within African historical writing suggests a remarkable success story with many prominent historians and fresh thematics involved. Alongside an interest in subjectivities has emerged vigorous attention to the affective, emotions, and the senses. Why affect has emerged now matters. At the same time, new kinds of intellectual histories are burgeoning in the African field, frequently forwarding an unacknowledged masculinity. With the affective and the intellectual seemingly at odds with each other, it is crucial to seek ways to cross and combine them, while remaining alert to methodological perils and innovative forms.

‘High apartheid’ in the 1960s was marked by intensified efforts to redraw urban areas along racial lines and quash black South Africans' schooling and employment ambitions. The 1953 Bantu Education Act became infamous for limiting African educational opportunities. Yet this article shows how women in Umlazi Township, outside of Durban, schooled their children – despite and indeed because of apartheid's oppressive educational and urban policies. Drawing on oral histories and archival records, it explores the ‘bond of education’, the gendered material-emotional family connections that enabled schooling and resulted from schooling. In the face of increasingly insecure intimate relations, a booming economy, and expanded basic education, mothers' attention to their children's and grandchildren's education grew in importance and scale: education required sacrifices but promised children's eventual support.

We present a new class of models of players’ reasoning in non-cooperative games, inspired by David Lewis's account of common knowledge. We argue that the models in this class formalize common knowledge of rationality in a way that is distinctive, in virtue of modelling steps of reasoning; and attractive, in virtue of being able to represent coherently common knowledge of any consistent standard of individual decision-theoretic rationality. We contrast our approach with that of Robert Aumann (1987), arguing that the former avoids and diagnoses certain paradoxes to which the latter may give rise when extended in particular ways.

This critical note concerns John Broome's book Rationality through Reasoning (2013). Broome claims that rationality amounts to satisfying rational requirements as opposed to responding correctly to reasons. My critique focuses on two issues. First, I try to show that Broome's account of rational requirements, in particular his answer to the so-called ‘symmetry-problem’, presupposes that responding correctly to reasons is part of rationality. Secondly, in discussing Broome's account of reasoning I criticize his claim that first-order reasoning involves no appeal to reasons and, hence, no normative thoughts on behalf of the reasoner.