This article provides an analysis of Turkish trade deficits from the perspective of technology, with particular focus on the period that began with the new millennium. It draws special attention to the technological structure of Turkish exports vis-à-vis Turkey’s major trade partners and illustrates how Turkish trade deficits are primarily structural in nature and essentially caused by weak technology as compared with Turkey’s partners. Turkish products lack competitiveness, particularly in the case of relatively higher technology goods. The future prospects for Turkey are discussed in relation to the present level of the country’s technology infrastructure, and it is emphasized that, if Turkey is to achieve a better trade balance and a prominent share of world exports in the future, merely increasing its business sector’s weak R&D expenditures will not be sufficient, as the country needs also to provide a sufficient number of researchers in order to increase its technological capacity. Moreover, in the case of both R&D expenditures and researchers, quality as well as quantity is required, with the number and quality of the latter in particular being crucial both for innovating and for absorbing foreign technology.

This study concerns how olive oil producers and local bureaucrats in western Turkey use geographical indications (GIs) as a localist strategy to strengthen their position in global markets by challenging conventional agricultural practices. The study employs the disarticulation approach of global commodity chain analysis in order to understand which factors delink people and places from conventional commodity chains/industrial chains and link them instead to GI chains. The results of the study indicate that regional disadvantages—e.g., high production costs due to land characteristics—are the main factor delinking local actors from the conventional olive oil commodity chain. Furthermore, certain dynamic rent opportunities that are related to characteristics of territorial quality and to local cultural characteristics also contribute to the linking of the region and producers to GI chains.

In this essay, I examine Robert Boyle's strategies for making imperceptible entities accessible to the senses. It is well known that, in his natural philosophy, Boyle confronted the challenge of making imperceptible particles of matter into objects of sensory experience. It has never been noted, however, that Boyle confronted a strikingly similar challenge in his natural theology – he needed to make an equally imperceptible God accessible to the senses. Taking this symmetrical difficulty as my starting point, I propose a new approach to thinking about the interconnections between Boyle's natural philosophy and natural theology. For the most part, studies of science and religion in the early modern period work by seeking out the influence of explicitly stated religious beliefs on scientific ideas. I argue, by contrast, that we need to focus on Boyle's representational practices, using his attempts to represent imperceptible entities as a means of uncovering metaphysical and theological presuppositions that he did not always articulate when stating his religious beliefs. With new interpretations of both A Discourse of Things Above Reason (1681) and Some Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection (1675), I show that there were crucial similarities between Boyle's practices for representing both God and atoms. I go on to show, moreover, that Boyle used these practices to enact an ontological stance at odds with one of his most important professed beliefs.

In this symposium on God's Own Ethics, Erik Wielenberg, Kristen Irwin, and Paul Draper raise important criticisms of the arguments of that book. I respond to these criticisms.

I advance three challenges for the view Murphy advances in God's Own Ethics. The first two challenges target Murphy's claim that God does not have requiring reasons to prevent the suffering of rational creatures. I develop two arguments against that position, one based on the intrinsic value of human beings, the other based on the intrinsic badness of the suffering of rational creatures. My third challenge targets Murphy's account of God's contingent love for humanity. I seek to raise doubts about whether Murphy's picture is one in which it is true to say that God loves all human beings.

In God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil, I consider what norms of action we should take to regulate God's agency. I also consider what inferences we should draw about the success of the argument from evil when we consider how an all-powerful, all-knowing agent would be motivated, given the ascription of those norms of action to God. This article is a précis of the main arguments of that book.