In the context of the arrival of Syrians as of 2011 and the subsequent humanitarian assistance received in light of the EU–Turkey deal in 2016, there has been increased control over civil society organizations (CSOs) in Turkey. Through the case study of language education, this paper examines the relationship between the state and CSOs as shaped by the presence of Syrian refugees and how it evolved through the autonomy of state bureaucracy. It demonstrates that increased control led to the proliferation of larger projects, the deterrence of smaller CSOs, and a hierarchy between organizations prioritizing those that are aligned with the state. It argues that this policy is not only the result of the increased lack of trust between state and civil society but also an attempt to channel funds through state institutions to handle an unprecedented number of refugees while externalizing some of its functions. At the same time, this emerging relationship effectively allows the state to avoid making long-term integration policies and facing growing tensions among the public. This study is based on a qualitative study encompassing interviews with state officials as well as stakeholders in different types of CSOs that deliver language education for adults.

Two primary impulses have historically motivated the Iraqi Shi'i juristic establishment in its relations with the Iraqi state. The first, deeply embedded in centuries of Islamic jurisprudence, is to achieve maximum autonomy for the Shi'i community from the state. The second has developed more recently in response to the modern state's efforts to extend its hegemonic control over areas that premodern empires were content either to leave to the jurists to administer or at least to share the administration of with jurists. This is to have the state recognize and implement Shi'i rules within parts of the state infrastructure that are of core interest to the juristic establishment. There is an obvious tension between these two desires, nowhere more evident than in the subject of this article—namely, the law pertaining to the creation, management, and liquidation of the Islamic charitable land trust known as the waqf. On the one hand, Article 43 of Iraq's constitution declares the followers of religions and sects to be “free” in administering the waqfs and their affairs, suggesting a strong desire for autonomy and separation from state control. Yet the implementing legislation for this provision extends the existence of a thick state bureaucracy and hands its administration over to juristic authorities. The ultimate irony of this arrangement is that it subjects juristic forces to far more potential interference as a legal matter than they have ever been subjected to, even during the totalitarian rule of the Ba'ath. In the end, a religious establishment historically deeply suspicious of political rulers and political engagement—indeed, one that defines itself by virtue of its separation from the state—now finds itself deeply and dangerously entangled in state political and administrative affairs. This article explores how this came to be and some of the significant consequences that arise from it.

Responding to recent calls made within the UK Parliament for a government-backed definition of Islamophobia, this article considers the unanticipated consequences of such proposals. I argue that, considered in the context of related efforts to regulate hate speech, the formulation and implementation of a government-sponsored definition will generate unforeseen harms for the Muslim community. To the extent that such a definition will fail to address the government's role in propagating Islamophobia through ill-considered legislation that conflates Islamist discourse with hate speech, the concept of a government-backed definition of Islamophobia appears hypocritical and untenable. Alongside opposing government attempts to define Islamophobia (and Islam), I argue that advocacy efforts should instead focus on disambiguating government counterterrorism initiatives from the government management of controversies within Islam. Instead of repeating the mistakes of the governmental adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)'s definition of antisemitism by promoting a new definition of Islamophobia, we ought to learn from the errors that were made. We should resist the gratuitous securitization of Muslim communities, rather than use such definitions to normalize compliance with the surveillance state.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is conventionally understood as voluntary and market- based corporate behaviour without direct government involvement. The development of CSR in China challenges this understanding in the light of the growing role of government in promoting it. Over the past decade China has demonstrated a state-centric approach towards promoting CSR. Existing studies focus only on Chinese domestic CSR practices. However, with the rise of Chinese companies in Africa under China's ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, it is important to examine how the state-centric approach applies to the overseas CSR practice of Chinese companies. This article aims to fill the literature gap through in-depth interviews and analysis of the Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya. It shows that close institutional, relational, and bureaucratic ties between the state and the business community give the Chinese government the power to influence the behaviour of Chinese state-owned enterprises overseas. The Chinese government can influence the CSR practices of Chinese companies overseas through mandating, facilitating, endorsing and partnering in order to minimize the negative externalities of companies’ overseas activities. However, the state-centric CSR approach limits the space for civil society engagement and the effectiveness of the approach abroad is constrained by a variety of institutional contexts and corporate ownership models.