I argue that direct consequentialism is not rationally believable. I focus on duties of love. Those feelings are so fundamental to us that believing consequentialism creates insanity. For it entails negative judgements not just about our loyal acts, but also about our deepest feelings. If direct consequentialism is true we should be able to believe it and stay sane. But we cannot, so it is not true.

Analyzing the messages and the responses that Chinggis Khan sent to and received from Ong Khan and his allies after his defeat at the hands of the latter at the battle of Qalaqaljit Elet in the spring of 1203, and explicating the terms of cimar (chimar) and törü that appear in the messages, this article looks at the political order and culture where the Chinggisid state rose. The article argues that pre-modern Mongolian and Inner Asian politics was guided by the idea of törü, which resembles the Indo-Buddhist idea of dharma, the Chinese idea of dao, and the European idea of natural law. It also argues that the hereditary divisional system that the Inner Asian state builders regularly employed to govern their nomadic populations, the institutions of dynastic succession, and the hereditary rights of princes and the nobility for inheritance fundamentally structured Inner Asian politics. Hence, it questions the conventional wisdom that depicts pre-modern Inner Asian politics not only as pragmatic, fluid, and fractious but also dependent on the personal charisma of leadership, and the personal bond and loyalty between leaders and followers, as if it were lacking enduring social, political institutions and order.

This article analyzes the special historical characteristics of prefecture-level regional financial administration during the latter half of the Tang Dynasty, which had as its primary revenue source the twice-a-year tax legally established in 780. Prefectural financial administration during this period consisted of three components: the portion of the twice-a-year tax retained by prefectures (liuzhou), “money for public use” (gongyongqian), and the ever-normal and charity granaries (changping yicang). Each of these elements made its appearance at separate times from the Northern Wei to the Sui. Following the establishment of the twice-a-year tax law, they became consolidated as components of prefectural financial administration at the beginning of the ninth century. At the same time, these components of prefectural financial administration became subject to the control of the central government, especially with regard to the “money for public use,” the section over which prefectures exercised the broadest discretion. In the early Northern Song, at the end of the tenth century, all revenue sources (beyond those used to meet obligatory expenses such as the stipends of bureaucrats) came to be retrieved by the central government, and prefectural financial administration came to be placed directly under central control.

In the public debate played out in the media, the financial crisis in Italy is often depicted through a culturalist frame; the country’s difficulties are traced deterministically to an ethos, supposedly widespread among Italians, of amoral familism and a limited sense of civic engagement. This paper illustrates three issues that exemplify the country’s financial problems, and which are often seen through this type of culturalist lens: i) a lack of discipline in managing public finances; ii) a lack of interest in co-operation caused by the excessive importance given to family ties; iii) a lack of agency from the people involved, symbolised by a reluctance to leave home and to adopt an intense pace of work. Considering the relevant literature and various statistics, we show that a culturalist approach helps to spread a stereotyped and misleading view of these three issues. Instead, we suggest that a more accurate reading of the situation, and more stimulating when it comes to public debate, can be obtained by observing the way individuals adapt to the limitations and opportunities of the context in which they operate.