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Drawing on little known archival sources, this work brings to the fore the salience of a schism in the Indonesian communist movement between pro-Moscow loyalists and 'national-communists' reaching back to the 1920s, which survived even the Japanese occupation and surfaced in the throes of the National Revolution (1945-49). At the heart of the rift lay contrasting visions of revolutionary tactics, the salience of Islam in an Islamic majority society, the vexed question of alliance between leftists and other anti-colonial forces, and even the concept and definition of state and national ideology. As such, we cannot ignore the lineages of Marxism in the National Revolution, which trace their roots to the pioneer actions on Java by Dutch communists, themselves influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution. Contrary to the image of a non-revolutionary peasantry and a nationalist leadership broken or tamed by colonial carceral practices, the picture that emerges is one of acute agency on the part of an awoken population at a critical historical moment at the end of World War II.
Traditionally an opposition outfit, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has evolved to become a mainstream operation. A consequential player in Malaysian politics, it now has forty members of parliament and ninety state assembly representatives.
Because of its cadre-based structure, the DAP usually has orderly party elections. Nonetheless, foundational issues have caused some disagreements to bubble to the sur-face - most recently at the 2025 National Party Congress.
Now approaching its sixtieth year, the party is grappling with three key challenges.
The first is the managing of generational change and the fostering of greater inclusiveness. Senior leaders are retiring, not always willingly; and while the party is multiracial in outlook, it has struggled to diversify its leadership.
The second stems from it evolving from having a small group structure into a larger and more complex organization. No longer a uniquely nationally focused party, the DAP's leaders are increasingly nourishing support bases at the state level - shifting power within the party structure outwards and downwards.
The third is the managing of diverse expectations. While much of its support base sees the DAP as the opposition, it is now in government. Navigating within the boundaries of what is politically feasible now calls for a different set of skills.
Thailand's 2023 general election reveals a political landscape undergoing significant transformation, where the traditional Bangkok-versus-countryside political dichotomy has given way to more nuanced urban-rural electoral dynamics unfolding within individual provinces and constituencies.
As urbanization spreads across Thailand, political candidates adapt their campaign strategies to appeal to voters across the urban-rural divide in their constituencies, leveraging the resources and competitive advantages that come with their party affiliation.
Parties with strong ideological stances and popular prime ministerial candidates who took clear positions on political reform performed better in urban constituencies than rural ones. Conversely, parties that specialized in candidate-centred, locally driven campaigns - including vote-canvassing networks - saw greater success in rural constituencies.
A visible trend of ballot splitting emerged in rural constituencies, where voters frequently supported nationally appealing parties like the Move Forward Party (MFP) in the party-list vote but chose local candidates from other parties for constituency seats.
A more urbanized electorate nationwide, combined with rural voters' strategic distinction between national and local preferences, enabled the MFP to win constituency seats outside major cities and secure strong party-list support across the urban-rural spectrum.
A variety of governance forms have emerged in Myanmar's post-coup landscape, bringing together established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) with dynamic new actors from a broad spectrum of elected lawmakers, youth, women and civil society in Myanmar's 'Spring Revolution' against the 2021 coup and military rule.
Experiments with new forms of governance have had varying degrees of success, with wide swathes of territory across the country coming under the control of groups opposed to the State Administration Council (SAC). Governance in non-SAC areas ranges from union-level claims, through regional, township and village tract arrangements. We identify five main types of governance in non-SAC areas: (1) Direct EAO governance - generally an (often benign) one-party state, in the name of a specific ethnic group; (2) Emergent (post-coup) state or area-based governance with more inclusion of civilians and local minorities, in a specific area; (3) Transitional governance arrangements, moving from model 1 to model 2; (4) Local resistance administrations in non-EAO areas - often aligned with the National Unity Government; (5) Indigenous local governance - at organic village/community-level, but also radical initiatives such as the Salween Peace Park in northern Karen State.
These developments have significant implications for democratic practices, national reconciliation and intercommunal relationships in Myanmar, serving as 'bottom-up building blocks' for a new federalism aspired to by many ethnic minority groups.
However, they remain vulnerable to junta attacks and are potentially subject to conflict due to overlapping territorial claims and the unsettled nature of territorial control by competing armed groups.
The concept of political volunteerism in Indonesia differs markedly from that in established democracies. In Indonesia, it is less about civic engagement or strengthening democracy and more about serving as a tool for candidates to mobilize voters and win elections.
The relationship between candidates and their volunteers is reciprocal but often imbalanced, fostering opportunities for patronage within electoral politics.
Volunteers emerge from an electoral system requiring candidates to meet high thresholds to participate. In Indonesia's multiparty system, where most parties fail to meet these thresholds, coalition-building becomes essential as support for the singular candidate.
As a result, candidates often lack strong ties to a party or coalition. Volunteer groups, operating independently from party structures and directly under candidates' control, provide an alternative mechanism for voter mobilization.
The importance of volunteer groups may decline if political parties become more institutionalized, and candidates consolidate support through single well-established parties with significant voter backing.
While much research has explored how perceptions of income inequality influence political outcomes - such as political participation, behaviour, and support for democracy - less attention has been given to how a country's economic and political conditions shape these perceptions. This article argues that economic outlook and political stability play a crucial role in shaping how youths perceive income inequality.
A youth and civic engagement survey conducted by the ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute between August and October 2024 found that Indonesian, Filipino and Thai youths are the most pessimistic about the economic prospects and political conditions of their countries. This bleak outlook aligns closely with their negative perceptions of income inequality.
In contrast, youths in Singapore and Vietnam exhibit higher levels of optimism, underpinned by the strong economic growth and political stability of their countries. These favourable conditions contribute to more positive perceptions of fairness in wealth distribution in their respective countries.
Malaysia, however, presents a more nuanced picture. Despite relatively high levels of income inequality, Malaysian youths remain optimistic about the economic future of the country, revealing a disconnect between economic optimism and perceptions of income inequality.
Overall, this article urges policymakers to address objective measures as well as subjective perceptions of inequality by fostering economic environments and political systems that bolster youth optimism and confidence in equitable development. Ensuring a balanced narrative regarding economic growth and fair wealth distribution is essential for sociopolitical stability in Southeast Asia in the future.
Since Indonesia adopted a direct presidential election in 2004, which applies a one-man, one-vote system, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Muslim organization, has played an increasingly significant role in elections.
Candidates actively develop ties with the organization's leaders and vast voter base to improve their chances of winning elections.
Factors driving the political engagement between Indonesia's presidents and NU are arguably contingent on the dynamics of the existing political situation. Whereas material or transactional factors defined the political engagement between NU and presidents Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, the relationships were driven mainly by ideological factors under the administrations of Soekarno and Joko Widodo.
This article seeks to trace, albeit briefly, the political engagement between Indonesia's presidents and NU throughout the presidencies of Soekarno to Prabowo Subianto. This longitudinal research seeks to give readers a more comprehensive understanding of NU's political engagement with different presidents throughout Indonesia's history.
Youths are becoming an increasingly significant political force in Southeast Asian countries. As a collective, young Southeast Asians aged 18-35 have the potential to exert greater sway over their respective national foreign policymaking landscapes. They will also occupy key positions in their respective countries and societies in the future, thus understanding young Southeast Asian opinion leaders' views on geopolitics can provide valuable insight into the future of foreign policymaking in the region.
Using mixed purposive and open sampling methods, this series of Focus Group Discussions engaged thirty-three youths from the ASEAN-6 countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - between September and October 2024. Semi-structured interview questions and polling methods were used, and the results were aggregated and comparisons made for all age groups found in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey.
The study's findings are fourfold. (1) Mainstream news sources remained the most referred source of information for youth elites. (2) Young Southeast Asian elites had a stronger preference for China over the US when compared to respondents across all age groups in the survey. (3) Japan and India emerged as the top preferred hedging partners for Southeast Asian youth. This stood in contrast to the results of the general survey where the EU emerged as the most preferred choice. (4) Youth elites in the region were deeply concerned about ASEAN becoming an arena for major power competition, the ineffectiveness of the organization, the disunity, and the growing disconnect with the average Southeast Asian citizen.
An escalation of violence in Myanmar has led to a significant loss of territories by the Myanmar junta and reconfigured the country's political terrain. The territories can presently be characterized broadly into Junta-controlled areas with low resistance, junta-controlled areas with high resistance, active armed conflict areas, areas controlled by highly vulnerable non-state armed groups, areas controlled by non-state armed groups that are not as vulnerable, and border areas sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.
Negative concerns originated from the proliferation of armed actors and a growing conflict among non-state armed actors and inter- and intra-communal hostilities, while positive responses are drawn from emerging bottom-up local governing practices.
The SAC has various options. It can intensify repression, it can divide and rule, or it can negotiate settlements on the terms set by the National Unity Government (NUG) and its coalition partners. Any of these could perpetuate the status quo or lead to negotiations that may either revert to civil war or result in further negotiations for 'federal democracy'.
The nature of Myanmar's future territorial and governing landscapes will be determined by the relationships between union-level actors and regional actors, as well as those among regional actors.
Given the many fault lines in Myanmar, domestic and international peace-building efforts will need to focus on fostering a broad coalition for federal democracy and mediating differences among anti-SAC forces, while encouraging local power holders to be more accountable to and sensitive about the needs of populations under their administrations.
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, with a reported membership of between 40 and 162 million, has played an immense role in Indonesian presidential elections. It can be described as a loosely structured organization comprising Islamic boarding schools and autonomous agencies. However, given its vast resources and branches across the archipelago, including a massive budget, NU-affiliated schools, and its representatives in the influential umbrella organization, Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), NU has effectively played both the roles of power broker and community mobilizer. Many senior kiais who serve as NU leaders can influence their followers and sympathizers through sermons and speeches. Given such a context, initiating and maintaining political engagement with NU have been crucial for Indonesia’s presidents if they are to execute their social, political and developmental agendas and guarantee their re-election for a second term or their longevity in power.
Because of their immense number, NU voters have played a crucial role in contributing to a presidential candidate’s victory since 2004. In the 2024 presidential election that secured Prabowo Subianto’s win, they made up at least 40 million, or one-fifth of the 204.8 million registered voters. Among them, more than half (55.8 per cent) voted for Prabowo, while 21.8 per cent and 12.8 per cent voted for Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, respectively. A similar percentage of NU voters (56 per cent) voted for Joko Widodo in the 2019 presidential election, securing his win.
• Since Indonesia adopted a direct presidential election in 2004, which applies a one-man, one-vote system, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization, has played an increasingly significant role in elections.
• Candidates actively develop ties with the organization’s leaders and vast voter base to improve their chances of winning elections.
• Factors driving the political engagement between Indonesia’s presidents and NU are arguably contingent on the dynamics of the existing political situation. Whereas material or transactional factors defined the political engagement between NU and presidents Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, the relationships were driven mainly by ideological factors under the administrations of Soekarno and Joko Widodo.
• This article seeks to trace, albeit briefly, the political engagement between Indonesia’s presidents and NU throughout the presidencies of Soekarno to Prabowo Subianto. This longitudinal research seeks to give readers a more comprehensive understanding of NU’s political engagement with different presidents throughout Indonesia’s history.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
• Traditionally an opposition outfit, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has evolved to become a mainstream operation. A consequential player in Malaysian politics, it now has forty members of parliament and ninety state assembly representatives.
• Because of its cadre-based structure, the DAP usually has orderly party elections. Nonetheless, foundational issues have caused some disagreements to bubble to the surface—most recently at the 2025 National Party Congress.
• Now approaching its sixtieth year, the party is grappling with three key challenges.
• The first is the managing of generational change and the fostering of greater inclusiveness. Senior leaders are retiring, not always willingly; and while the party is multiracial in outlook, it has struggled to diversify its leadership.
• The second stems from it evolving from having a small group structure into a larger and more complex organization. No longer a uniquely nationally focused party, the DAP’s leaders are increasingly nourishing support bases at the state level—shifting power within the party structure outwards and downwards.
• The third is the managing of diverse expectations. While much of its support base sees the DAP as the opposition, it is now in government. Navigating within the boundaries of what is politically feasible now calls for a different set of skills.
Founded in late 1965 and formally registered in March 1966, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) is among Malaysia’s oldest parties. Initially the Malaya-based branch of Singapore’s People’s Action Party, the DAP was formed after Singapore’s exit from the Malaysian Federation. Since its founding, the party has advocated a multiracial and centre-left approach to political issues, as expressed in its first policy document, the Setapak Declaration.
In 1966, the DAP contested in by-elections in Selangor and Johor, and subsequently fielded candidates in the 1969 general election. It has contested in every general election since. In subsequent years, the party had successful forays in the southern part of the peninsula as well as its west coast. But while it also competed in elections in the north, the DAP had limited success in states like Kelantan, Perlis and Terengganu.
During the 1970s, the DAP built up its brand and grassroots network, focusing on issues such as education and language, parliamentary democracy, anti-corruption, and the rights and prerogatives accorded to East Malaysia. The DAP was the first major peninsula-based party to operate in East Malaysia, establishing branches in Sabah and Sarawak in 1978.
The DAP further expanded in the 1980s, with notable successes in the 1986 and 1990 general elections, where it won 24 and 20 parliamentary seats, respectively. However, as with all opposition parties, the party was hampered by Malaysia’s first-past-the-post parliamentary system, which penalizes runners-up. Consequently, it always netted a lower proportion of seats than its share of votes.
The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
S. Rajaratnam, one of Singapore’s core founding fathers and its first Foreign Minister, was a man of ideas, ideals and action. In engaging prose, Irene Ng, bestselling author of the first volume of Rajaratnam’s biography, The Singapore Lion, reveals - as never before - how Rajaratnam changed the course of his country’s history, often by the sheer force of his ideas and will. The second volume, The Lion’s Roar, begins with his struggles during Singapore’s traumatic years in Malaysia from 1963 to 1965. Informed by decades of research, numerous interviews, and access to Mr Rajaratnam’s private and government papers, the book gives new insight into his personality and priorities as he was confronted with Singapore’s sudden independence, which left the island exposed to all the calamities of a vulnerable state.
S. Rajaratnam was one of the most significant and influential founding fathers of modern Singapore. This first volume of Irene Ng’s biography of Rajaratnam gives unparalleled insight into his early life and influences. The riveting story spans his birth in 1915 to Singapore’s independence as part of Malaysia in 1963, arguably the most formative years in his life and also for the nation on the cusp of independence. It traces his family roots in Ceylon and Malaya, his political awakening in London during the Second World War, and his transformation into a crusading journalist and feisty politician in Singapore.