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Onset of schizophrenia commonly occurs during late adolescence or early adulthood and is often characterized by greater symptom severity and impairment.
Objectives
To evaluate the efficacy and safety of lurasidone in the treatment of acute schizophrenia in adolescents and young adults.
Methods
The 4 studies in this pooled analysis used similar study designs. Patients (ages 13-25 years) were randomized to 6 weeks of double-blind, placebo-controlled treatment with once-daily lurasidone (37 mg, 74 mg, 111 mg, 148 mg). The primary outcome was endpoint change in the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) total score; secondary measures included the Clinical Global Impression, Severity scale (CGI-S).
Results
The safety population consisted of 537 patients; 79.1% completed the studies. Treatment with lurasidone was significant (P<0.001) at Week 6 endpoint for change in the PANSS total score, with higher effect sizes (ES) at higher doses (37 mg, 0.53; 74 mg, 0.57; 111 mg, 0.67; 148 mg, 1.35); significance was also observed for change in the CGI-S (37 mg, 0.51; 74 mg, 0.49; 111 mg, 0.57; 148 mg, 1.75). For lurasidone (combined doses), 3 adverse events occurred with a frequency ≥5% (nausea, 13.5%; somnolence, 12.1%; akathisia, 10.1%); 4.8% of patients discontinued due to an adverse event. At LOCF-endpoint, 3.6% of patients had weight gain ≥7%, and 1.5% had weight loss ≥7%. Minimal median changes were observed at endpoint in metabolic lab values.
Conclusions
In adolescents and young adults with schizophrenia, treatment with lurasidone in doses of 37-148 mg/d was a safe, well-tolerated, and effective treatment.
Disclosure
Presenter is an employee of Sunovion Pharmaceuticals Inc. The study summarized in this Abstract was supported by Funding from Sunovion Pharmaceuticals Inc.
In the history of western philosophy, people were often encouraged to seek knowledge by starting from their own minds and proceeding in a highly individualistic spirit. In recent contemporary philosophy, by contrast, there is a movement toward Social Epistemology, which urges people to seek knowledge from what others know. However, in selected fields some people are experts while others are laypersons. It is natural for self-acknowledged laypersons to seek help from the experts. But who, exactly, are the experts? Many people claiming to be experts are not the real thing. How can laypersons identify genuine experts? This essay explores the problems that arise, pointing out some of the mistakes that can be made and how to avoid them.
The aim of this fixed-dose study was to evaluate the efficacy and safety of dasotraline in the treatment of patients with binge-eating disorder (BED).
Methods
Patients meeting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition criteria for BED were randomized to 12 weeks of double-blind treatment with fixed doses of dasotraline (4 and 6 mg/d), or placebo. The primary efficacy endpoint was change in number of binge-eating (BE) days per week at week 12. Secondary efficacy endpoints included week 12 change on the BE CGI-Severity Scale (BE-CGI-S) and the Yale-Brown Obsessive–Compulsive Scale Modified for BE (YBOCS-BE).
Results
At week 12, treatment with dasotraline was associated with significant improvement in number of BE days per week on the dose of 6 mg/d (N = 162) vs placebo (N = 162; −3.47 vs −2.92; P = .0045), but not 4 mg/d (N = 161; −3.21). Improvement vs placebo was observed for dasotraline 6 and 4 mg/d, respectively, on the BE-CGI-S (effect size [ES]: 0.37 and 0.27) and on the YBOCS-BE total score (ES: 0.43 and 0.29). The most common adverse events on dasotraline were insomnia, dry mouth, headache, decreased appetite, nausea, and anxiety. Changes in blood pressure and pulse were minimal.
Conclusion
Treatment with dasotraline 6 mg/d (but not 4 mg/d) was associated with significantly greater reduction in BE days per week. Both doses of dasotraline were generally safe and well-tolerated and resulted in global improvement on the BE-CGI-S, as well as improvement in BE related obsessional thoughts and compulsive behaviors on the YBOCS-BE. These results confirm the findings of a previous flexible dose study.
Dasotraline is a long-acting dopamine/norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor with a PK profile characterized by slow absorption and a t½ of 47-77 hours, permitting once-daily dosing. In a previous flexible dose study, dasotraline demonstrated significant efficacy in the treatment of binge-eating disorder (BED). The aim of this confirmatory fixed-dose study was to evaluate efficacy and safety of dasotraline in the treatment of patients with BED.
Methods:
Patients meeting DSM-5 criteria for BED were randomized to 12 weeks of double-blind treatment with dasotraline (4 mg/d or 6 mg/d), or placebo. The primary efficacy endpoint was change in number of binge-eating days per week at week 12. Secondary efficacy endpoints included changes at Week 12 on the Binge Eating Clinical Global Impression of Severity Scale (BE-CGI-S), the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale Modified for Binge Eating (Y-BOCS-BE), and the proportion of patients with 100% cessation of binge-eating episodes during the final 4 weeks of treatment. Efficacy was assessed using an MMRM analysis (and a logistic regression model for cessation) with a pre-specified sequential testing procedure used to control overall type I error rate.
Results:
A total of 486 were in the ITT population (dasotraline 6 mg/d (N=162), 4 mg/d (N=161), or placebo (N=163). At week 12, treatment with dasotraline was associated with significant reduction in number of binge-eating days per week in the 6 mg/d group vs. placebo (-3.5 vs. -2.9; P=0.0045), but non-significant improvement in the 4 mg/d group vs. placebo (-3.2; P=0.12). Greater improvement was observed vs. placebo for dasotraline 6 mg/d and 4 mg/d, respectively, on the BE-CGI-S (P<0.01 and P<0.03) and the Y-BOC-BE (P<0.001 and P<0.02; all P-values were nominal, not adjusted for multiplicity). The proportion of patients who achieved 4-week cessation of binge-eating episodes was only significant for the dasotraline 6 mg in the completer population (P<0.05; post-hoc analysis) but was not significant for either dose of dasotraline vs. placebo when drop-outs were included in the analysis. The most common adverse events on dasotraline 6 mg/d and 4 mg/d were combined insomnia (early, middle, late), dry mouth, headache, decreased appetite, nausea, and anxiety. Changes in systolic and diastolic blood pressure were minimal. Mean baseline to endpoint changes in supine pulse rate on dasotraline 6 mg/d and 4 mg/d vs. placebo was +6.2 bpm and +4.8 vs. +0.2 bpm.
Conclusions:
In this 12-week, placebo-controlled, fixed-dose study, treatment with dasotraline 6 mg/d was associated with a significant reduction in frequency of binge-eating days per week; efficacy was not demonstrated for the 4 mg dose. Treatment with both doses of dasotraline resulted in improvement in the Y-BOCS-BE and the BE-CGI-S. Dasotraline was safe and generally well-tolerated at both doses; most common adverse events were insomnia, dry mouth and headache.
Clinicaltrials.gov: NCT03107026
Funding Acknowledgements:
Supported by funding from Sunovion Pharmaceuticals Inc.
The Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) has previously been used to depict the hierarchy between visual, tactile and perceptual stimuli. Studies on schizophrenia inpatients (SZs) have found mixed results in the ability to first learn the illusion, and have yet to explain the learning process involved. This study's aim was two-fold: to examine the learning process of the RHI in SZs and healthy controls over time, and to better understand the relationship between psychotic symptoms and the RHI.
Method:
Thirty schizophrenia inpatients and 30 healthy controls underwent five different trials of the RHI over a two-week period.
Results:
As has been found in previous studies, SZs felt the initial illusion faster than healthy controls did, but their learning process throughout the trials was inconsistent. Furthermore, for SZs, no correlations between psychotic symptoms and the learning of the illusion emerged.
Conclusion:
Healthy individuals show a delayed reaction to first feeling the illusion (due to latent inhibition), but easily learn the illusion over time. For SZs, both strength of the illusion and the ability to learn the illusion over time are inconsistent. The cognitive impairment in SZ impedes the learning process of the RHI, and SZs are unable to utilize the repetition of the process as healthy individuals can.
Binge eating disorder (BED) is the most common eating disorder in the US, with a lifetime prevalence of 2.8%. Disturbances in reward circuitry have been implicated in its pathogenesis. Dasotraline is a novel and potent dopamine and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor with slow absorption and a long half-life resulting in stable plasma concentrations over 24 hours with once-daily dosing. This study evaluated the efficacy and safety of flexibly-dosed dasotraline (4, 6, and 8 mg/day) vs placebo in adults with moderate to severe BED over a 12-week period (NCT02564588).
Methods
Key inclusion criteria included moderate to severe BED based on a history of ≥2 binge eating days/week for ≥6 months prior to screening, and ≥3 binge eating days for each of2 weeks prior to randomization, as documented in participant’s binge eating diary. Patients were randomized 1:1 to flexibly-dosed dasotraline (4, 6, 8 mg/day) or placebo. Theprimary endpoint was change from baseline (CFB) in the number of binge eating days per week at Week 12. Key secondary endpoints were: CFB in Clinical Global Impression–Severity (CGI-S) Scale at Week 12; CFB in Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale Modified for Binge Eating (YBOCS-BE) at Week 12; and the percentage ofsubjects with a 4-week cessation from binge eating prior to Week 12 or end of treatment (EOT). Except for 4-week cessation, the other three variables were analyzed using amixed model for repeated measures (MMRM).
Results
317 subjects (84% female) received ≥1 dose of study medication (mean age was 38.2 years; mean number of binge eating days per week, 4.25; mean CGI-S score, 4.5; mean BMI, 34.7). The MMRM analysis of CFB at Week 12 in the number of binge days/week yielded a significant mean difference of –0.99 (95% CI: –0.65 to –1.33; p<0.001) infavour of dasotraline (–3.74 in the dasotraline group vs –2.75 in the placebo group). All three key secondary endpoints were met at Week 12 or EOT: 46.5% of subjects in thedasotraline group achieved at least 4 consecutive weeks’ cessation from binge eating vs 20.6% in the placebo group (p<0.001); CFB in CGI-S and YBOCS-BE scores were also statistically significant in favour of dasotraline (p<0.001). The treatment-emergent adverse events (TEAEs) that occurred more frequently with dasotraline vs placebo at >2% incidence included: insomnia (44.6% vs 8.1%), dry mouth (27.4% vs 5.0%), decreased appetite (19.7% vs 6.9%), anxiety (17.8% vs 2.5%), nausea (12.7% vs 6.9%) and decreased body weight (12.1% vs 0%). Discontinuation due to AEs occurred in 11.5% of patients taking dasotraline vs 2.5% taking placebo.
Conclusions
In adults with moderate to severe BED, there were highly significant and clinically meaningful reductions with dasotraline vs placebo in the frequency of binge eating, global severity of illness, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms related to binge eating. These results suggest dasotraline may offer a novel, well-tolerated and efficacious treatmentfor BED.
This article aims to say what democracy is or what the predicate ‘democratic’ means, as opposed to saying what is good, right, or desirable about it. The basic idea—by no means a novel one—is that a democratic system is one that features substantial equality of political power. More distinctively it is argued that ‘democratic’ is a relative gradable adjective, the use of which permits different, contextually determined thresholds of democraticness. Thus, a system can be correctly called ‘democratic’ even if it does not feature perfect equality of power. The article's central undertaking is to give greater precision to the operative notion(s) of power. No complete or fully unified measure of power is offered, but several conceptual tools are introduced that help give suitable content to power measurement. These tools include distinctions between conditional versus unconditional power and direct versus indirect power. Using such tools, a variety of prima facie problems for the power equality approach are addressed and defused. Finally, the theory is compared to epistemic and deliberative approaches to democracy; and reasons are offered for the attractiveness of democracy that flows from the power equality theme.
According to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.
Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition (Goldman 1999). This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. In making this choice, I am not blind to the allure of alternative approaches. In this paper I explain and motivate the knowledge-centered approach by contrasting it with a newly emerging alternative that has a definite appeal of its own. According to this alternative, the chief dimension of social epistemological interest would be rationality rather than knowledge.
Folk psychology, the naive understanding of mental state concepts, requires a model of how people ascribe mental states to themselves. Competent speakers associate a distinctive memory representation (a category representation, CR) with each mentalistic word in their lexicon. A decision to ascribe such a word to oneself depends on matching to the CR an instance representation (IR) of one's current state. As in visual object recognition, evidence about a CR's content includes the IRs that are or are not available to trigger a match. This poses serious problems for functionalism, the theory-of-mind approach to the meaning of mental terms. A simple functionalist model is inadequate because (1) the relational and subjunctive (what would have happened) information it requires concerning target states is not generally available and (2) it could lead to combinatorial explosion. A modified functionalist model can appeal to qualitative (phenomenological) properties, but the earlier problems still reappear. Qualitative properties are important for sensations, propositional attitudes, and their contents, providing a model that need not refer to functional (causal-relational) properties at all. The introspectionist character of the proposed model does not imply that ascribing mental states to oneself is infallible or complete; nor is the model refuted by empirical research on introspective reports. Empirical research on “theory of mind” does not support any strict version of functionalism but only an understanding of mentalistic words that may depend on phenomenological or experiential qualities.
My target article did not attribute a pervasive ontological significance to phenomenology, so it escapes Bogdan's “epistemological illusion.” Pust correctly pinpoints an ambiguity between contentinclusive and content-exclusive forms of folk functionalism. Contrary to Fodor, however, only the former is plausible, and hence my third argument against functionalism remains a threat. Van Brakel's charity approach to first-person authority cannot deal with authority vis-a-vis sensations, and it has some extremely odd consequences.