Jens Timmermann’s scholarship illuminates the nuances and contexts of Kant’s thought. I have learned a great deal from reading his article. His question is whether Kant’s ethics is overdemanding, in something like the way that ‘classical utilitarianism’ has been thought to be. He is aware that this is not a clear-cut question, however he is inclined to reply that the answer is ‘no’. I too think the question is not clear-cut, but I am inclined to answer ‘yes’.

In the present work, specimens of the metastable austenitic stainless steel AISI 347 with different surface morphologies were investigated in stress-controlled fatigue tests in the high cycle fatigue (HCF) regime at ambient temperature. Specific surface morphologies were generated by cryogenic turning with CO2 snow cooling. As a result of the metastable austenite microstructure, phase changes from paramagnetic austenite to ferromagnetic martensite take place in the near-surface regime during cryogenic turning as well as in the whole specimen volume during monotonic and/or cyclic elastic–plastic deformation. The metastability of AISI 347 was characterized according to the M S-temperature determined from the chemical composition and by X-ray diffraction measurements with in situ cooling. Microhardness and strength of both phases were measured. Near-surface microstructure was analyzed by optical and scanning electron microscopy after focused ion beam preparation. Besides a partially martensitic surface layer, a thin nanocrystalline layer, both induced by cryogenic turning, was observed. In case of cyclic loading, the martensitic surface layer leads to a reduction of plastic strain amplitude as well as a retardation of crack initiation and consequently to an increase in fatigue life.

One of the important tasks that air traffic management services are faced with today is the task of maximising airport capacity. This can be achieved at the tactical level through proper organisation of air traffic around an airport. In recent years, many methods and algorithms for scheduling aircraft landings have been developed; they take into account various optimisation goals. The aim of this paper was to create a method that would allow one to evaluate landing aircraft sequences resulting from these control algorithms, especially in the presence of random disturbances. This method involves modelling the landing aircraft sequence by using Petri nets. The model and the computer tool that have been developed make it possible to take into account different kinds of disturbances and examine the effectiveness of various control strategies under these conditions. This paper presents two experiments that test disturbances with different characteristics and of different intensities. It has been shown that small but more frequent disturbances lead to the worsening of evaluation scores for a given sequence to a lesser extent than rare but larger disturbances. This is particularly important for control algorithms in which the focus is on high aircraft density. If the type of particular disturbances is properly assessed, then it will be possible to assist the decision-maker (air traffic controller) by providing him/her with quantitative evaluations of possible solutions.

This paper shows how moral concepts are definable in terms of reasons for the blame sentiment. It then shows how, given that definition, the categoricity of moral obligation follows from some plausible principles about reasons for blame. The nature of moral agency is further considered in this light. In particular, in what sense is it self-governing agency? Self-governing actors must be at least self-determining: that is, they must be able to think about what reasons they have, in order in order to assess what they have sufficient reason to believe, feel, or do. Thus any moral assessment implies that the person assessed is capable of self-governance in that sense. Furthermore, this notion of self-governance implies that an agent's moral obligations are relative to the agent's warranted beliefs. However it does not entail that moral agents must be autonomous, in the strong sense intended by Kant. Some consequences for modern conceptions of morality are considered.

This collection of essays is a mixed bag. It is intended to be, inasmuch as the selection has been made to show Robert Nozick's versatility as a philosopher and a writer. And it does so—but too much that is of passing interest is included. The first ten essays could have made a collection on their own. Nine of these are included within two sections: “Choice and Utility” and “Philosophy and Methodology.” The tenth, “Moral Complications and Moral Structures,” appears in a section entitled “Ethics and Politics.” It is by far the most substantial piece in this section, both in length and depth. A selection of the remaining pieces in the book might then have been included in a section of jeux d'esprit. So I will first report on the first ten essays and then come back to some of these.

This paper deals with the problem of classification of the two-stream instability for hot plasmas. The method is based on the criterion of Fainberg, Kurilko & Shapiro (1961). The basis of the analysis is the ‘resonance’ distribution, but a modified resonance distribution, leading to better results, is also investigated. The stability limit, classification into absolute and convective instabilities, as well as asymptotic growth rates are given for some chosen values of stream densities and temperatures, and arbitrary stream velocities. A method for finding the maximum temporal growth rates is also outlined.

In this note the problem of stability of two hot collisionless streams of charged particles is considered. The masses, charges, densities, and temperatures are arbitrary and the distribution functions are modelled by one ‘resonance’ function for each stream. The problem of stability is resolved by Nyquist diagrams, and, for the case of equal plasma frequencies, also by solving the dispersion relation in ω. A comparison with two Maxwellians on the one hand, and a two step function model on the other, is given. Step functions appear to be too crude for this problem.

This paper examines T. H. Green's and Henry Sidgwick's differing views of desireand the will, and connectedly, their differing views of an individual's good and freedom. It is argued that Sidgwick makes effective criticisms of Green, but that important elements in Green's idealist view of an individual's good and freedom survive the criticism and remain significant today. It is also suggested that Sidgwick's own account of an individual's good is unclear in an important way.

It seems common at the moment to make agent-neutrality a necessary condition of ‘consequentialism” and to hold that deontological ethics are agent-relative. This note argues that both these tendencies regrettably obscure useful terms and distinctions. It concludes by considering what it would be best, now, to mean by ‘utilitarianism” and making a proposal.