Informal or extra-institutional representation is variably present in all political contexts, from local social movements to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In this chapter we focus on extra-institutional representation within complex associative systems (CAS). The early part of the chapter outlines key features of the representative claim framework of particular relevance to this focus, which we then apply to selected CAS in Mexico. We explore the forming and validating of representative claims in such systems, with special attention to the importance of experts and scholars. Through this exploration, we seek to advance at least three of the main points made by this book as a whole: that political representation is variable, multidimensional and vulnerable; that different practices and settings create different varieties of representation; and that representatives coming from these various settings tend to become interdependent through interaction.
The claim to representation
How can a person or group, in effect, express the voice of other people, promote their interests, defend their views and otherwise represent them in political matters? The short answer is unequivocal: they cannot. If it is difficult for an individual to articulate his or her true political will, desires, interests, reasons, hopes and doubts, it is impossible for another person to do so in their name. People can, at best, present themselves, not represent others. And yet, political representation is almost everywhere, even in places and relations that are not formally recognized as representative. By observing representation in one of those improbable settings, this chapter seeks to help explain how this seemingly practical impossibility is, nonetheless, realized.
Students and critics of representation have long acknowledged the practical impossibility of representation. According to the well-known argument of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The will – individual or collective – cannot be transferred. Somebody ‘may indeed say: “I now will actually what this man wills, or at least what he says he wills” ‘. But he ‘cannot say: “What he wills tomorrow, I too shall will” because it is absurd for the will to bind itself for the future, nor is it incumbent on any will to consent to anything that is not for the good of the being who wills’ (Rousseau 1992: 199).