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Most research on political identities studies how individuals react to knowing others’ political allegiances. However, in most contexts, political views and identities are hidden and only inferred, so that projected beliefs and identities may matter as much as actual ones. We argue that individuals engage in motivated political projection: the identities people project onto target individuals are strongly conditional on the valence of that target. We test this theoretical proposition in two pre-registered experimental studies. In Study 1, we rely on a unique visual conjoint experiment in Britain and the USA that asks participants to assign partisanship and political ideology to heroes and villains from film and fiction. In Study 2, we present British voters with a vignette that manipulates a subject’s valence and solicits (false) recall information related to the subject’s political identity. We find strong support for motivated political projection in both studies, especially among strong identifiers. This is largely driven by negative out-group counter-projection rather than positive in-group projection. As political projection can lead to the solidification of antagonistic political identities, our findings are relevant for understanding dynamics in group-based animosity and affective polarization.
One hundred percent pasture-fed beef production has been suggested as a promising approach for sustainable ruminant farming, due to the potential benefits that can accrue across a range of sustainability domains. This study aimed to investigate the impacts across the four domains of sustainability of a wholesale switch from conventional to 100% pasture-fed beef production in the UK. We used fuzzy cognitive mapping (FCM) as a method for extracting knowledge from multiple stakeholders to create representative systems models of both conventional and pasture-based beef production systems. We then conducted a scenario analysis to assess how a switch to a pasture-fed system could affect components of sustainability in the UK beef sector. The FCMs indicated that vegetation quality, grass use efficiency, and soil health were central components of the pasture-fed approach, while economic and regulatory aspects, and climate change targets were more central to mainstream production approaches. The most marked changes under the 100% conversion scenario were an increase in income from subsidies (27.3%) in line with ‘public money for public goods’, a decrease in ability to export beef (unless advice to reduce consumption of animal protein is followed) (23.5%), a decrease in land used for farming vs other uses (e.g., natural capital) (11.23%), and a decrease in the use of feed from agricultural co/byproducts (7.5%), freeing up these feed sources for more sustainable monogastric production. Therefore, the mapping and scenario analysis suggests that while upscaling the pasture-fed approach may reduce productivity, it would likely increase public goods provision and reduce feed–food competition in the UK.
There is growing interest in lifestyle interventions as stand-alone and add-on therapies in mental health care due to their potential benefits for both physical and mental health outcomes. We evaluated lifestyle interventions focusing on physical activity, diet, and sleep in adults with severe mental illness (SMI) and the evidence for their effectiveness. To this end, we conducted a meta-review and searched major electronic databases for articles published prior to 09/2022 and updated our search in 03/2024. We identified 89 relevant systematic reviews and assessed their quality using the SIGN checklist. Based on the findings of our meta-review and on clinical expertise of the authors, we formulated seven recommendations. In brief, evidence supports the application of lifestyle interventions that combine behavioural change techniques, dietary modification, and physical activity to reduce weight and improve cardiovascular health parameters in adults with SMI. Furthermore, physical activity should be used as an adjunct treatment to improve mental health in adults with SMI, including psychotic symptoms and cognition in adults with schizophrenia or depressive symptoms in adults with major depression. To ameliorate sleep quality, cognitive behavioural informed interventions can be considered. Additionally, we provide an overview of key gaps in the current literature. Future studies should integrate both mental and physical health outcomes to reflect the multi-faceted benefits of lifestyle interventions. Moreover, our meta-review highlighted a relative dearth of evidence relating to interventions in adults with bipolar disorder and to nutritional and sleep interventions. Future research could help establish lifestyle interventions as a core component of mental health care.
In this chapter, we study voter preferences for different social democratic programmatic strategies. In line with the theoretical framework of the volume, we suggest that there are four different strategies social democratic parties could currently pursue: Old Left, New Left, Centrist, or Left National.
In original surveys conducted in six European countries (Austria, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden), we present these four strategies to respondents in the form of tabular vignettes. Evaluations of these vignettes are used to examine which programmatic strategies resonate with, on the one hand, the general electorate, and, on the other hand, the potential social democratic electorate. We also study support for the different programmatic strategies across subgroups of voters, and we analyze the determinants of voters’ choice between particular social democratic strategies and matched competitor party programs.
Our findings show that while in the overall electorate, Centrist Left and Left National programmatic profiles enjoy high levels of support, potential social democratic voters on average more strongly support Old Left and New Left programs. We find that from the perspective of voters, there might be less of a trade-off between “redistribution and recognition” policies than public debates would have us think. In line with these findings, we show that choices between social democratic parties and their direct competitors are responsive to programmatic supply within the left bloc. However, the choice between social democratic parties and parties of the Right is much less strongly affected by social democratic positioning.
Two widespread narratives attempt to account for the decline of social democratic parties over the past decades. The economic narrative points to these parties’ centrist positioning as the key cause and the Radical Left and Right as the key beneficiaries. By contrast, the cultural narrative focuses on the liberal positions of social democratic parties on new issues relating to cultural issues such as immigration, gender equality, and European integration and points to the Radical Right as key beneficiaries. What links these two narratives is the idea that Social Democrats have alienated the working class. In this chapter, we use individual-level survey data from eight countries to show that although social democratic parties have seen losses among all electoral groups, the voters who left social democratic parties were disproportionately centrist and educated. Second, we find that only a small share of former social democratic voters defected directly to parties of the Radical Right. Instead, social democratic parties lost most voters to moderate right, green, and left-libertarian parties. We additionally show that cultural attitudes play only a small role for choosing between moderate right and social democratic parties. By contrast, they are strongly linked to choices between social democratic and green/left-libertarian parties. These findings cast doubt on both predominant narratives of social democratic decline.
The research paper delves into the importance of point cloud data obtained from 3D scanning technology ensuring quality control in industrial settings. It presents a new heuristic approach that utilizes the wavelet algorithm and other techniques to detect and characterize induced forming defects accurately. The proposed approach offers more flexibility, ease of use, and better results based on descriptive and prescriptive analyses from DRM. The results demonstrate that the wavelet algorithm was successful in identifying and characterizing forming defects in point cloud data.
Affective polarization, a concept that originated in the USA, has increasingly been studied in Europe’s multi-party systems. This form of polarization refers to the extent to which party supporters dislike one another – or, more technically, to the difference between the positive feelings towards the supporters of one’s own political party and the negative feelings towards the supporters of other parties. Measuring this gap in Europe’s multi-party systems requires researchers to make various important decisions relating to conceptualization and measurement. Often, our focus could instead lie on assessing partisan hostility or negative party affect, which is easier to measure. While recent research on affective polarization in Europe has already taught USA lot, both about affective polarization and about political conflict in Europe, I nevertheless suggest that research in this field faces four challenges, namely developing better measures, more sophisticated theories, clearer accounts of affective polarization’s importance and successful ways of reducing negative party affect, if this is indeed desirable.
Affective polarization between partisans is potentially troubling for liberal democracy. Hence, recent research has focused on how affective dislike between partisans can be reduced. Using a survey experiment in Austria, we test whether elite signals matter. Respondents exposed to fictional news stories implying that their in-party might form a coalition with an out-party show reduced dislike toward supporters of that out-party. Our experiment also shows that coalition signals can influence out-party affect even if neither of the two parties signaling cooperation are an in-party. We conclude that cooperation between rivals has an important role in reducing affective polarization.
Due to the continuous progress in information technology, complex problems of machine elements can be investigated using numerical methods. The focus of these investigations and optimizations often aims to reduce the stresses that occur or to increase the forces and torques that can be transmitted. Interference fit connections are an essential machine element for drive technology applications and are characterized by their economical fabrication. The transmission of external loads over a large contact surface between the shaft and hub makes it less vulnerable to impact loads. These advantages contrast with disadvantages such as the limited transmittable power, the risk of friction fatigue, and stress peaks at the hub edges, which can lead to undesirable and sudden failure, especially in the case of brittle hub materials. Analytical approaches already exist for optimizing these connections, which are expensive, time-consuming, and complex, so a high degree of expert knowledge is required to apply these methods in practice successfully. This paper presents a novel method using the example of optimizing the pressure distribution in the interface of a shrink-fit connection.
In recent decades, governments in many Western democracies have shown a remarkable consensus in pursuing fiscal austerity measures during periods of strained public finances. In this article, we show that these decisions have consequences for political polarization. Our macro-level analysis of 166 elections since 1980 finds that austerity measures increase both electoral abstention and votes for non-mainstream parties, thereby boosting party system polarization. A detailed analysis of selected austerity episodes also shows that new, small and radical parties benefit most from austerity policies. Finally, survey experiments with a total of 8,800 respondents in Germany, Portugal, Spain and the UK indicate that the effects of austerity on polarization are particularly pronounced when the mainstream right and left parties both stand for fiscal restraint. Austerity is a substantial cause of political polarization and hence political instability in industrialized democracies.
Political debates are structured by underlying conflict dimensions, such as left-right and economic and cultural ideology, which form the basis for voter choice and party competition. However, we know little about how voters arrive at perceptions of parties' positions on these dimensions. We examine how the emphasis parties place on the different issues that make up a higher-level ideological dimension affects perceptions of their position on that dimension. Using two population-based survey experiments, we present respondents with either short or long statements that communicate the same issue stances. We then test whether the length of statements affects positional perceptions on the higher-level dimension. The empirical results show support for our hypotheses and imply that political parties – and the context in which they compete – can affect their perceived position even if underlying issue stances remain stable.
Governments have great difficulties designing politically sustainable responses to rising public debt. These difficulties are grounded in a limited understanding of the popular constraints during periods of fiscal pressure. For instance, an influential view claims that fiscal austerity does not entail significant political risk. But this research potentially underestimates the impact of austerity on votes because of strategic selection bias. This study addresses this challenge by conducting survey experiments in Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK and Germany. In contrast to previous findings, the results show that a government's re-election chances greatly decrease if it proposes austerity measures. Voters object particularly strongly to spending cuts and, to a lesser extent, to tax increases. While voters also disapprove of fiscal deficits, they weight the costs of austerity policies more than their potential benefits for the fiscal balance. These findings are inconsistent with the policy recommendations of international financial institutions.
Position change is an essential feature of political competition. Implicitly, policy change on an issue dimension is often equated with opinion change on specific issues within that dimension. However, in addition to opinion-based policy change, we highlight that parties and candidates can change their overall position by increasing their emphasis on certain opinions within that issue dimension (emphasis-based policy change). Using party manifesto data, we find that parties differ in their use of each type of policy change based on aspects of party organization, particularly the relative power of leaders and activists. Leader-dominated parties are more likely to engage in opinion-based policy change, also in reaction to systemic policy shifts. In contrast, activist-dominated parties tend to change their overall position in reaction to systemic shifts by emphasizing certain positions more. Our approach links salience-based to spatial models of party competition and has broader implications for how we study party competition.
Parties and politicians want their messages to generate media coverage and thereby reach voters. This article examines how attributes related to content and sender affect whether party messages are likely to get media attention. Based on content analyses of 1,613 party press releases and 6,512 media reports in a parliamentary, multiparty context, we suggest that party messages are more likely to make it into the news if they address concerns that are already important to the media or other parties. Discussing these issues may particularly help opposition parties and lower-profile politicians get media attention. These results confirm the importance of agenda setting and gatekeeping, shed light on the potential success of party strategies, and have implications for political fairness and representation.
Existing research suggests that voters tend to respond positively to legislator independence due to two types of mechanism. First, dissent has an indirect effect, increasing a legislator’s media coverage and personal recognition among constituents (profile effects). Secondly, constituents react positively to dissent when this signals that the legislator has matching political or representational preferences (conditional evaluation). This article presents a third effect: dissent acts as a valence signal of integrity and trustworthiness. Consistent with the valence signalling mechanism, it uses new observational and experimental evidence to show that British voters have a strong and largely unconditional preference for legislators who dissent. The findings pose a dilemma for political systems that rely on strong and cohesive parties.
It is easier for voters to make informed electoral choices when parties talk about the same issues. Yet, parties may decide against such “issue engagement.” We hypothesize that issue engagement between parties is more likely (a) when the similarity of their policy positions means that both parties have clear electoral incentives to talk about the same topics and (b) when parties face few organizational constraints in terms of campaign resources. Our empirical analysis of 2453 press releases by Austrian parties shows that ideological proximity and party resources affect the level of issue engagement. These findings suggest that issue engagement is less likely precisely where it is needed most, which has important implications for understanding the democratic quality of election campaigns.