The outcome of the 2016 election made it abundantly clear that victory in US presidential contests depends on the Electoral College much more than on direct universal suffrage. This fact points to the importance of using state-level models to arrive at adequate predictions of winners and losers in US presidential elections. In fact, the use of a model disaggregated to the state level and focusing on three types of measures—namely, changes in the unemployment rate, presidential popularity, and indicators of long-term patterns in the regional strength of the Democratic and Republican parties—has in the past enabled us to produce fairly accurate forecasts of the number of Electoral College votes for the presidential candidates of the two major American parties. In this article, we bring various modifications to this model to improve its overall accuracy. With Joe Biden out of the race, this revised model predicts that Donald Trump will succeed in winning back the presidency with 341 electoral votes against 197 for Kamala Harris.

Cette étude examine l’évolution de la couverture accordée aux enjeux dans la presse écrite durant les campagnes au Québec de 1994 à 2018. Deux constats ressortent de cette étude. On assisterait d'abord à une diversification de l'ordre du jour médiatique s'expliquant notamment par un recul de la question nationale dans l'espace médiatique au profit d'enjeux comme l'environnement et l'immigration. Le recadrage de la question nationale nettement plus axée aujourd'hui sur la dimension identitaire que sur la question du statut politique du Québec est frappant. Ces changements semblent indiquer la montée d'un axe politique libéral-autoritaire dans la province, alors même que l’émergence du multipartisme ouvre la porte à un réalignement politique durable. Ces observations tendent à confirmer la perspective voulant que l'ordre du jour lors d'une campagne résulte de l'interaction entre les médias, les partis et les électeurs et qu'il offre ainsi un reflet adéquat de l’évolution de la dynamique politique dans une société donnée.

The extent to which citizens comply with newly enacted public health measures such as social distancing or lockdowns strongly affects the propagation of the virus and the number of deaths from COVID-19. It is however very difficult to identify non-compliance through survey research because claiming to follow the rules is socially desirable. Using three survey experiments, we examine the efficacy of different ‘face-saving’ questions that aim to reduce social desirability in the measurement of compliance with public health measures. Our treatments soften the social norm of compliance by way of a short preamble in combination with a guilty-free answer choice making it easier for respondents to admit non-compliance. We find that self-reported non-compliance increases by up to +11 percentage points when making use of a face-saving question. Considering the current context and the importance of measuring non-compliance, we argue that researchers around the world should adopt our most efficient face-saving question.

Changes in voters' behavior and in the campaign strategies that political parties pursue are likely to have increased the importance of campaigns on voters' electoral choices. As a result, scholars increasingly question the usefulness and predictive power of structural forecasting models, that use information from “fundamental” variables to make an election prediction several months before Election Day. In this paper, we empirically examine the expectation that structural forecasting models are increasingly error-prone. For doing so, we apply a structural forecasting model to predict elections in six established democracies. We then trace the predictive power of this model over time. Surprisingly, our results do not give the slightest indication of a decline in the predictive power of structural forecasting models. By showing that information on long-term factors still allows making accurate predictions of electoral outcomes, we question the assumption that campaigns matter more now than they did in the past.

Will President Obama lose votes in 2012 because of racial prejudice? For 2008, weestimated, via a carefully controlled, national survey-based study, that on balancehe lost about five percentage points in popular vote share due to intolerance forhis race on the part of some voters. What about 2012? There are at least threepossibilities: (1) the presidency has become postracial, and the vote will registerno racial cost; (2) intolerance has increased, and the vote will register anincreased racial cost; and (3) intolerance has decreased, and the vote will registera decreased racial cost. Our evidence, drawn from an analysis comparable to thatcarried out for 2008, suggests Obama will pay a racial cost of three percentagepoints in popular vote share. In other words, his candidacy will experience adecrease in racial cost, if a small one. In 2008, this racial cost denied Obama alandslide victory. In the context of a closer election in 2012, this persistentracial cost, even smaller in size, could perhaps cost him his reelection.

Almost all the prolific work done on economic voting has been based on the classic reward–punishment model, which treats the economy as a valence issue. The economy is a valence issue, but it is much more than that. This article explores two other dimensions of economic voting – position and patrimony. Investigating a 2010 British survey containing relevant measures on these three dimensions, the authors estimate their impact on vote intention, using a carefully specified system of equations. According to the evidence reported, each dimension of economic voting has its own independent effect. Moreover, together, they reveal a ‘compleat’ economic voter, who wields considerable power over electoral choice in Britain. This new result confirms and extends recent work on American and French elections.

Who will win the next French presidential election? Forecasting electoral results from political-economy models is a recent tradition in France. In this article, we pursue this effort by estimating a vote function based on both local and national data for the elections held between 1981 and 2007. This approach allows us to circumvent the small N problem and to produce more robust and reliable results. Based on a model including economic (unemployment) and political (approval and previous results) variables, we predict the defeat, although by a relatively small margin, of the right-wing incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy in the second round of the French presidential election to be held in May 2012.

Barack Obama was denied a landslide victory in the 2008 presidential election. In the face of economic and political woe without precedent in the post-World War II period, the expectation of an overwhelming win was not unreasonable. He did win, but with just a 52.9 percentage point share of the total popular vote. We argue a landslide was taken from Obama because of race prejudice. In our article, we first quantify the extent of the actual Obama margin. Then we make a case for why it should have been larger. After reviewing evidence of racial bias in voter attitudes and behavior, we conclude that, in a racially blind society, Obama would likely have achieved a landslide.

American presidents have enjoyed a significant boost of their popular support early after their election. This article examines the existence of this same honeymoon phenomenon in the context of Canadian federal elections since 1945. The study shows that the above-mentioned phenomenon exists in Canada, identifies the circumstances more conducive to producing it and tries to demonstrate that it mostly results from a majority effect. In conclusion, it is suggested that the gain in political resources due to the honeymoon effect could be beneficial to the government's legislative performance.

This study examines perceptions of party competence in four issue areas: inflation, unemployment, international affairs and Canadian unity. Using Gallup poll data from a 35-year period, the study shows that in three of the four issue areas Canadians clearly distinguish between parties. These distinctions do not merely reflect party popularity and are durable rather than immutable; perceptions change slowly but do respond to government performance. Canadians see the greatest differences between parties with respect to international affairs and Canadian unity; the Liberals enjoy a substantial lead on these two questions. On inflation, perceived competence tends to reflect popularity while on unemployment, Canadians have greater confidence in the New Democratic party. On all issues, the Conservative party image has substantially improved under the Mulroney government.

The article proposes a simple model to explain election outcomes in Canadian federal elections. The model hypothesizes that the share of the vote obtained by the Liberal party depends on deviations from the average rate of unemployment, inflation and income growth, and on the presence or absence of a party leader from Quebec. The results confirm the hypotheses regarding the impact of unemployment and party leader, but inflation and income growth prove to be nonsignificant. The evidence also suggests that the model may be less satisfactory for elections involving governments that had been in place for less than a year (1958 and 1980).