Chapter 6 describes Gao Pian’s carrot-and-stick strategy for winning the second war against Nanzhao. “Securing the Dadu” narrates his rout of the invading army, their expulsion across the Dadu river, the symbolic frontier with Nanzhao running through a wide border zone in southern Sichuan. Gao consolidates his military advantage by reinforcing the border defenses and reforming the Sichuan military, among other measures, through the bloody suppression of a militia mutiny in 875 (“Mutiny and Malediction”). Sichuan was the historical birthplace of Daoism. “The Cradle of Daoism” illustrates the general’s increased recourse there to Daoist ritual and occult strategy. In “A Letter to Shilong,” an intimidating and peremptory missive addressed to the king of Nanzhao, Gao reminds the ruler of his past defeats in Annan and on the banks of the Dadu, and threatens further punitive action. In stark contrast with his public stance, Gao’s “Tantric Diplomacy” opens a parallel, secret channel of diplomacy through which his envoy, a Buddhist monk, conveys a conciliatory peace proposal to the Tantric kingdom.

Chapter 11 explores Gao’s strategies for defending Huainan, maintaining its economic and financial viability, ensuring its local administration, and pursuing external relations. Huainan was one of the wealthiest and most populous regions in the empire. “Great Bounty” outlines Gao’s policies of economic, agricultural, and commercial administration. “Commodity Taxes” discusses his role in southern China’s financial administration and his approach to using monopoly taxation for funding Huainan’s government. “Border Defense” details Gao’s actions as commander-in-chief and military governor responsible for building and funding armies capable of securing Huainan. “Inked Edicts” refers to the emperor’s privilege of appointing prefects and other provincial officials by personal edicts, a prerogative delegated to Gao Pian and other military governors in 881. In “Friend or Foe,” Gao engages in diplomatic exchanges with external actors to prevent attacks on Huainan’s borders and join forces with potential allies. After Huainan’s military and fiscal decoupling from the government-in-exile, Gao gains full powers over the region’s administration.

This chapter explores the interactions of high-level Chinese and North Korean leaders. It argues that the actions of Chinese and North Korean leaders – especially Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung – were critical to building political order in the PRC and the DPRK. It shows how the utterances and actions of these leaders were particularly influential in shaping popular emotions and establishing the legitimacy of the PRC and DPRK.

The conclusion offers a broader look into the role of emotions in alliances and the similarities and differences between Sino-North Korean friendship and other Cold War alliances. It shows how the idea of Sino-North Korean friendship limited emotional freedom in China and North Korea.

This chapter provides brief conclusions drawing together the threads of the story and its wider analysis, the political and religious context, its transnational significance and the insights a single document and event have provided. Returning to some of the themes raised in the introduction, reflects on the role of truth and secrecy amid the practicalities for ministers of upholding an ideological cause.

Chapter 6 focuses on fears of espionage and treachery, but also the extensive use of information and intelligence-gathering by all sides, and the fine distinctions between these. The close connection with ambassadors and their contacts is discussed, alongside how spies and spying were viewed by contemporaries, through correspondence and judicial records. Explores extensive fears of plots and foreign intervention and how this affected diplomatic and confessional relations; the execution of experienced courier, Jean Abraham, secretary to the prince of Condé, exemplifies this. Looks in detail at contemporary English concerns about a Franco-Scottish alliance in support of Mary Queen of Scots, making links from these concerns to the activities of Norris, cardinal Châtillon and to the network exposed by the letters carried by Tivinat. Attention is given to the role of female agents and especially to double agents, such as Edmund Mather, whose career and connections to Norris, Regnard/Changy and the wider network are explored in detail.

Chapter 5 explores the importance of the communication of news and information through correspondence, but also the problems of its interception and betrayal. Couriers faced the risk of violence and incarceration, particularly at times of diplomatic tension, and strategies of concealment could be quite sophisticated to counter this, such as the use of ciphers, pseudonyms and other methods. Nevertheless, the dangers to which Tivinat and other couriers were exposed was considerable, their detention was a frequent occurrence, as was that of Huguenots carrying books and papers, as shown in cases drawn from the Conciergerie in Paris. Consideration is given to the importance of correspondence as a source for both contemporaries and historians. The news content of the letters carried by Tivinat is discussed in detail, revealing concerns with events both international and domestic. Connections between the letters and those found in other circumstances, such as on the body of the prince of Condé and in the English State Papers, are made, identifying Regnard/Changy as their author and the complexity of the network in which he operated.

This chapter introduces the interrogation document and associated letters around which the book is based and summarises the structure of the book and the content of its chapters. Emphasises the European-wide context of the Huguenot network that is revealed as well as the circumstances of the French religious wars c. 1567–1571. Engages with the relevant historiographical themes, including studies of correspondence and communication, diplomacy, intelligence-gathering and espionage, and confessional and transnational connections. Addresses the sub-themes of truth and secrecy and how these provide the backdrop for the clandestine confessional activities to be explored, particularly through the participation of Huguenot ministers. Investigates what we are able to reconstruct about the man, Jean Tivinat, who was arrested for and interrogated about his role in carrying the correspondence and the circumstances of his incarceration at the château of Dieppe.

Chapter 3 explores in detail the households between which Tivinat was carrying the correspondence: of Henry Norris, the English ambassador, in the suburbs of Paris and of Odet de Coligny, the cardinal of Châtillon, in the outskirts of London. Discusses Norris’s experience as ambassador and the challenges of this role, not least the interception of couriers, as well as the difficulty of negotiating between the French and English courts at a time of turbulent diplomatic relations. Establishes the importance of his household as a hub of Protestant activity. Châtillon’s life and career are examined as context for his experience of exile in England and his role as diplomat at Elizabeth’s court from 1568 to 1571. Establishes the importance of his contribution as Huguenot representative, facilitating a Protestant network of ministers and agents across Europe, as well as the links of this network with the two households and the correspondence carried by Tivinat. The role of other prominent figures in exile with Châtillon are also explored.

This chapter summarizes the main lessons for diplomacy that we derive from our study. These eight lessons are: 1. A major factor separates the crises that escalate to war from those that do not; in the latter, a strong leader reins in any hard-liners who advocate going to war. 2. Individuals make a difference. 3. Contingency plays a more important role than system structure in determining whether or not a crisis escalates to war. 4. Someone must stand for peace. 5. The secret to preventing war structurally is to find a functional equivalent to war. 6. Norms and rules are important for avoiding war – and, therefore, maintaining peace. 7. War can be avoided; it is not inevitable. 8. The realist concepts of the national interest and balance of power do not always accurately describe the behavior of states.

One of the main challenges faced by the missionaries and their US supporters was the renewal of their short-term visas. The State Department repeatedly urged its Italian counterparts to consider issuing permanent or long-term residence permits, hoping to eliminate one of the most contentious points of the ongoing dispute. While the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was generally sympathetic to these proposals and sought to accommodate Washington’s requests, it faced significant resistance from Mario Scelba, the inflexible interior minister, as well as repeated pressures from the Vatican. The Vatican followed the matter with interest and concern, viewing the presence of Protestant missionaries as a potential threat to Italy’s Catholic identity and spiritual unity. Catholic propaganda leaned heavily on familiar anti-Protestant tropes, portraying Protestantism as a foreign import, threatening the country’s cohesion and spiritual unity, which, it was argued, was essential to counter the Communist threat. The visa issue became a constant point of contention, resolved only through temporary solutions and case-by-case renewals. Meanwhile, the missionaries frequently clashed with Italian authorities, who sporadically (and inconsistently) harassed them by shutting down preaching halls or preventing access to their facilities.

The American Revolution transformed Indigenous American nations. But their history throughout the colonial period was one of great change and rupture well before 1776. Colonization introduced disease, new material goods, economic transformations, and countless new ideas to the Indigenous people of North America over the course of generations. In this context, Indigenous communities changed, adapted, and above all survived through many challenges and opportunities. By the mid eighteenth century, several Indigenous groups were building power and stability in the midst of change, even as others struggled, migrated, and consolidated. In the 1750s, imperial conflicts between France and Great Britain altered the political context in which several groups had built influence and authority. In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, Eastern Indians faced the British empire without a counterbalancing French colonial government. This severe change constrained Indigenous options and strategy on the eve of Revolution.

In June of 1776, the Continental Congress voted to declare independence as thirteen United States, seeking not just to transform the governments of those states, but to undertake a transformation of the international system from which it sought recognition and legitimacy. Diplomacy lay at the heart of the American Revolution, to win the war and to position the United States as the hegemonic power in North America. This chapter analyzes how leaders such as John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson used diplomacy over five decades from the Declaration of Independence (1776) to the Monroe Doctrine (1823) to enact a revolution in international affairs that would result in the distancing of newly independent republics in Western hemisphere from direct involvement in the European state system, the marginalizing of Indigenous nations, and the elevating of the United States to a position of hegemony.