Two approaches dominate the literature on the construction of emotions: transitory role theory and the more recent Conceptual Act Theory. We identify two ways in which these approaches would benefit from correction, revision, or further development. First, they tend to downplay the body, insisting that social forces work primarily at a conceptual level. That is, culture is considered to primarily impact the conceptualization of emotion, not emotional embodiment. Second, they tend to neglect the impact social norms have on emotions. We include relevant work in traditions outside philosophy and psychology (sociology, anthropology, and queer theory) that may shed light on the impact of social norms on emotions, as well as the relationship between socialization and embodiment. We propose an account of emotions as constructs that combine sociality and corporeality—an account that understands social norms and bodily responses as interdependent. Our proposal is to understand emotions as constructed via societal norms that materialize in bodily states. This advances the debate on the nature of emotions by integrating different theoretical strands (construction and embodiment), and it also contributes to the emerging literature on emotional injustice by shedding light on the role the social plays, for example, in shaping whose body gets to express which emotions.

Prevailing narratives within the conservation decision-making literature argue conservation professionals should utilize rational, objective methods that do not engage emotion to make decisions. However, as conservation professionals are emotional beings, it is inevitable that emotion will be present during such processes. Perpetuated narratives and limited investigation into the involvement of conservation professionals’ emotion in decision-making processes mean the emotional selves of conservationists continue to be denied and unexplored, potentially hindering transformative change. To trouble these prevalent narratives, I investigate if and how conservationists’ emotion is involved in decision-making and whether external structures influence this involvement. Sixteen conservation professionals took part in this study. The data were gathered through semi-structured interviews, the diary method and a workshop, and were subjected to a thematic analysis. The findings demonstrate that conservationists’ emotion plays three roles within conservation decision-making processes: as a way of knowing, as a (de)motivator, and as a relationship shaper. These roles are not recognized or nurtured, and this is predominantly influenced by organizational culture. These findings indicate the need for conservation organizations to create healthy emotional cultures, to in turn enable professionals to acknowledge, and utilize, the roles of emotion within their work. Additionally, creating organizational cultures that encourage and enable the expression of, engagement with, and reflection on emotion could support conservationists to enact transformative change and transform the field of conservation itself.

Philosophers are often embarrassed by philosophy, or at least write as if they are. But what should we make of this connection between philosophy and embarrassment? Taking a cue from sociologist Erving Goffman, this paper treats embarrassment in general as revealing of social phenomena and then considers the case of philosophical embarrassment from that point of view. As we will see, this allows us to formulate and explore several hypotheses about the discipline of philosophy, why it might be rational to be embarrassed by it, and how this embarrassment might be managed or overcome.

Theorists conceptualize reactive aggression as emotional (especially angry) and proactive aggression as unemotional (although it is unclear whether relations between proactive aggression and emotion are null or negative). Goals of the current study were to: (a) examine links between reactive aggression and a range of emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and anxiety), and (b) include neutral emotion to address whether proactive aggression is unrelated or negatively related to emotion. To assess emotion, playgroups of four same-sex, unfamiliar, nine-year-old children (N = 158; 52.5% males; racially/ethnically diverse) interacted as round-robin dyads while completing challenging and cooperative tasks; observers coded emotions second-by-second. To assess both behavioral and observational reactive-versus-proactive aggression, children completed video games with virtual peers. Reactive aggression was positively related to happiness, anger, and anxiety and negatively related to neutral emotion, for at least one task and one aggression measure. Proactive aggression was positively related to neutral emotion but negatively related to happiness, for both tasks and aggression measures. Findings enhance theoretical understanding of: (a) reactive aggression as broadly emotional by relating it to happiness and anxiety as well as anger, and (b) proactive aggression as unemotional by linking it to the display of neutral emotion and the lack of display of happiness.

The article probes the analytical utility of the increasingly popular concept of ‘cognitive warfare’. It proceeds by reflecting writings associated with the concept’s mainstream meaning against selected insights from general strategic theory and affective science and finds cognitive warfare problematic in multiple aspects. From the perspective of general strategic theory, cognitive warfare misrepresents the nature of the challenge at hand, blurs the distinction between core aspects of strategic effort, and draws on questionable rather than sound strategic thought. From an affective science perspective, it relies on an increasingly outdated paradigm for explaining the human mind, provides little insight into how cognition shapes behaviour, and overlooks the beneficial roles of emotions in maintaining social cohesion. Integrating these perspectives, the article argues that information aggression is better understood as attempted subversion centred on specific emotions. The presented argument allows practitioners to better understand the nature of the challenges they face and to develop appropriate remedies, and academics to study the subject in a more focused manner.

This work explores the travels of Ugandan Enoch Olinga, as an example of a person who enjoyed connections with global minorities across national boundaries and as a unique lens into the Black international experience in the mid-twentieth century. I examine his internationalist experiences through the lens of emotions to emphasize different dynamics of global racial identities and transnational diasporic connections during the 1950s–1970s, an era of decolonization and civil rights movements. I argue that Olinga, a prominent Baha’i who traveled worldwide during this era, advocated for unification among global minorities by emphasizing common racial and cultural heritages and expansive concepts of a politicized kinship. Through the Baha’i Cause, he articulated his own ideas about striving for global harmony and racial unity, with a connection to Africa serving as the linchpin. Emotional analysis provides insights into how Olinga invoked diverse notions of family and kin to arouse particular emotions amongst people of color both within and beyond the unity offered by the Baha’i Faith.

Captivity is a complex phenomenon in international politics with a broad range of purposes, functions, and consequences. Existing scholarship suggests that states use captivity, for example, to facilitate hostage or prisoner exchanges, to extract material rewards, or, in the case of human shields, for deterrence purposes. This article argues that states may use captivity to deter not only traditional military threats emanating from other states, but also perceived threats to regime security posed by non-state actors, including individuals, and that emotions are central to this process. The argument is illustrated through three empirical vignettes that show how the Chinese government has detained foreign academics, publishers, and NGO workers engaged in activities seen as threatening regime security. Detention is interpreted as attempts to deter such actors. While fear is often seen as key to successful deterrence, the article indicates that paying attention to other emotions can help better understand deterrence failure. Specifically, because captivity, and deterrence, involve the denial of the captive’s agency and may trigger feelings of humiliation and shame, it can backfire as the target of deterrence efforts might seek to act to regain agency.