We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Practical wisdom is caring understanding of the good in the situations of a human life. Our emotions are rational to the extent that we care about the real good and are truthful about the facts. The two main kinds of virtues – the virtues of caring and the enkratic virtues – embody different aspects of practical wisdom. On the one side, in compassion, generosity, justice, and sense of duty, we care about and understand our good in its varieties and aspects. On the other side, we know about and know our practical way around ourselves, our shortcomings and the ways they may be mitigated and repaired by use of courage, patience, perseverance, and self-control. The virtues of caring form a coherent ensemble and overall picture of the good, a practical wisdom by which we see our situations in the perspective of a whole life.
Chapter 23 stresses that four sets of ideas need to be added to the principles and the topics of focus mentioned in Chapter 22. First, neither international order nor national order can be sustainable if the contradiction that exists today between, on the one hand, the celebration of human rights and, on the other hand, the tendency to treat individuals as disposable, deepens or simply persists. Second, the global justice agenda cannot credibly claim to be feasible if it does not factor in the views of the rest of the world. It is imperative to integrate what the non-West thinks. The ownership of a global agenda cannot be lopsided. Third, a cosmopolitan approach does not have to call for the removal or elimination of the state and sovereignty; rather, it is their reconceptualization and the application of this reconceptualization that are recommended. Fourth, institutional innovation will help implement this agenda.
In this book, I have tried to make sense of legitimacy at the international level, especially in relation to international law. I have paid a lot of attention to international law, in particular aligned with the demands of legitimacy and justice. But international law is only one aspect of the forces and the ecosystem that shape international order. Therefore, alone it cannot engineer the change that the international system requires today. This change has to be part of a more comprehensive approach. Here is not the place to offer a full account of the areas on which research could concentrate in the future to further encourage justice and legitimacy at the international level. However, it is worthwhile to present a general overview of these areas. In particular, three domains offer a possible road map for facilitating a constructive path forward: globalization, emotions and passions in social life, and the geopolitics of tomorrow.
The ‘Age of Anxiety’ has emerged as a common narrative trope in International Relations scholarship, particularly within the sub-field of ontological security studies. This narrative frames recent global crises – such as climate change, COVID-19, and declining Western-liberal hegemony – as ushering in a new era of existential uncertainty. The article critiques the universality of this thesis, arguing that it overgeneralises from the Western-liberal experience and neglects spatial and temporal diversity in the global experience of anxiety.
Methods
The article employs a critical-interpretivist methodology, drawing on postcolonial theory, the history of emotions, and ontological security studies. It draws on illustrative examples to interrogate the spatial and temporal assumptions underpinning the Age of Anxiety thesis.
Results
The article shows how the Age of Anxiety thesis reproduces Eurocentric periodisations, presenting the affective experiences of the liberal-Western lifeworld as universal, thereby marginalising subaltern experiences of anxiety. The article also identifies significant spatial and demographic variation in the circulation of anxiety, such as the uneven distribution of climate anxiety, and introduces the concept of postcolonial anxiety to foreground longue durée, haunting forms of insecurity that elude Western-centric framings.
Conclusion
The article concludes by calling for a pluriversal approach to ontological security that recognises diverse emotional communities and alternative temporalities through which anxiety can be experienced. It urges scholars to adopt more reflexive, empirically grounded, and historically sensitive analyses that decentre the Western-liberal subject.
Marcus Aurelius acknowledges his debt to the Stoic tradition of emotions and endorses both the analysis of emotions as value judgements, the ideal of apatheia, i.e. the eradication of ‘passions’, and the promotion of ‘good feelings’. By emotions, he means all kinds of emotional reactions to everything that reaches us from the outside, i.e. pleasure and pain as well as anger, love, fear, etc. Every impression being twofold (what the object is and of what value it is to us), Marcus develops a strategy to eradicate the second judgement. But there is a positive side to the reshaping of desire and aversion, a joy resulting from the gifts of nature and the fulfilment of our human relations. Such emotions are reserved for the Sage in ancient Stoicism, but they become more accessible to Marcus, who does not reject any emotion from human life but values the appropriate ones.
Norm contestation has become an established research programme in International Relations. However, scholars have yet to scrutinise the form and effect of radical contestation. I argue that radical contestation is a disruptive form of contestation, distinguished by (1) the extensive scope that attacks a specific norm and wider normative order, institutions, and actors sympathetic to the norm, and (2) high emotional intensity in animating contestation. To bring these features of radical contestation together, I use insights from the study of emotions and backlash movements to advance a new ‘emotional backlash’ framework and explain the construction, mobilisation, and outcome of radical contestation. I subsequently apply this framework to analyse the emotional backlash against Rohingya refugees during Covid-19. Cultivated by resentment, the emotional backlash against the Rohingya contests refugee protection norms and extends to radically challenge human rights advocates, United Nations agencies, and the larger humanitarian and cosmopolitan principles. In doing so, backlash supporters aim to restore a society without refugees and their sympathisers, and instead to promote racism as a ‘normal’ organising principle. By capturing radical contestation, this contribution steers norms scholarship towards a new research terrain and highlights the implications that the backlash has for the international refugee regime.
Chapter III delves into the discursive mechanisms through which former Israeli conscripts in this study understood, justified and/or distanced themselves from the violent regime in which they serve(d) – relating this to the broader context of ‘moralised militarism’ so frequently attributed to the Israeli military. Through analysis of the speech acts, moralisations and emotive articulations by former and current soldiers, I argue that traits of emotional expression, reflection and critique – far from being anomalies of militarised masculinity in this context – are central to its legitimation and idealisation, enabling the soldier, and society more broadly, to retain their sense of humanity amidst enduring violence. Rather than performances of stoicism and emotional control with which ‘traditional’ forms of militarised masculinity are normatively associated, a more philosophical, emotive, and cerebral approach to violence appears to be celebrated and encouraged within Israeli militarism – consolidating the supposed relation between militarism, masculinity, and moralism in the settler-colonial state.
Specifically analysing the experiences of Palestinian youth in a West Bank refugee camp, Chapter IV analyses the navigation of emotions inevitably precipitated by the grinding realities of colonisation and military occupation, in a setting in which normative conceptions of masculinity assert that ‘men don’t cry’. Using Palestinian rap music as a case study to explore young refugee men’s navigation and subversion of these dynamics, I argue that emotional expression in this particular musical culture both functions to reconfigure binary gendered norms in a context of invasive settler colonialism, while simultaneously masculinising emotionality through a dialogic performance of emotion, nationalism, resistance, and paternalism. I illustrate, therefore, that in some ways gendered binaries are challenged in and through the performance of Palestinian rap as a form of resistance and release, while in other ways, these are reconfigured so that men’s emotional expression can be subsumed within them.
Chapter 5 reveals the numerous specific challenges experienced by emigrant soldiers and explores the coping mechanisms they employed. Compared to other soldiers, they experienced additional difficulties related to sending and receiving letters from abroad, in finding their preferred brands of foreign cigarettes and, for those without close family in Italy, in using their infrequent periods of leave. In addition to such practicalities, integration into the Italian Army was often challenging. A significant obstacle was their weak grasp of the Italian language and the fact that they were often treated as foreigners by others. There was no widespread recognition of the need to consider the emigrant soldiers as a distinct cohort within the Army and the men often felt forgotten and disregarded. Within a few months of Italy’s entry into the war, intense feelings of regret surfaced for most of the emigrants, even those who had previously been patriotic. While feelings of being Italian may have increased for many non-emigrant soldiers, the opposite was true of large numbers of those who had returned to Italy from abroad and many of them found their feelings of national belonging severely weakened as a result of their military service.
How does anxiety influence voting behaviour? Whereas anxiety is usually treated as a unidimensional emotion, we highlight the multiplicity of socially contingent forms it can assume in response to societal threats. Different anxieties, we posit, can create distinct axes of political competition along which anxious voters exhibit widely varying preferences. We illustrate our argument with unique observational and experimental survey data from Spain’s COVID-19 crisis, showing that individuals anxious about the pandemic’s health consequences favoured parties advocating stringent lockdown restrictions, whereas individuals anxious about its economic disruption preferred parties opposing such measures. Analyzing municipality-level results from Madrid’s 2021 regional election, we additionally provide evidence that COVID-19 boosted support for pro-lockdown parties in areas more exposed to its health effects and support for anti-lockdown parties in areas more exposed to its economic impact. Our findings point to the importance of disaggregating complex emotional states for understanding the determinants of voting behaviour.
Describe some important features of infant–caregiver relationships; evaluate the role of early life experiences on later development; understand what emotions are for and how they develop.
In today’s ultra-connected world, personal and emotional narratives are omnipresent in media. This study examines how the emotional framing of second-hand testimonies about difficult or controversial past events influences attitudes. A sample of 154 Belgian participants, aged 18–77, evaluated their attitudes regarding Second World War (WWII) collaboration with Nazi Germany and the post-war repression before and after reading either the positively framed or negatively framed version of an ecologically valid interview. The narrative revolved around a son recounting his father’s past as a former collaborator joining the German forces during WWII. Results revealed a significant influence of the narrative’s emotional frame on attitudes towards collaboration and repression. The positively framed interview promoted more understanding attitudes towards collaboration and nuanced views on repression, while the opposite occurred with the negatively framed story, where participants viewed collaboration less favourably and regarded repression as justified and moral. Nevertheless, the role of emotions needs further investigation, exploring the medium of presentation of the narrative and considering the development of first-person narratives to elicit stronger emotional reactions.
The article examines the contributions of John Dewey’s philosophical thought to an institutionalist conception that integrates the dynamics of emotions to enrich the conception of action and the analysis of the links between institutions and individuals. We first demonstrate the close connections between the enactivist approach underlying the post-Northian cognitive analysis of institutions and John Dewey’s situational approach. We then identify the main features and functions of emotions in the pragmatist’s theory. Subsequently, we outline three levels – emotional rationality, communication, and collective emotions – that illustrate how the incorporation of emotions enriches the study of institutions, drawing on North’s cognitive model. Finally, we illustrate the scope of Dewey’s theory of emotions through a concrete case (the France Télécom case), in which emotions serve as a driving force for actors’ creativity, changes in managerial practices, and a transformation of legal norms.
Clinical ethics consultants navigate dilemmas across patient care, public health, and healthcare policy. Issues span from the beginning to the end of life, complex discharges, employment of novel technologies, and visitation restrictions. The second edition relays the narratives of fraught, complex consultations through richly detailed cases. Authors explore the ethical reasoning, professional issues, and emotional aspects of these impossibly difficult scenarios. Describing the affective aspects of ethics consultations, authors highlight the lasting effects of these cases on their practices. They candidly reflect on evolving professional practice as well as contemporary concerns and innovations while attending to equity and inclusivity. Featuring many new chapters, cases are grouped together by theme to aid teaching, discussion, and professional growth. The book is intended for clinicians, bioethicists, and ethics committee members with an interest in the choices made in real-life medical dilemmas as well as the emotional cost to those working to improve the situations.
Interoception is crucial for emotional processing. It relies on the bidirectional connections between the insula, a crucial structure in interoception, and the frontal lobe, which is implicated in emotional experiences. Acquired frontal brain injury often leads to emotional disorders. Our goal was to explore the interoceptive profiles of patients with frontal lesions with or without insular involvement.
Method:
Given the neuroanatomical links between interoception and emotions, we conducted a systematic Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-analyses guided review of studies assessing at least one dimension of interoception in adults with acquired frontal injuries, with or without associated insular lesions.
Results:
Seven articles were included. The review indicated that interoceptive accuracy declines after frontal injuries. The two studies that investigated interoceptive sensitivity found lower scores in patient groups. Finally, inconsistent results were found for interoceptive metacognition after frontal damage.
Conclusions:
This review is the first to explore interoceptive disorders after acquired frontal brain injury. The findings reveal deficits in cardiac interoceptive accuracy and interoceptive sensitivity following frontal damage. Inconsistent results were observed for interoceptive metacognition. Further research is needed to confirm the presence of interoceptive deficits following a frontal lesion. Additionally, the relationship between interoceptive deficits and emotional disorders, often reported after frontal brain injury, should be investigated.
By 1849 the kindergarten spread across the German Confederation as an alternative space of revolutionary politics and protest. I argue that the kindergarten worked alongside the barricade as a key location to protest traditional forms of state and religious authority and cultivate a new humanity that centered on women's gendered labor and children's education. For the founder of the kindergarten Friedrich Fröbel and his supporters, the classroom was a garden for the future in which educators and children alike could “perform utopia.” For female revolutionaries, the kindergarten provided a forum to make political claims in ways not open elsewhere. This article provides insight not only into the history of Central Europe in the Age of Revolutions, but also into the histories of emotions, gender, and education. I argue that historians should examine how ideas of “utopian hope” have been utilized in moments of upheaval to create new spaces of opposition.
In International Relations (IR) scholarship, there is a growing body of research on the connections between emotions, stigma, and norm violations. It is often presumed that for stigma imposition to be successful, norm violators should feel shame. We argue instead that the emotional dynamics that inform the management of stigma are more complex and involve overlooked emotions such as anxiety, sadness, and hopelessness. We substantiate this by analysing the successful stigmatisation of anti-war voices in Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war. While the vast majority of the Azerbaijani population supported the war, a small minority contested its legitimacy and the related emotional obligation to express hatred against Armenians. However, these anti-war voices became stigmatised as ‘traitors to the homeland’, and were ultimately pushed to self-silence. We contribute to the growing IR scholarship on emotions and stigma in two ways. First, we show how successful stigmatisation of norm violators may involve emotional dynamics that go beyond shame. Second, we discuss the power of emotion norms of hatred, which, especially in times of war, can push ‘ordinary people’ to pro-actively and vehemently stigmatise norm-violators. In conclusion, we elaborate on the potential future implications of stigma on peacebuilding activities between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
This Element aims to better understand the role of the internet in the radicalization process, focusing on how online factors contribute to self-radicalization. Specifically, it examines the neurocognitive process of online radicalization by analyzing the impact of terrorist and extremist propaganda videos on individuals' cognitive empathy using electroencephalography (EEG). Ultimately, this research aims to provide a more comprehensive understanding of online radicalization and the psychological effects of exposure to extremist content on the internet.
This chapter explores the foundations of emotions from empirical research in neuroscience, biology, psychology, multiculturalism, and primatology. The phenomenon of emotional experience is depthless and ever complex. The reader learns to appreciate how social and emotional intelligences are necessary if one is to learn the nature of emotions. Cultural meanings, languages, and world paradigms may seek to define emotions. However, this chapter argues that by developing a multicultural humanistic psychology approach to understanding emotions, readers can appreciate their flowing nature that is not known by definition, but through relationship.
This chapter discusses multicultural humanistic psychology, which is a theoretical foundation that seeks to engage the culturally relative self-actualization processes of the individual and community through the diverse spectrum of multicultural facets, so that wellbeing and social and emotional intelligences flourish. This paradigm synthesizes the strengths of both humanistic psychology and multicultural paradigms to support clinicians and educators in engaging with phenomena in the rapidly changing world. Multicultural humanistic psychology is not about validating Western cultural paradigms so that a new theory can be prepackaged and distributed globally. Rather, it is a way to awaken the potential of consilience, to recognize and transcend limitations, and acknowledge that together the fields are more relevant to global challenges. This paradigm guides the further discussions on social and emotional intelligences.