To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Although closely linked in typically developing children, cognitive and language development may diverge in IA children – particularly when they arrive already speaking their birth language. In such cases, cognitive growth may outpace language acquisition in the new linguistic environment. This chapter examines the relevant literature, synthesizing findings from studies that illuminate these dynamics. Special attention is given to the contributions of IA individuals – especially those who enter their new homes with relative proficiency in their mother tongue – to our understanding of the interplay between language and cognition. Assessing the extent to which cognitive deficits resulting from institutional care can be mitigated, and whether such improvements are sustained over time, is essential not only for advancing theoretical knowledge of cognitive development but also for informing effective policies regarding the care of children without parental support.
Michael F. Joseph's The Origins of Great Power Rivalries advances a comprehensive rationalist theory of how great powers assess emerging threats; why enduring great power rivalries unfold through either delayed competition, or delayed peace; and how diplomacy functions when rising powers emerge on the scene. In an important departure from traditional realist theory, Joseph argues that countries are motivated by distinct principles - normative values that shape foreign policy beyond simple security concerns. Exploring instances of great power competition, he explains why rational states draw qualitative inferences about rivals' intentions by examining the historical context of their demands, not just military capabilities. Offering an analysis of great power rivalries since 1850, Joseph illuminates British reactions to Stalin at the beginning of the Cold War, among other rivalries. He animates a theoretically sophisticated defense of America's approach to China in the post-Cold War era with 100s of Washington-insider interviews.
Psychologists are increasingly asked to assess intellectual functions in adults from diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. This study investigated the impact of acculturation and bilingualism on Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS)-IV performance among Arabic-Danish bilingual university students.
Methods:
Forty-eight academically high-achieving participants (69% female), fluent in Danish and educated entirely in Denmark, were recruited in Greater Copenhagen and completed a demographic questionnaire, the Danish version of the WAIS-IV, and self-report measures of acculturation and bilingualism.
Results:
Several WAIS-IV indexes and subtests were significantly associated with degree of bilingualism and acculturation, even after controlling for educational variables. Despite being academically high-achieving university students, participants scored below the national mean on most indexes and subtests. In fact, only performances on the Processing Speed Index, and the Coding and Symbol Search subtests were at the expected level. Notably, the lowest scores were observed on Block Design, which showed a strong correlation with Arabic acculturation scores. Finally, participants had index profiles that were more uneven than predicted based on the norms.
Conclusions:
These findings underscore the influence of cultural and linguistic factors on WAIS-IV performance and suggest that WAIS-IV may not fully capture the intellectual abilities of bilingual individuals, even when they are fluent in the test language and have the same educational experience as the norm population.
Observational studies report a correlation between height and intelligence, but causality and mechanisms remain unclear due to confounding and reverse causation. Using large-scale genome-wide association study (GWAS) summary data, we performed bidirectional two-sample Mendelian randomization (MR) analyses and two-step mediation analyses to examine the associations between height and intelligence (general and fluid), and potential mediation by neuroticism, body mass index (BMI), anxiety, and major depression. Genetically predicted height was positively associated with intelligence (general intelligence: β = 0.115, p = 1.2 × 10−19; fluid intelligence: β = 0.266, p = 5.7 × 10−22). Height was negatively associated with neuroticism (β = −0.032, p = 7.0 × 10−5) and BMI (β = −0.067, p = .002), which were in turn negatively associated intelligence. Mediation analyses showed significant indirect effect of neuroticism (6.09%, p = 2.6 × 10−4) and BMI (7.83%, p = 6.0 × 10−3). No mediation was found for anxiety or depression. Reverse MR also suggested positive associations of intelligence with height. This study provides genetic evidence for bidirectional association between height and intelligence, with neuroticism and BMI as potential mediators. These findings improve our understanding of the height-intelligence relationship and its underlying psychological and metabolic pathways.
We need to consider that influences of reading on cognition are not restricted only to knowledge effects obtained from the content of what is read. Reading enhances cognitive skills that are highly relevant and useful for doing well in intelligence tests. There is robust evidence that reading massively trains and consequently improves many different perceptual and cognitive abilities: The science of how reading enhances the human mind reveals the many perks of being a bookworm.
This article examines how generative AI (GenAI) is reshaping strategic crisis decision-making through the emergence of ‘synthetic foresight’ – the algorithmic simulation of adversary intentions, escalation pathways, and imagined futures under conditions of uncertainty. Unlike traditional practices such as early warning, scenario planning, wargaming, or red teaming, which discipline strategic imagination through structured engagement with uncertainty, GenAI functions as a synthetic cognitive and strategic actor, shaping how leaders anticipate, interpret, and respond to crises in real time. While the implications of GenAI span multiple domains, this study focuses on nuclear crises as the most acute and consequential test of these dynamics. The article identifies three interrelated risks: the normalisation of low-probability escalation pathways, the misattribution of adversarial intent cloaked in algorithmic certainty, and the emergence of synthetic feedback loops that can transform foresight into a driver of escalation. Together, these dynamics may generate self-fulfilling escalatory prophecies, undermining crisis stability as simulated futures begin to shape the behaviours they were intended to anticipate or prevent. The article theorises synthetic foresight as a distinct epistemic force – not merely a predictive aid, but a transformative influence on how strategic futures are imagined, interpreted, and acted upon.
Chapter 3 INTELLIGENCE SOCIALISM opposes two radically different views about the relation between skills and intelligence—elitism and socialism. Elitism—pervasive in popular culture as well as in psychometrics—is the view that only a particular class of skill—‘theoretical’, or ‘intellectual’ skills, versus ‘practical’ or ‘embodied’ skills—manifests intelligence. I single out the best case for the stronger socialist claim that no principled difference in intelligence can be found between theoretical, or intellectual, skills, and practical, or embodied skills.
Chapter 6 INTELLECTUALISMS distinguishes between forms of intellectualisms and lays out the main goal of the second part of the book: to defend a form of intellectualism about skills, skilled action, and intelligence that, while explaining the distinctive features of intelligence and skills in terms of knowledge, it shies away from fully identifying either intelligence or skills with knowledge states. It is a form of intellectualism that is compatible with socialism and that pertains to the kind of intelligent beings that we are; it concerns agentive intelligence but it also extends, in a qualified way, to subagentive intelligence, thereby widening the scope of traditional intellectualism. In all of these ways, it is intellectualism with a human face.
Our breathtaking intelligence is embodied in our skills. Think of Olympic gymnastics, and the amount of strength and control required to perform even a simple beam routine; think of a carpenter skillfully carving the wood, where complicated techniques come across as sheer easiness of the bodily movements; of a pianist performing a sonata, balancing technical virtuosity with elegance. Throughout our lifetimes, we acquire and refine a vast number of skills, and the improvement and refinement of skills are not bound to the human lifespan alone either: somehow, they also cross generations. Skills both foster cultural evolution and are refined by it – for example, in the way cultural evolution perfects tools and building techniques. What makes skills possible? And how can skills explain our successes? This book is the first systematic discussion of skills: of their nature, and of their relation to knowledge and reasoning.
This article examines the paradoxical effects of international legal accountability processes on the international law of intelligence. In response to increasing exposure of their intelligence activities, liberal democracies have shifted from a national security culture of secrecy to one of legal rationalisation, offering legal justifications to defend and legitimate contested practices. Rather than improving compliance, accountability processes have enabled states to strategically reshape legal norms to accommodate their preferred policies. Focusing on how legal justifications affect international law’s constraining function, the article analyses the effects of legal justifications on three dimensions of legal norms: obligation, precision and delegation. Intertwining doctrinal legal analysis with International Relations scholarship on rhetorical and justificatory approaches to international law, it identifies four causal mechanisms through which strategic legal justifications decrease law’s constraining power on state behaviour and facilitate norm evasion. The article demonstrates how strategic uses of international law for legitimation purposes can gradually alter legal norms without formal changes to legal texts or institutions, ultimately decreasing international law’s constraining power. Shedding light on the limits and risks of legalisation as a regulatory strategy, these findings raise important questions about the effectiveness and adequacy of legal accountability strategies, particularly strategic litigation, in inducing behavioural change.
Abstract: In this chapter, Herbert explores John Dewey’s concept of impulse in Human Nature and Conduct (1922), highlighting its oft-neglected role in his theory of agency. Dewey presents impulse as a spontaneous and creative force essential for breaking rigid habits and fostering intelligent inquiry. Unlike moral theories that treat impulse as something to suppress, he sees it as crucial to moral growth and adaptation. Dewey’s naturalistic framework situates impulse within a dynamic interplay with habit and intelligence. While habit provides stability, impulse introduces novelty, enabling the reorganization of conduct when patterns fail. This aligns Dewey with Peirce’s view of inquiry as emerging from disrupted expectations and contrasts with Bergson’s élan vital, which lacks Dewey’s empirical grounding. Dewey also engages implicitly with Freud, critiquing reductionist views of instinct while endorsing the constructive redirection of impulses through sublimation. Dewey envisions ethics as a form of empirical inquiry, treating moral agency as continuous experimentation rather than rule adherence. As Herbert concludes, Dewey critiques traditional moral philosophies for their distrust of impulse, arguing that rigid norms stifle creativity. Instead, Dewey advocates an ethics that integrates impulse, habit, and intelligence into a flexible and adaptive model for human flourishing.
Abstract: In Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Dewey writes that bad habits are ones that have a “command over us” making us “do things we prefer not to do,” because as he puts it, “we are the habit.” In this chapter, Striano describes how education has a role in our understanding of the command of habit over our lives. The chapter considers how within the process of growth we can start reshaping our habits, making them increasingly intelligent so as to inform “intelligent dispositions.” Intelligent dispositions are central to helping us come to perform new, more reflective, courses of action in the world. The chapter concludes with the ideas that such intelligently reconstructed habits − ones that have been channeled through educative experiences which account for both human plasticity and the changes and “obstacles” in our environment − have the power to determine an effective transformation of our attitudes, behaviors, and understandings and, therefore, of our selves.
Journalist and historian Mark Dapin argues that ‘every stage of Australia’s Vietnam War has been misremembered and obscured by myth'. This is not unusual. Much of Australia’s military history is coloured by storytelling and the perpetuation of legends. Several myths, legends and falsehoods have also grown around the conduct of operations of the Australian Army’s intelligence personnel during the war in South Vietnam. These range from simple fabrications and ‘storytelling’ to an attempt to deflect criticism from those responsible. One of these relates to a particular allegation of torture and the mistreatment of a prisoner by Australians during the Vietnam War.
At the end of January 1968, the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) launched their Tet Offensive, a series of coordinated attacks on more than one hundred towns and outposts in South Vietnam. These attacks aimed to foment rebellion among the South Vietnamese population so that they would revolt against the corrupt South Vietnamese regime and break the United States’ resolve before peace talks. In response to this offensive, the US and South Vietnamese forces commenced a massive operation, Toan Thang (Complete Victory), which aimed to destroy the remaining enemy involved in the Tet Offensive and prevent fresh enemy forces from moving towards the capital, Saigon. In these objectives neither side obtained complete success. In April 1ATF became part of this operation with its infantry battalions conducting ‘reconnaissance-in-force’ operations to block enemy infiltration routes. In May, the task force changed its concept of operations by deploying several units outside Phuoc Tuy province into Area of Operations (AO) Surfers, which had been sub-divided into battalion areas of operation Manly, Newport and Bondi. Artillery located at Fire Support Bases Coral and Balmoral would support these tactical areas.
The action at the Long Tan plantation on 18 August 1966, about six kilometres east of the Australian base at Nui Dat, was the Australian Army’s most significant and costliest single-day battle during the Vietnam War. Eighteen Australians died in action, and 24 were wounded. Over the years, several myths and accusations have emerged about the battle. This includes the role of some senior officers, the number of enemies that faced the Australians and the number killed, and even the timings of the battle. Some of these myths were reinforced, and new ones were created through the Danger Close feature film. Among the myths and accusations are claims of an ‘intelligence failure’ and post-war statements by the task force commander, Brigadier Oliver Jackson, that he did not have good intelligence. From an intelligence perspective, the various claims related to how a large enemy force could have approached within a few kilometres of the 1ATF base at Nui Dat without the task force’s intelligence detecting it.
After the Second World War, the Australian Army changed from one mainly comprising part-time citizen soldiers to a new generation of Royal Military College-trained officers and professional soldiers, and it witnessed the reraising of the Australian Intelligence Corps. As such, it became part of the army’s first combat deployment of the new Australian Regular Army and its transition from jungle warfare to occupation duties in Japan, to conventional action in Korea (1950–53), and then back to jungle warfare and counterinsurgency operations with the Malayan Emergency, Konfrontasi with Indonesia and the Vietnam War. The Cold War was also dominated by Australian Army operations in a combined arms and joint environment, operating as part of a multinational force and often within a multinational command organisation.
There can be little doubt, and it is arguably conventional wisdom, that the role of intelligence in the Malayan Emergency was critical to the success of the British counterinsurgency campaign against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Indeed, according to the author and unaccredited ‘official historian’ for the Emergency, Anthony Short, ‘intelligence was the key that locked counterinsurgency in place’. This view is endorsed by Lieutenant-General Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations (1950–51). He emphasised the importance of intelligence in his plan for the counterinsurgency in Malaya, known as the Briggs Plan. Briggs’s replacement was General Sir Gerald Templer, a former British Army Director of Military Intelligence (1946–48). Templer was well versed in intelligence processes and understood that an integrated and efficient intelligence system was ‘undoubtedly one of the greatest battle-winning factors in counterinsurgency warfare’. More recent authors argued that the Emergency had a far-reaching influence on the development of military intelligence. Historian Rory Cormac, for example, concluded that the Malayan experience marked the beginning of the need for coordinated intelligence assessment by integrating all intelligence resources, civil and military, and ensuring all sources were exploited.
The Korean War has been called the quiet war fought by a silent generation. Perhaps, more correctly, it should be described as the most remembered ‘forgotten’ war in history, with Google listing about 18,600,000 results. Indeed, aspects of the conflict have been forgotten. Even 70 years on, the literature is quiet on intelligence, with few historians or authors even discussing intelligence's role. Battlefield intelligence has been almost entirely neglected, except for the occasional mention in some American and British regimental histories. As Australia played a minor role in the Korean War, it is unsurprising that the part played by the Australian Army’s battlefield intelligence has hardly been mentioned.
There were two fundamental problems that the commander of 1ATF, Brigadier Oliver Jackson, had to deal with when the task force was established at Nui Dat. The first was the presence of main force enemy in Phuoc Tuy province. The second was the VCI: ‘the extortionists, the terrorists, the standover men, [and] the tax men’. This infrastructure provided a shadow government and support network for the North Vietnamese military and VC local forces in the south. Most villages and towns had representatives of this network – men, women, and children – who provided a recruitment base for the VC, an intelligence network, a supply service and various other forms of support. The VCI enabled the enemy to conduct operations in the south. While it was the National Police, ARVN and associated paramilitary forces that were responsible for its destruction, this proved to be beyond the capability of the Saigon government.
Psychological and civil affairs operations in Vietnam, while very different in scope, resource requirements and primary objectives, were also of specific interest to the intelligence staff of 1ATF. The former had the dual aims of countering VC propaganda while appealing to the ‘attitudes, vulnerabilities and susceptibilities’ of the local population to persuade them to accept and assist the South Vietnamese authorities and Australian forces. In this way, it aimed to attack the enemy’s morale and induce them to surrender. The latter sought to complement the former and support the Australian Government’s foreign policy objectives in Vietnam. From an intelligence perspective, both aided in what is now called the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, which built an extensive database on each operational area’s environment, including people, terrain, infrastructure and the level of VC support in each village. The information collected also covered ‘sociological, political and economic aspects which when related to the enemy can indicate his strengths and weaknesses’.