Turning from the pulpit to the courtroom, Chapter 4 demonstrates the centrality of frenzy to what would later come to be termed the ‘insanity defence’. The English common law had its own framework for classifying mental illness, one which ran parallel to the medical nosologies explored in Chapter 1. This chapter explores the different categories of ‘madness’ recognizsed by early modern common lawyers – partial versus total, continual versus intermittent – and shows where frenzy fitted within this framework. It then turns to look at how these theories were mobilized in a specific legal context: coroners’ inquests into unexplained drownings. Where suicide was suspected, it argues, a story about frenzy – told right – offered an escape route for suspects and their families. Crucial, here, was the issue of culpability: frantic persons could not be held accountable for what they did while their wits were impaired. Without the capacity for consent, crime was impossible.

This chapter sets out a framework to analyse the existence of international law in thirteenth-century Mongol Eurasia. It uses the category of the Universal Mongol Empire and the creation and use of the yasa (Chinggis Khan’s legal code) as the basis of the legal arena of the time. In addition to the Universal Mongol Empire, Inner Eurasia as a unit of history, the Mongol Commonwealth and the Mongol world system are used to identify the making and practice of international law in this period. The Mongol Khans articulated a specific world view that accommodated the disparateness of the Eurasian landscape, be it peoples, civilizations, religions or political ideologies. Governance (political and economic) of this multifarious empire relied on institutions that permeated throughout the empire and gave it coherence. Thus the focus is on conveying the meaning of sovereignty and law which was a product of interpolity relations that had taken place over centuries. Consequently the chapter seeks to broaden the discipline of modern international law by engaging with historic Eurasia, specifically Mongol rule in the thirteenth century.

The revisionist school has asserted that pre-colonial indigenous polities were fluid shadow entities and that pre-British South Asian regimes had no law. This line of argument claims that unique conditions of India prevented the emergence of states with well-defined contiguous territories possessing centralised governments. Ironically this view is reminiscent of colonial British scholars’ argument about pre-colonial India. The argument that pre-British India had no laws and that the ruler’s will was the ultimate authority is incorrect. Rulers of pre-British indigenous polities did not operate in a vacuum, but had to take into account long-established practices, existing procedures and the presence of local powerbrokers. Arabic discourse for the Delhi Sultanate and Turko-Mongol conventions for the Mughals, along with local custom, shaped the legal history of medieval India’s militaries. Overall, the political theorists of the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughal Empire and the ‘Hindu’ dynasties accepted the pivotal role of the monarchy and the army in shaping the structure of interpolity relationships.

This chapter focuses on the expressive functions of tears, the face and the body on the early modern stage, to probe the deep relation between drama and the law, including their entwined but distinct investments in natural self-evidence and the rhetoric of presence. Through an interdiscursive approach, it shows how drama mines the complexities of hypokrisis through an engagement with the radical performativity at the core of law, and offers the provocation that law’s disknowledges are turned into a poetic condition of theatrical knowledge, and a forging of subjecthood and inwardness that complicates the distinction between the fiction of theatre and the reality of the law court. It ends with the suggestion that the theatre looks at, as well as beyond, the vivid invisibilities of judicial encounters to unpack the epistemic, affective and ethical impulses structuring the ‘scene’ of law.

In conversation with Peters’s Law as Performance, I suggest paying closer attention to dialogue as one central element of performance itself. In this contribution, I analyze the configuration of affective spaces based on the characteristics of dialogue in legal settings, from legislation to inquisitorial cases.

This chapter focuses on the legal framework for the use of AI in courts in Croatia and Slovenia, which results from their legal traditions as well as their membership in the Council of Europe and the EU. It also aims to discuss AI systems, either operational or in development, in both countries, and to evaluate their impact on fundamental rights and ethics. The findings demonstrate that while both countries experience a slow but gradual introduction of AI initiatives, in Slovenia this is happening without pre-existing or rigorous regulatory oversight.

Appearing at the tail end of this volume, I begin with a brief meditation on the coda. A (musical) ending, the vulgar form of cauda (tail or privy member), figure of our fallen state, the coda may also be a whip or goad to inspiration or even exaltation. Attempting to turn my posterior position to good ends, I have, in the place of an ending, used the chapters here as provocations and inspirations. Recognizing in them a more expansive account of legal performance than my own, I point to how they unbind law and performance from the rigid definitional strictures on which I have relied, how they challenge the boundaries between text and performance, performance and law, law and world, world and fiction (the veritas falsa of theatre and the falsitas verus of law), how they show the methodological Über-Ich (with its rules and dogmas) to be unseated by an ontological Id that scoffs at its laws. That force – like the comedic cauda in the courtroom – answers legal solemnities with impudent laughter and other “minor jurisprudences of refusal,” creating heterotopias, wild zones, rehearsals for alternative futures.

Judicial systems, long considered the most tradition-bound of public institutions, are at a critical juncture. From Strasbourg to São Paulo, from Delhi to Wellington, courts around the globe confront a shared challenge: how to navigate justice in an era redefined by artificial intelligence (AI). The question is no longer whether courts will engage with AI – but how, and on whose terms. This Handbook is the first global and comparative volume that systematically examines the use of AI and digital technologies in courts. It provides an interdisciplinary and cross-jurisdictional perspective on how judicial institutions are responding to the opportunities and risks posed by AI – from e-filing systems and predictive tools to ‘robo-judging’ and AI- supported decision-making. The forty-five contributions of the Handbook are arranged across ‘Part I: AI and Courts: Context and Normative Positions’, ‘Part II: AI and Courts: Disciplinary Perspectives’, ‘Part III: AI & Tech Challenges to Judicial Values’, and ‘Part IV: AI in Courts across the Globe: Jurisdictional Perspectives’, with each part offering a distinct analytical lens on justice and judging in the age of AI. The Handbook examines not just what AI can do for courts, but also what courts must do to ensure AI enhances, rather than erodes, their fundamental role in democratic societies.

Law, with its seemingly endless paperwork, is almost overwhelmingly textual. From contracts to briefs to opinions to treatises, law lives in its texts. Simultaneously, law requires performances to produce authenticity and authority. Witness testimonies, pleadings, and trials all enact the law through participants’ bodies. There is no law without text. There is no law without performance. Legal texts and performances produce and reproduce each other: Legal texts record or script legal performances; legal performances generate or stage legal texts. Because law entwines text and performance, this chapter considers the law’s material textuality and its theatricality in tandem by probing how law brings performance to book. Drawing on theater studies and the history of dramatic texts, I offer methods for reading legal texts as scripts that precede or follow legal performances. Examples from Anglo-American law reveal that legal documents’ typographical conventions uncover law’s reliance on performance and its anxiety about deviating from textuality. More sophisticated legal attention to the relationship between text and performance would better serve law and, more importantly, justice.

Anosognosia, commonly understood as a lack of insight, renders individuals with schizophreniaand schizoaffective disorder unable to understand that they are living with a disease, often resulting in a refusal to accept treatment. Typically, to impose involuntary commitment in an effort to obtain treatment, an individualmust be a danger to others or themselves. Even if involuntary commitment is imposed, however, an individualmay remain competent to refuse medication—despite symptoms of anosognosia and an inability to understand that they are ill. This article examines the existing legal theories of competency and informed consent and proposes a statutory definition of competency that encompasses the specific needs of people with anosognosia, while considering the significant interests at stake when taking away an individual’s right to choose or refuse treatment.

This book’s Introduction sets out the key intellectual and historical contexts for its argument. It shows that religious belief gained an important cultural emphasis after the Reformation and that it was considered to be distinct from other kinds of belief or assent. Engaging with scholarly discussions of belief, this introduction suggests that the period from around 1580 to the 1650s witnessed an attempt to investigate what was particular about a specifically religious kind of belief. Its certainty and spiritual origin were compared to, and contrasted with, other kinds of assent that were generated by probable forms of argument. An important and widespread way of effecting this comparison involved considering religious belief alongside the kinds of assent generated in legal settings – when witness evidence is evaluated for its credibility. The introduction roots this discursive method in contemporary legal culture, before surveying recent scholarship on literary culture, law and religion.

Medical providers involved in child abuse cases will encounter a variety of issues with legal implications, including informed consent, appropriate documentation, confidentiality, mandated reporting and potential liability. Consequently, all medical providers who may become involved in child abuse cases should have a fundamental understanding of child maltreatment laws in their jurisdiction. While informed consent is a well-established medicolegal doctrine in many countries, there are often jurisdiction-specific variations in cases of suspected child maltreatment. Complete, accurate and objective medical documentation is also imperative, as medical reports are frequently submitted in legal proceedings. Care should be taken, however, to ensure appropriate release and retention of medical records in accordance with country-specific legislation (e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and 21st Century Cures Act in the United States). Finally, medical providers should understand their responsibility to report to the appropriate protective services agency if there is reasonable suspicion that child maltreatment has occurred. A practitioner’s failure to adhere to statutory requirements may result in negative actions against the provider.

Though coverage denials and delays impose on physicians and patients (especially marginalized patients) substantial administrative burden, the persistence of this practice is inevitable. Drawing on interviews with patients and former health insurance executives, this chapter reflects on harms caused by prior authorization and offers a menu of state and federal solutions to expand access to care, while also reflecting on how the 2024 election results impact their likelihood. A growing complication is major insurers’ increasing reliance on AI tools to process prior authorizations and claims in seconds. Though many states have sought to lessen prior authorization burden in targeted ways, this reach is limited because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts state policies that “relate to” much of employer-sponsored health insurance. Despite some appetite for reform in Congress, legislative efforts have stalled. The 2024 election results signal a likely acceleration of America’s reliance on privatization (especially Medicare Advantage), so it is especially important to understand the impact of these managed care practices and ways to mitigate their burdens.

This chapter examines efforts to list Kenya’s ‘minorities’ and ‘marginalised communities,’ categories in the 2010 constitution entitled to affirmative action in government representation, resource distribution and public service employment. These are the first classifications with allocative consequences since colonial times. I examine how these terms are operationalised in legal cases, by government Commissions, and by civil society. I show the impossibility of arriving at a fixed list and illuminate myriad strategies for responding to competing political demands for status. These are quintessential examples of cultivated vagueness. I show how this enables both generosity in conferring special status and its application in divisive ways. I use three cases of code seeking – Nubian, Wayyu and Sakuye peoples – to further illustrate both how vague codes have become and how politically salient they are. I examine both the limits of classification in this space and explore ways to make them work to benefit marginalised people. I conclude with some alternatives to classification for remedying marginalisation.

Grounded in comparative politics, this chapter presents new theory in comparative political economy: First, it argues that, in the context of technological transition, a legal system that facilitates reassignment of property rights, making certain rights less secure, plays an important and under-theorized role in promoting economic development. It focuses on China’s technological transition from a rural, agricultural economy to an urban, industrial one to highlight the relationship between technology change, reassignment of land rights, and transformative economic growth. The chapter reinterprets England’s post–Glorious-Revolution reassignment of land rights, using enclosure, estate, turnpike, and other parliamentary acts, in light of China’s rise. It also identifies the problem of state misallocation of land resources in the Chinese case. Second, it argues that the authoritarian state also invests in the formal legal system in order to manage conflict over changes in land rights and to legitimate the state. It revisits England’s eighteenth-century use of law, including the Riot Act and Black Act, to contain protest over dispossession and compares it to China’s embrace of authoritarian legality to repress conflict. The chapter defines liberal and illiberal law in both form and content and locates the analysis in the context of the law-and-development movement.

Chapter 2 uses official data and primary documents to examine land as a factor of production and the legal status of land in China’s political economy. It highlights how insecure property rights and incomplete markets for land diverge from the liberal economic model. As codified in law, the state generates rents through its ability to take land from the rural sector at below-market prices to sell into the urban real estate and industrial sectors at higher and lower prices, respectively. This pattern is reminiscent of the planned economy and enacts urban bias. Local governments rely on land for revenue, as a tool of industry policy, and for capital mobilization through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). Informality persists in the form of illegal land conversion and “small property rights” in urban villages and elsewhere. Beyond the analysis of land law at the rural-urban interface, the chapter also analyzes land rights within the rural and urban sectors, respectively. Within the agricultural sector, reforms have improved the property rights of rural households to arable land, but limits on rights and sources of insecurity remain. Urban households have been the beneficiaries of housing reforms, giving them a vested interest in resisting property taxes.