This chapter examines efforts to list Kenya’s ‘minorities’ and ‘marginalised communities,’ categories in the 2010 constitution entitled to affirmative action in government representation, resource distribution and public service employment. These are the first classifications with allocative consequences since colonial times. I examine how these terms are operationalised in legal cases, by government Commissions, and by civil society. I show the impossibility of arriving at a fixed list and illuminate myriad strategies for responding to competing political demands for status. These are quintessential examples of cultivated vagueness. I show how this enables both generosity in conferring special status and its application in divisive ways. I use three cases of code seeking – Nubian, Wayyu and Sakuye peoples – to further illustrate both how vague codes have become and how politically salient they are. I examine both the limits of classification in this space and explore ways to make them work to benefit marginalised people. I conclude with some alternatives to classification for remedying marginalisation.

This chapter focuses on the expressive functions of tears, the face and the body on the early modern stage, to probe the deep relation between drama and the law, including their entwined but distinct investments in natural self-evidence and the rhetoric of presence. Through an interdiscursive approach, it shows how drama mines the complexities of hypokrisis through an engagement with the radical performativity at the core of law, and offers the provocation that law’s disknowledges are turned into a poetic condition of theatrical knowledge, and a forging of subjecthood and inwardness that complicates the distinction between the fiction of theatre and the reality of the law court. It ends with the suggestion that the theatre looks at, as well as beyond, the vivid invisibilities of judicial encounters to unpack the epistemic, affective and ethical impulses structuring the ‘scene’ of law.

In conversation with Peters’s Law as Performance, I suggest paying closer attention to dialogue as one central element of performance itself. In this contribution, I analyze the configuration of affective spaces based on the characteristics of dialogue in legal settings, from legislation to inquisitorial cases.

Appearing at the tail end of this volume, I begin with a brief meditation on the coda. A (musical) ending, the vulgar form of cauda (tail or privy member), figure of our fallen state, the coda may also be a whip or goad to inspiration or even exaltation. Attempting to turn my posterior position to good ends, I have, in the place of an ending, used the chapters here as provocations and inspirations. Recognizing in them a more expansive account of legal performance than my own, I point to how they unbind law and performance from the rigid definitional strictures on which I have relied, how they challenge the boundaries between text and performance, performance and law, law and world, world and fiction (the veritas falsa of theatre and the falsitas verus of law), how they show the methodological Über-Ich (with its rules and dogmas) to be unseated by an ontological Id that scoffs at its laws. That force – like the comedic cauda in the courtroom – answers legal solemnities with impudent laughter and other “minor jurisprudences of refusal,” creating heterotopias, wild zones, rehearsals for alternative futures.

Law, with its seemingly endless paperwork, is almost overwhelmingly textual. From contracts to briefs to opinions to treatises, law lives in its texts. Simultaneously, law requires performances to produce authenticity and authority. Witness testimonies, pleadings, and trials all enact the law through participants’ bodies. There is no law without text. There is no law without performance. Legal texts and performances produce and reproduce each other: Legal texts record or script legal performances; legal performances generate or stage legal texts. Because law entwines text and performance, this chapter considers the law’s material textuality and its theatricality in tandem by probing how law brings performance to book. Drawing on theater studies and the history of dramatic texts, I offer methods for reading legal texts as scripts that precede or follow legal performances. Examples from Anglo-American law reveal that legal documents’ typographical conventions uncover law’s reliance on performance and its anxiety about deviating from textuality. More sophisticated legal attention to the relationship between text and performance would better serve law and, more importantly, justice.

This chapter addresses one of the most important areas of philosophy – ethics – and uses it to examine aspects of the role of the law in education. Of all the areas of philosophy, more has probably been written about ethics, and over a longer period, than any other. In addition, all cultures are structured around a fundamental ethical system: the law. However, irrespective of their importance, both subjects are currently notable for their lowly status within the teacher education curriculum.

Chapter 3 looks at the various ways Muslims in the early Islamic centuries constructed a variety of idealised communities engaging with dialogues between universal ideas and more particularist ones, an endeavour that can be seen in a number of different scholarly fields. The first half of the chapter looks at debates in the fields of theology (specifically prophetology), law and politics (and political theology); the second half considers ideas about attachment to territory and the existence of a united Muslim world, before ending with a brief consideration of the social significance of gradual processes of conversion to Islam. One of the key arguments of this book is that local history-writing was one way for certain elites to deal with the dialogue between universal and more particular concerns as they envisioned and created their communities. Chapter 3 lays the groundwork for this by exploring that dialogue in fields ranging beyond history alone.

Although the main focus of the dialogue is practical deliberation rather than political and legal theory, it has over time provided stimulus to such theorizing. In this dialogue, the bond between citizen and state is portrayed as one of personal commitment. Strikingly, Plato does not invoke natural law, divine law, Kantian generalizations, or consequentialist theories where he might have done.

This chapter notes that British law was hybrid in character, and also novel, standardized and sometimes ill-matched with India, but nonetheless adopted by many Indians as well as for official policy and purposes. The discussion mostly excludes criminal law but gives accounts of how civil law was applied. First described are codifications of Hindu and Muslim law, the evolving civil court system and laws on landed property and agrarian debt – with impact on production as well as social norms, alongside continuing sociopolitical dominance. Next considered are labour, contract and company laws, with limited range and effect, applying mostly to Western-style enterprises rather than to more substantial indigenous practice. Banks and currency were similarly regulated, with direct Indian influence only in the last decades of British rule. Such comprehensive, uniform law impinged more on some aspects of society and economy than on others, but did gradually and permanently reshape Indian practice.

The earth’s shadow darkens the initial Heavens of Dante’s ascent, the shadow waning the nearer a Heaven is to that of the Sun.The inhabitants of the last earth-shadowed Heaven turn to that Heaven hoping to be free from the imperfections of terrestrial existence.But these Heavens’ vestigial earthiness exerts an effect.Each focuses on a particular imperfection: the fragility of moral vows; the defect of human law as a vehicle of justice; and the reign of “mad love.”These produce an urge to transcend this region.

But Dante has readers assess the losses as well as the gains that accrue when we leave our world behind.This assessment puts reason on trial, its inadequacies seeming to sanction reason’s subordination to faith as provided in the vision that beckons above.But these Heavens ask not only whether that’s possible but desirable.Reason’s inadequacies are shown to be inseparable from moral responsibility, from more just politics, and from the desires that generate the Comedy.Asking whether the transcendence of terrestrial existence makes for a happier life, Dante gives readers cause to consider the possibility that these earth-shadowed Heavens are more than merely a necessary step on the way to perfection.

Law students routinely forget that the legal tradition has been concerned with fact finding for centuries. The entire body of evidence law has evolved for two important purposes: ensuring that the evidence presented to a court is legally admissible; and ensuring that the evidence presented to the court is reliable so that the tribunal of fact is able to draw conclusions about whether or not an alleged fact existed in circumstances where the tribunal of fact has not witnessed the event for itself. Legal reasoning is empirically grounded and draws upon centuries of human experience in the examination of materials of this kind. With that in mind, principles from evidence law can be used to help us to think about facts as part of the analysis of a legal problem. Indeed, turning your mind to the rich body of evidence law is essential. It is not possible in a book like this to engage with evidence law in any detail. Evidence law in Australia is comprehensively examined by several authoritative authors, to which the reader is referred to for detail.

The discipline of law is unique as a body of knowledge. It is both theoretical and applied. Abstract and concrete. Moral and amoral. Just and cruel. And at its heart is a moment in which the abstract is translated into concrete action, a process that depends on theoretical application to the physical world. That application is linked to the art of problem solving. Human beings are problem-solving animals. All of us possess skills and experiences that enable us to engage with obstacles and problems in life. A problem is characterised by some event, experience or situation where our usual methods of operating and achieving desired ends are slowed down, prevented from operating or simply no longer work in that environment. Failure to successfully navigate a problem creates a crisis, during which we engage in different forms of conduct and thinking to find a resolution. Crises operate on a spectrum. Some are life- threatening. Some are innocuous. But the underlying dynamic is much the same. Problem solving is an adaptive and evolved trait that humans share with other animals and that enables us to survive in changing environments.

Writing up your answer is shaped by context. As a student, you are often called upon to answer a problem question in a specific format, such as a memorandum or letter of advice, with the added complication of a word limit. Students are often not aware that the requirement to write in a particular manner, with specific limits, is a pedagogical tool intended to reflect the kinds of documents used in practice, along with the need to strike a balance between accuracy and brevity. Being able to write sharply is an important skill in practice. Practitioners are also restricted by context. By now you should have a sense that the process is a complex one, and part of the art of lawyering is being able to translate complexity in ways that different audiences need to understand the situation. A person without legal training needs to have things explained as simply as possible. A practitioner will need the necessary detail, but keep in mind that time is money, and verbose correspondence is unnecessary and not appreciated. A barrister will need all the relevant information presented in such a way that the issues and complexities are clear and sharply identified.

In this chapter the aim is to undertake something of a guided analysis of a problem and apply the principles discussed so far. To that end, let’s now return to the problem set out in Appendix A. For this exercise, it is useful to begin by making notes, both of the information within the hypothetical and of the law. Using the steps explored in the last chapter as a guide, simply begin by reading the hypothetical in Appendix A. Note the people involved, the event(s), and especially the question you have been asked. Make some notes on your initial thoughts, before looking back over the Chapter 5 context. Then begin a systematic examination of the information.

Problem solving is an art form, which takes years of practice, experience, a thorough understanding of the law, and a thorough understanding of human behaviour. This chapter presents some basic ideas to set you on the path. There are several steps involved in dealing with a problem. Please keep in mind that legal reasoning is not linear, although it can be. Much depends on the nature of the problem. It involves the ability to proceed in a linear, logical approach in some cases, and a universal, nomadic approach in others. In this chapter we look at strategies for problem solving. Up to now we have talked about way of thinking about law and fact in the context of a problem solving analytic. The discussion is then steered towards application. Two approaches are suggested: one basic, the other advanced. Both approaches are outlined here. The model you choose really depends on your purpose and the depth of analytical detail needed.

Through an analysis of his Pauline exegesis in the 390s, especially Romans 7, Chapter 2 demonstrates that Augustine develops a consistent interpretation of Paul on justification: faith justifies because it trusts God to give the grace of charity to fulfill the law by the Holy Spirit in baptism. The chapter situates this interpretation within the predominantly baptismal theology of justification in Ambrose and North Africa. This context unlocks how Augustine’s account of faith justifying by obtaining grace is intended to interpret the catechumen’s reception of the Holy Spirit in baptism; in Augustine’s own analogy, faith is the conception of grace, and baptism is its birth. Turning to ad Simplicianum (To Simplician), Augustine’s changed view on election preserves this interpretation of justification by faith. The chapter concludes by applying Augustine’s interpretation of Paul to his conversion in confessiones (Confessions), though this also reveals Augustine’s need to explain why faith sometimes fails to obtain grace.

You will have seen that a significant part of legal reasoning is linked to interpretation, and that the law plays an important part in shaping the rules of interpretation. This is especially true in the interpretation of legislation, which forms most of the conceptual terrain in which contemporary criminal law is located. This chapter introduces some of the core concepts linked to statutory interpretation principles applicable to the criminal law. Please note that this is by no means a comprehensive review but serves as an introductory overview.

This introductory chapter details the purpose of the collection and its structure. This collection presents the state-of-the-art research in applied linguistics directly relevant to procedural and administrative law and practice, with an emphasis on how legal procedure is constructed, negotiated and implemented through language. Covering the themes around legal process and legal profession through the lens of linguistics, the focus of this collection is very firmly on the applicability of linguistic theory and methodology to the context of legal practice. The Introduction also outlines the chapters, which draw on distinct methods and data types to explore diverse aspects of professional practice across a number of jurisdictions. In doing so, the chapter highlights the immense potential for incorporating linguistic insights into the legal process and the benefits it can bring to law researchers and practitioners.

Law is an applied and theoretical discipline. To that end, the law must be applied to the facts available when assessing the alignment of the facts with the law. In this respect law is an empirical discipline, one that requires objective fact and law in association with one another in its application. Evidence must exist to establish fact, while law must exist to establish the rule structure. The relationship between law and evidence is unique, for it is not simply the existence of objectively present objects that will establish the fact – the fact in law is subject to further legal construction through the laws of evidence. One aspect of that process is an object or event that has actual existence may not, as a matter of law, be available to the decision maker because of legal invalidity. Hence the empirical foundations of law are based on admissible evidence rather than mere evidence. This will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3.