The global order is undergoing significant transformations with far-reaching implications for international criminal justice. These shifts pose an existential challenge to core crimes accountability while re-shaping its pursuit. As the liberal order recedes, the International Criminal Court (ICC) faces a crisis driven by absolute sovereignty’s reassertion, weakened multilateral governance and increasing political and coercive pressures from powerful states. Simultaneously, these developments promote decentralised accountability, fostering the emergence of a polycentric system of international criminal justice. Trends in re-nationalisation, hybridisation and regionalisation align accountability with a more pluralistic, fluid global order. In this context, the ICC is not obsolete but requires a redefined role. While no longer the apex of international criminal justice, its existence remains crucial to addressing the risks of decentralised accountability. The Court, particularly its Office of the Prosecutor, should reconfigure strategies around positive complementarity, repositioning itself as a co-ordinating hub within this polycentric system.

This symposium grew out of dissatisfaction with the existing theories of institutions. Notwithstanding significant progress in the analysis of the macro-institutions through which systemic rules and norms are established and the micro-institutions through which actors decide and implement transactions within the playing field thus defined, researchers working along one or the other dimension faced a critical and largely unanswered question: how to bridge the gap between these two institutional layers? The selected articles assembled in this issue came out of efforts to identify and understand within a unified theoretical framework the arrangements through which these layers interact. Building on contributions in economics and other social sciences as well as from in-depth empirical studies, these articles explore the relevance of the concept of ‘meso-institutions’ to designate and characterize the devices (e.g. regulatory agencies) and mechanisms (e.g. guidelines) that connect the macro- and micro-institutional layers.

Medieval lex mercatoria refers to the customary commercial law developed by merchants to govern cross-border trade, operating alongside and sometimes independently of territorial legal systems. This paper compares that historical form of autonomous ordering with contemporary blockchain governance. Both create institutional frameworks that facilitate exchange among diverse actors and provide mechanisms that function, to varying degrees, outside traditional state authority. The key difference lies in how rules are generated and enforced: medieval merchant law relied on flexible norms interpreted by merchant courts and other human adjudicators, whereas blockchain systems seek to reduce ambiguity by encoding rules ex ante in smart contracts and automating enforcement. Decentralized decision-making and emerging forms of on-chain adjudication further reimagine dispute resolution without centralized judicial power. The central claim is that both represent polycentric legal orders whose significance ultimately depends on how they interact with, complement, or challenge formal governmental institutions.

Carmen Pavel has recently provided an illuminating analysis of the limits of anarchic legal orders and, by extension, current arrangements for international law (Pavel 2021). Central to her argument is an account of the structural flaws in market anarchist institutions. The current paper argues that market anarchist theorists have robust responses to at least some of Pavel’s criticisms. From the anarchist viewpoint, statist approaches to legal enforcement have problems that are at least as “structural” as those Pavel attributes to anarchism. The paper seeks to articulate this anarchist position and clarify the ways in which it complicates some of Pavel’s claims. It then offers some suggestions regarding what insights this market anarchist perspective might offer for our understanding of international law.

The American K12 education system has long been seen as centralized and rigid. The 1990s saw the emergence of several changes, which arguably pushed it in a potentially more polycentric, localized direction. Many school choice policies have developed since then, and a large amount of research has been conducted on these trends in American education since 1991. Just prior to these changes, in 1991, Davis and Ostrom published ‘A Public Economy Approach to Education: Choice and Co-Production’. That work sought to examine the extent of co-production in American schools to that time, and the extent to which the system was polycentric. This paper seeks to use Davis & Ostrom’s framing and to update their work in the current context. U.S. education policy has generally become more decentralized during this time, but not consistently. This paper also finds that U.S. education policy and practice has in fact developed along several of the lines Davis & Ostrom predicted.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has made it increasingly difficult to protect and enforce intellectual property (IP) rights in a digital landscape where content can be easily accessed and utilized without clear authorization. First, we explain why LLMs make it uniquely difficult to protect and enforce IP, creating a ‘tragedy of the commons.’ Second, drawing on theories of polycentric governance, we argue that non-fungible tokens (NFTs) could be effective tools for addressing the complexities of digital IP rights. Third, we provide an illustrative case study that shows how NFTs can facilitate dispute resolution of IP on the blockchain.

Collusive agreements in the form of corporate cartels are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on terms that are legally not enforceable. However, the interplay between the involved firms in a collusive agreement, i.e., the governance dimension within a cartel, has received surprisingly low attention. Using a comprehensive OECD dataset of 191 cartels from 2012 to 2018, this paper empirically demonstrates how polycentric governance within a cartel may possibly contribute to understanding its stability. It may be beneficial for the duration and lower sanctions imposed by competition authorities, especially for large cartels. By that, the paper sheds new light on two aspects: the entangled governance structures of corporate cartels and the relevance of the concept of polycentricity beyond public administration.

Based on a linguistic ethnographic study of student–teacher classroom interactions, this article sheds light on language norms in a contemporary Danish STX school (upper secondary education, also known as gymnasiums). The analysis reveals that neither classrooms with the explicit teaching of an ‘academic register’ nor classrooms where teachers orient towards a youth norm constitute spaces where students have equal access to perform as good students. Even when students can decode and reproduce the language preferred by the teachers, they do not experience an equal opportunity to conform to this. It is argued that performing linguistically as good and competent students is more complex than just adapting to a specific school norm, as the students have to navigate different teacher’s norms as well as peer norms emphasising authenticity.

This paper reveals a novel and perhaps surprising ingredient in the mix of influences that inspired and informed the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom on self-governance: cybernetics, understood as a theory of control via feedback mechanisms. Based on this crucial insight, the paper portrays self-governance as involving an architecture of multiple levels of so-called ‘second order’ feedback mechanisms. Such compounded systems of organization are the key to understanding any self-governance process and the paper argues that their intrinsic logic provides a critical link between the work of the Ostroms and the public choice and constitutional political economy perspectives on institutional order. The paper thereby offers both a fresh perspective on the Ostromian view of self-governance and also of also of governance theory in general.

In the 1840s, the polka craze established lead/follow partner dancing as the normative social dance structure in the Atlantic world. In the process, it imposed a choreographed performance of bourgeois heteropatriarchy (originally developed with the waltz) on Europe's colonies and post-colonies. However, a central mechanism of the lead/follow system in social partner dance is the woman's body attitude, and as the nature of that attitude changes, so do the associated dances. In the Americas, women acculturated to African-rooted principles of polycentricity disrupted the equilibrium of the lead/follow dynamic, catalyzing the creation of new partner dance forms and techniques. On the one hand, this resulted in an intensification of the lead/follow system such that men could now control and shape the dissociated parts of their partners’ bodies. On the other hand, it also seeded the fissioning and eventual dissolution of the dance partnership itself.

A substantial experimental literature in behavioral economics and psychology finds that individuals rely on heuristics and cognitive biases when they make decisions. These heuristics and biases impact the choices of individuals from all walks of life, including police officers entrusted with the power to enforce laws. Individuals act within an institutional context. We examine how the institutions that structure American policing interact with the heuristics and biases of individual police officers. We then suggest institutional changes that may result in better performance from boundedly rational police officers.

In response to Paniagua and Rayamajhee's (2021) proposal for a polycentric approach for pandemic governance, Frolov (2022) notes that their paper focuses on preventive measures, and neglects the deeper, cognitive dimension of coproduction. In this essay, we extend the notion of coproduction to analyze the cognitive institutions that underlie social behavior during a pandemic. We analyze the role of coproduction and polycentricity in the emergence and persistence of shared mental models, including counterproductive models such as virus skepticism, conspiracy theory beliefs, and antivaccine narratives.

Pablo Paniagua and Veeshan Rayamajhee (2021) propose an Ostromian polycentric view on coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) preventative measures co-produced by the state and citizens. I argue that we should also use another Ostromian approach – ‘crafting of institutions.’ Focusing on the crafting of cognitive institutions allows us to understand the co-production of virus containment in all its complexity. Combining the ‘crafting cognitive institutions’ and ‘boosting’ approaches will allow for the creation of institutionally and behaviorally informed anti-COVID policy interventions in line with polycentric pandemic governance.