The interpretation of Hegelian theodicy that has emerged over previous chapters finally allows us to understand Hegel’s accusation that Leibnizian theodicy is undermined by its ‘abstract’ and ‘indeterminate’ categories. As Hegel’s fuller discussion of Leibniz’s theodicy shows, the root of the problem is that his theodicy is afflicted by two kinds of ‘arbitrariness’: first, Leibniz’s application of axiological criteria to worldly instances eludes rational comprehension; second, Leibniz simply presupposes those criteria, with the result that the mutual implication of good and evil remains an unexplained given. Hegel’s own theodical enterprise, however, is not without its internal tensions. Following through on the logic of Hegel’s theodicy as geared towards effecting reconciliation means seeing it as effecting a break with the juridical model found in Kant and Leibniz: the goal of justification must be renounced not as unrealisable, but as misconceived. Nevertheless, Hegel’s own presentations of the goal of his philosophy frequently betrays a justificatory ambition that marks a fundamental continuity with his predecessors, seemingly invoking a teleological logic, whereby history can be measured by an absolute end or standard. The ultimate assessment of Hegelian theodicy turns, in large part, on whether this should be understood as rhetoric or rationale.

This chapter begins with an interpretation of the final sections of the ‘Spirit’ chapter of the Phenomenology. Here, Hegel diagnoses the paradoxes of Kantian theodicy before going on to elaborate, in a highly allegorical idiom, how he envisages overcoming the dichotomy between divine and human standpoints that plagued his Leibnizian and Kantian predecessors. By developing the thesis that evil is a structural possibility of rational self-conscious, the culminating dialectic of ‘conscience’ posits an essential relation between human freedom and the historicity of the good; the ideal of conscience, of a unity between natural and ethical wills, is their continually coming apart. The chapter then moves away from the Phenomenology to elaborate the resulting picture of Hegelian theodicy in its own terms, drawing also on Hegel’s preface to his Philosophy of Right. Hegelian theodicy stands revealed as reconciling us to reality by fulfilling a primarily diagnostic function, resolving our theodical puzzlement by explaining its mistaken, but intelligible, origins. To bring out the specificity of this view of Hegel’s project, the chapter ends by contrasting it with two recent alternatives, Michael Rosen’s ‘right Hegelian’ and Robert Brandom’s ‘left Hegelian’ interpretations.

This chapter details the vital role of Indigenous trade and investment in promoting sustainable development. Firstly, it discusses the prerequisite for Indigenous trade, emphasizing a nation-building approach centred on the significance of robust tribal infrastructure. The chapter then addresses the barriers hindering Indigenous inter-tribal trade, including state, or provincial interference in tribal jurisdiction, poor tribal governance, Canada’s failure to honour its Jay Treaty obligations, the lack of Indigenous foreign trade zones, the exclusion of Indigenous traditional knowledge (TK) from intellectual property (IP) regimes, and historical challenges in trade financing. Additionally, the chapter explores Indigenous trade and commerce engagements with non-Indigenous enterprises, both with and without federal permission, highlighting the implications, challenges, and opportunities involved. By examining these aspects, the chapter advocates for empowering Indigenous nations through trade and investment, fostering economic opportunities while preserving cultural heritage, and working towards sustainable development by creating a strong economic baseline.

This chapter presents a case study of Canada, examining the intricate relationship between Indigenous peoples and the developments related to British, then Canadian, governance. It begins by exploring the historical and legal context within which Indigenous peoples exist in Canada, tracing the impact of colonization and the recognition of Indigenous rights. The chapter then investigates the potential for affirming these rights through treaties and trade agreements, highlighting the role of treaties in recognizing and protecting Indigenous rights and the opportunities and challenges presented by trade agreements for Indigenous economic development and self-determination. It further analyses the Canadian government’s efforts to domestically enforce the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and the intersection of Canadian treaties with trade agreements. This chapter emphasizes the importance of ongoing dialogue, collaboration, and the implementation of measures aligned with UNDRIP principles to foster the recognition, empowerment, and well-being of Indigenous peoples within the Canadian context.

This chapter brings in the complexities of the intersection between renewable resources, sustainable development, and Indigenous treaty law. It begins by examining international guidance for renewable energy sources and their role in achieving sustainability objectives. This chapter then delves into the principles and rules governing sustainable forestry practices, fisheries management, and energy development. It highlights the importance of international agreements, protocols, and treaties in promoting responsible resource management, conservation, and the recognition of Indigenous rights and knowledge. By considering these principles and rules within the context of Indigenous treaty law, it highlights the need for harmonious and inclusive approaches to renewable resource use in the age of sustainable development. It underlines the significance of collaboration, respect for Indigenous knowledge, and the integration of sustainability principles to ensure a balanced and equitable relationship between renewable resources, Indigenous rights, and sustainable development.

Chapter 5 explores bottom-up diasporic state-building through the case study of the Swedish diaspora, which largely worked outside the structures of the state through civil society and grass-roots mobilisation. It firstly contextualises diasporic activity within Sweden’s foreign policy stance towards Iraq and how this shaped and limited mobilisation in 2003. The chapter later demonstrates how the Swedish diaspora organisations were able to influence Swedish policymakers and institute diaspora co-development projects in Iraq through Sweden’s development agency and Sweden’s democratic tradition. It also uncovers the challenges these endeavours faced in the context of conflict and insecurity in Iraq. In later years, the diaspora was able to initiate other initiatives such as the Diaspora Initiative for National Reconciliation and Dialogue, which attempted to reconcile Iraq’s fractious politics by bringing together opposing political factions in Iraq to talk and find common ground. Finally, the chapter reflects on how Iraq’s fragmented state-building has empowered majorities and disempowered minorities both in Iraq and in the diaspora, drawing attention to the way power is also distributed transnationally and how this has altered connections and mobilisation towards Iraq.

The final chapter of the book offers a reflection on the overarching dimensions that guided the selection of the eight Historical Trauma contexts. Here, the emphasis is placed on the concept of multi-directional memory, a notion derived from memory studies that can be employed to circumvent victimhood competition. Selected concepts related to the HT definition criteria are compared across the different contexts. To this end, a series of flowcharts were developed to illustrate the historical trajectories of the concepts discussed in the book, including conspiracy of silence, victim identity, and value compilations. The comparison of social pathologies and reconciliation is given a broad scope. The concept of healing is addressed, and it is noted that the social and cultural science literature has been reticent to engage in discussions about the reasoned use of the concept that is consistent with evidence-based health interventions and comprehensive psychological and holistic approaches. The outlook addresses the prolificacy of the concept of historical trauma, and the potential dangers associated with its overuse.

The chapter on the consequences of the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi brings many constructive contributions that have been made to improve the situation of those affected. Nevertheless, the consequences of this very short-lived genocide were immense. PTSD and trauma-related cultural syndromes were described as direct consequences, although the latter faced an impediment in prevailing against the dominance of the international (and Global North) vocabulary. Research attributed long-lasting societal problems, which were partially addressed by home-grown governmental programs. A very important topic discussed in the chapter is that of international aid organizations, which were also the producers of scientific contributions in most cases. These include contributions on interethnic trust and reconciliation. Some, especially local authors, refer to African values such as Ubuntu, which they argue should play a role in healing or reconciliation.

As Kamari Maxine Clarke likewise explores in her chapter, the intersection of rights and “transitional justice” in diverse situations has become one of the defining features of our time. Narrating the classic role of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the end of Apartheid, Clarke dramatizes the struggle over the meaning of transition, distinguishing between the “moralistic” goal of forgiveness and the more confrontational demand for accountability. For Clarke, the performativity of justice – it is always rendered by someone – means the history of human rights needs to be equally attentive to when it is not provided or when crimes are perpetrated or mistakes made in its name. What we see is that particular transitional justice speech acts enable the reproduction of particular types of power.

The other philosopher writing in Kant’s wake who figures prominently in the origins of “continental” philosophy is Hegel. Although many of the seeds of Hegel’s thought were planted by Fichte, Hegel’s works ultimately had far greater direct impact. Hegel was not, however, an ethical or moral philosopher like Fichte. T. H. Irwin plausibly claims, indeed, that Hegel actually denies that moral philosophy is “a distinct discipline.” But Hegel had a massive influence on the history of ethics even so, including on “modern moral philosophy.” Partly this was as a critic, not just of moral philosophy, but also of the modern conception of morality itself. Hegel argues that what he and other moderns call “morality” (Moralität) is a formal abstraction that is incapable of “truth” or “reality.” Moral philosophers who focus on oughts and obligation mistake, in his view, an abstract moment of practical thought for something realizable; they fasten on a desiccated abstraction rather than the “living good” that is embodied in actual modern (liberal) customs and institutions, what Hegel calls “ethical life.” Hegel’s critique of morality begins a tradition that runs through Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century and through Anscombe and Bernard Williams in the twentieth.

Chapter 9 takes up the study of integration as a project and examines views across inter-cultural divides. The study draws on argumentation methods as an analytical tool for understanding how people justify their views on integration through warrants, data and evidence in support claims. The study of argumentation reveals a broad diversity of views within both groups under study, with some favouring and some disagreeing with the integration project in both camps. It proceeds then to report survey findings that sought to measure the extent of agreement with these identified claims in a population of Maltese citizens as well as a sample of Arabs in Malta. The study further measured the attributions of each group about the other, that is, the extent to which one group thought the other would agree or disagree with the claims. The findings were highly revealing. Both the Maltese and the Arab respondents favoured integration, but the Maltese group misunderstood the Arab intent and the extent to which they favoured integration over other intercultural strategies. The chapter concludes by outlining a staircasing proposal using the solicited claims to bring both groups on board using claims they already agree with and to scale further collaboration thereafter.

The case for more aid to Afghanistan slowly gained ground from late 2002. The Accelerating Success initiative, coupled with the Bonn Process and a new Afghan Constitution, began to move reconstruction efforts in the right direction. A new reconciliation program recognized the need for a settlement with the Taliban. But enduring challenges from recalcitrant warlords, international donors, inflexible diplomacy, and a sclerotic bureaucracy counteracted whatever progress was achieved from 2003 to 2005.

Incarnation and Atonement are two aspects of the work of Christ addressed in Christology. In the IIncarnation, God the Son assumes a human nature in order to bring about human salvation; and in Atonement he achieves this. Various accounts of atonement have developed over the centuries. This chapter considers the major historic views in the context of a broadly Chalcedonian understanding of the Incarnation.

Forgivingness is virtue, a specification of generosity, a disposition to give offenders, especially against oneself, more of good and less of evil than they deserve. It is an interconnected set of sensitivities to features of situations marked by wrongdoing. The forgiving person is responsive to these features in ways that tend to mitigate, eliminate, or forestall anger in the interest of wishing the wrongdoer well and/or of enjoying a positive and harmonious relationship with him or her. The chief considerations favoring forgiveness are (1) the offender’s repentance, (2) excuses for the offender, (3) the offender’s suffering, (4) moral commonality with the offender, and (5) relationship to the offender.

Global patterns of political violence and war have changed across the course of the twentieth into the twenty-first century. We have seen the decline of inter-state wars – Ukraine being a testing exception – and the emergence of localised transnational conflict. At the same time, modern reconciliation processes have been globalised with a particular institutional form, usually conducted under the auspices of a nation-state. This chapter examines the mismatch between these forms. It asks whether a nation-based approach can adequately respond to local–global violence. It argues not for replacing national forums of reconciliation but for reframing them in terms of a new emphasis on global–local reconciliation forums. This will entail an understanding of the way in which contemporary social life is lived across different levels of integration and spatial extension. It requires a recognition that in the contemporary world we are seeing the continuing clash of ontologically different ways of life – customary, traditional, modern, and postmodern – and that this needs a different kind of cultural and political sensitivity than that offered by modern juridical proceduralism.

This study considers ethical questions of freedom and reconciliation in Jimmy Boyle’s autobiographical A Sense of Freedom (2016). A Scottish life prisoner, Boyle describes a moral phenomenology of freedom and reconciliation through his life and his time in prisons, including Glasgow’s Barlinnie Special Unit. Promoting mature democratic relations between prisoners and staff, the Unit enabled development and change in participants’ moral psychology. Boyle’s ‘sense of freedom’ moves from negative forms of refusal, resistance and withdrawal to ever more positive forms: abstract ideal freedom, emancipatory agency, trust, collective empowerment, taking responsibility, coming alive and loving creativity. Reconciliation recognised the human in the enemy, mature engagement, democratic involvement and thinking socially and politically beyond the prison. This metaphysics transcending violence was grounded in Boyle’s metapsychology as one capable of love. The chapter draws on earlier discussions of freedom and reconciliation in the young Hegel, recognition and complex victimhood, atonement and mature retributivism. The penal system is seen as combining a persecutory impulse in the major key and humanistic traces in the minor, a ‘structure in dominance’ of the former over the latter. Barlinnie Special Unit inverted this structure briefly, pointing to a deep abolitionist tendency inside what became ‘the loving prison’.