How do institutionalized memories of historical trauma shape contemporary political attitudes? This study examines how emotionally evocative reminders of past violence influence public opinion. Drawing on a survey experiment in South Korea, I test how symbolic narratives of Japanese colonial repression affect emotional responses and downstream political views. The results show that while these reminders evoke strong emotions—especially anger and fear—they do not directly alter attitudes toward national identity or policy. Instead, anger, more than fear, consistently predicts both inclusive orientations, such as increased national pride, and exclusive preferences, including support for protectionist policies. These findings suggest that historical trauma influences political behavior not by providing new information but by activating internalized emotional frameworks. The study contributes to research on the legacy of political violence by identifying discrete emotions as key mechanisms linking collective victimhood to divergent political responses.

There has been a decade-long debate in the studies of Malaysian politics on whether there is indeed an urban–rural difference when it comes to elections. Studies using aggregated election data suggest stark differences in parties’ performance in urban and rural electoral districts, while studies relying on survey data tend to downplay urban–rural differences in voting patterns. Notwithstanding the ecological fallacy problem inherent in studies using aggregated election data, the consistent differences between studies using individual and aggregated data are puzzling, and cast a shadow over our understanding of electoral politics in Malaysia. This article argues that in Peninsular Malaysia the urban–rural differences supported by aggregated election data may have been overestimated due to results being driven by a few large urban centers. Combining survey data from the fifth wave of Asian Barometer and aggregated election data from the fourteenth general election in Malaysia, this article demonstrates that both kinds of data in fact point to the same conclusion. Once we specifically control for inter-state and local heterogeneity in population density, the association between population density and party performance attenuates.

How does China strategically allocate foreign aid to increase its influence on South China Sea disputes? We posit that China uses foreign aid as a tool of strategic appeasement to manage militarized interstate disputes, particularly targeting claimant states with smaller winning coalitions that are more susceptible to aid influence. The results of our empirical analysis show that China is more likely to allocate aid to the ASEAN SCS claimants with a smaller winning coalition. These findings not only support the notion of foreign aid as a strategic tool employed by China to mitigate tensions in the South China Sea but also highlight the vulnerability of certain recipient states. This article contributes to the foreign assistance and conflict literature by examining the conditionality of claimant donors’ decisions to provide foreign aid to other claimant recipients.

What explains China’s decision to sign an alliance treaty with North Korea in 1961? The treaty was redundant to deter the United States and South Korea because China had credibly established its resolve and capability to defend North Korea after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. The treaty even increased the risk of China’s entrapment in a Korean conflict. This article develops a triangular theory of alliance formation to show that China’s signing of the treaty was intended to drive a wedge between North Korea and the Soviet Union, not to deter South Korea and the United States. China was thus willing to incur more risk to neutralize North Korea from a pro-Soviet position. This article tests the theory by process tracing events in the China–North Korea–Soviet Union triangle from 1948 to 1961 with a plausibility probe of the China–North Vietnam–Soviet Union triangle from 1954 to 1965. The article concludes with implications for the contemporary China–North Korea–Russia bloc and the study of alliance politics in the Asian context.

In politically divided environments like Thailand, affective polarization (AP) and social distrust threaten democratic stability and hinder consensus-building. Using an original survey (N = 2,016) conducted in 2021 during intense political turmoil, we examine how perceived ideological differences and media consumption shape AP. Our findings show that perceived—rather than actual—ideological differences drive out-group animosity, affecting trust in policymaking, political discourse, and attitudes toward justice. We also highlight the role of echo chambers created by the consumption of one-sided media that exaggerates polarization and amplifies hostility toward the out-group.