This chapter builds on the assumption that constitutional references to the historical constitution can contribute to the community building process in Hungary. While this assumption itself might be contended, this paper puts aside the question of whether the Hungarian historical constitution could be revived in legal terms or whether it could have legally binding force in any way. Instead, it will approach the question from a non-legalistic point of view and consider whether references to the Hungarian historical constitution might be useful and desirable from the perspective of community building. To put it briefly, this chapter contends that it might be useful and desirable but only under certain circumstances. Unfortunately, whether these conditions prevail can only be established retrospectively.

I read all the chapters, essential for engaging in an Afterword. I engaged as a sociological social theorist, long interested in power relations in organizations, who has contributed to the field of management and organization studies but currently works in a School of Project Management. I first encountered projects in the work of Alfred Schütz, as undergraduate reading in sociological theory. His phenomenological understanding of projects grounds much of my thinking about them. I conceptualized the role of contracts in projects as a form of coding that seeks to impose standing conditions on an open system in order to try and make it stable and closed. In a word, contracts work as autopoiesis. The endeavour is always in vain wherever events intrude. It is from this perspective that I review the ‘Five Hands’ debate. I regard the debate sociologically as a series of accounts. In doing this, some curious causality is revealed. From these auspices the chapter proceeds to discuss the central debate as a battlefield of ideas. It does so prior to considering each chapter in terms of the framing advanced. Finally, seven conclusions reposition project management studies, encapsulate the argument of the Afterword.

There are two practices of constitutional review: the diffuse review by the judiciary with supreme courts as the final appellate body in common law countries and the concentrated review by constitutional courts outside the ordinary judiciary in civil law countries. Though we observe a tendency towards a convergence of diffuse and concentrated review, there are still differences. In this chapter, the comparative merits and problems of concentrated versus diffuse review are evaluated. In order to compare the types of apex courts, a normative concept of constitutional review is developed. According to this concept, the most important precondition for legitimate and effective constitutional review is the difference between judicial and political decision-making. Judges who are capable of respecting this difference, enhance social integration by establishing a specific mechanism to correct procedural and substantive injustices. When evaluated by this standard, neither supreme nor constitutional courts are superior. Rather, the problem of both practices concerns a gradual process of a judicialization of politics. More and more political questions are decided by apex courts with constitutional review power, thereby reducing political alternatives. In concluding, a division of labor between judges and legislators is suggested that promises legitimate and effective constitutional review enriching democratic governance.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical framework for the book. I articulate, first, why it is useful to think in terms of social imaginaries, rather than alternative sociological concepts (such as paradigms or ideologies), for analysing social integration in modern societies. I then explore why, in modernity, it was imaginaries of prosperity that provided the most stable foundations for social integration. These imaginaries can bridge, I argue, the plurality of worldviews and identities, while at the same time play into modernity’s strengths, namely democracy and knowledge governance. However, any particular imaginary of prosperity can provide only a temporary foundation, because it will sooner or later produce too many problems and contradictions to continue fulfilling its integrative role. When such problems mount, imaginaries of prosperity become subject to their own dialectics, having to shift eventually between privatised and collective routes to prosperity. If, however, the pressures for change cannot be institutionalised through democratic channels, we have seen in the past – and are seeing again today – that illiberal and undemocratic tribal imaginaries may take hold, making identity (rather than prosperity) the main vector of politics.

Chapter 2 describes four types of relational features: social support, social integration, social capital, and social norms, collectively referred to as the “four socials.” The ways in which each of these relational factors impact health can be understood as operating through psychological, behavioral, and biological pathways. This chapter presents the definitional distinctions between the four socials and describes the scientific evidence for their pathways.

Chapter 9 explains Durkheim's understanding of moral facts and the conception of social solidarity at the core of his account of the division of labor's function in organized societies: crucial to what holds societies together and enables them to live are moral facts that inform relations among social members. Durkheim views human society as normatively constituted – governed by rules accepted as authoritative by social members – and claims that social institutions serve moral and not merely "useful" social functions. The chapter articulates the resources Durkheim has for conceiving of social pathology (itself an ethical phenomenon), examines the modern pathology most important to him, anomie, and coins a term for a related social pathology, hypernomie, a condition in which social rules are excessively rigid or constraining. Finally, the chapter reconstructs Durkheim's understanding of what is bad about social pathology – why social members should care whether their society is ill.

The European Union introduced ‘European Union citizenship’ in 1992. European Union citizens hold a citizenship that is linked to national citizenship. It is the only form of citizenship in the world that is acquired automatically by those who are nationals of a member state. Citizenship is complex and varied – some countries allow dual citizenship while others do not; individuals can change their citizenship or renounce it but states may not arbitrarily deprive a citizen of this status. As the EU is not a nation state, EU citizenship does not give Union citizens dual nationality. This chapter will explore the character of EU citizenship and the substance of the rights associated with it. EU citizenship may have been the idea that drove a wedge between the UK and the EU resulting in Brexit. A key question is whether it can be given enough substance to act as a ‘glue’ and bind the nationals in the twenty-seven EU member states. Furthermore, what is its value – is it an ‘inviolable’ status, giving rise to rights that exist regardless of any economic activity?

Wartime destruction and postwar redrawing of borders sparked a refugee crisis in Poland massive in dimensions and very particular in character. Two million ethnic Poles, driven out of the territories annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of the war, had to find new homes in the German territory ceded to Poland in 1945. The refugees did not encounter a “host society” per se, as the region’s former ethnic German population had been expelled, nor did they settle entirely unpopulated land. Some 2.5 million other Poles had migrated from the war-torn towns and villages of central Poland to the country’s new west shortly before the refugees’ arrival. These groups of Poles were joined by 200,000 Polish Jews who had survived the Holocaust, 200,000 Ukrainian-speakers forcibly resettled from southern and eastern Poland in 1947, and 1,000,000 so-called autochthones in Upper Silesia and Masuria, former German citizens allowed to stay in Poland because of their presumed Polish background. This essay explores strategies used to integrate this diverse population and the long-term consequences of forced migration.

This introductory chapter sets out the rationale for the book and in particular for its focus on the relationship between social integration and language development in the experiences of newcomer school students with English as an additional language. It also provides a critical examination and definitional review of key terms and concepts at the heart of the discussion: EAL, newly arrived, mainstreaming, language development and social integration.