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Since the 1980s, state capacity has been a major explanation for countries leaving the middle-income trap. However, this literature is unable to explain the failed experiences of countries with relatively high state capacity. This was the case of Chile after the unsuccessful enaction of a series of policies in the mid-2010s to upgrade the country’s position in the lithium value chain. To understand this failure, we combine the literature on developmental states and the literature on business power. We use the concept of institutional business power to understand how business actions erode state capacities leading to countries’ persistent inability to leave the middle-income trap. In the case of Chile, despite the relatively high levels of state capacity, previous processes of deregulation and privatization in the country configured a situation favorable to business’ monopolization of information and technical knowledge about lithium production and innovation processes that directly affected the capacity of the state to regulate the sector, let alone implement policies designed to upgrade the industry. The article highlights the need to investigate further the role of not just the state, but of the private sector in either facilitating or blocking value chain upgrading in countries caught in the middle-income trap.
This paper draws together the connections between the concepts of critical human security and state capacity and explores their relevance as a novel analytical framework for exploring the global pandemic and its aftermath, with a particular focus on Europe and East Asia. The paper highlights the relevance of integrating a ‘state capacity for human security’ analytical lens and policy philosophy to inform an understanding of human (in)security as well as its relevance for concerns around social protection, sustainability, and inequality. We argue that the long-held and taken-for-granted assumption that larger, high-spending welfare states produce greater well-being security can no longer be an automatic supposition given the nature and sources of risk and insecurity in the contemporary world. We argue that that widening the parameters and focus of social policy analysis towards state capacity for critical human security might better highlight the multi-dimensional challenges that welfare states should seek to address.
The papers in this special themed section reflect on, explore, and analyse national and local government policy responses to the recent pandemic between 2020 and 2022, and the short- and longer-term impacts on human security for different groups of people and places, with a particular focus on the UK and Korea. Drawing on an integrated critical human security and state capacity approach and qualitative methodology, they contribute to and further develop debates on the social policy responses to the pandemic and their scarring effects. They also highlight the key role that a state capacity for human security approach can play in promoting inclusive risk governance, recognising and addressing constellations of vulnerability, risk and insecurity, and highlighting the rapid and uneven distribution of the benefits of digital technologies and its potential from compromising as well as enhancing human security.
India’s landmark corporate law reform in 2013 contained a pioneering attempt to mandate corporate spending of 2 percent of average profits on corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives. This chapter explores a puzzle: The CSR requirement could have been written as a CSR tax rather than a CSR spending requirement, so why did the government choose the latter, more heterodox, option? The analysis suggests that the motivation for the reforms reflects a blend of political optics and state capacity or efficiency considerations informed by historical experiences with market-oriented reforms. On the efficiency and state capacity front, the Indian state might not have been as well placed to enforce a CSR tax as Indian firms might have been able to manage a CSR spending requirement in 2013. On the political optics side there was a prevailing perception that the liberalization had primarily benefited only a very small sliver of the country. If corporations were engaged in CSR then it might look like the gains from economic liberalization were beginning to find their way from India Inc. to the general citizenry. This blended account provides interesting insights about this rather unique set of reforms and subsequent developments.
Are civil conflicts driven by resource crises? Research suggests that the root of conflict, in part, is explained when analyzing how economic deprivation drives groups into turmoil. Resource ownership, especially when unevenly distributed, often leads to violence. Research remains divided, however, on which resources drive violence, and the precise mechanisms that are involved. While many scholars argue that inequality drives violence, there exist many other factors that can help to explain civil wars. Evidence in this chapter suggests that while oil dependence may trigger conflicts, the duration of conflict is heavily influenced by factors beyond resources alone. Contrarily, agricultural commodities lack significant ties to civil war onset or duration, challenging our understanding of deprivation on a country-specific basis. Conflict is inextricably tied to maintaining political order, which for resource-rich countries hinges on interacting factors that governance structures facilitate. Further analysis on these topics – like the greed, state capacity, and grievance frameworks – offers strong insights into why violence emerges, giving multiple avenues and case studies as evidence for explaining civil wars overall.
This section highlights and provides details of a range of key sources and databases that were either central to or provide further material on the issues explored in the papers in this special themed section. Building on the analysis of the UK and South Korea’s policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and its integration with the key concepts of critical human security and state capacity the section is organised around the following themes: Critical human security, vulnerability and the pandemic; State capacity and social infrastructure; Risk governance and systemic risk; Digitalization, public services, and the pandemic; Cities and local social policy; and finally, Data Sources. These additional resources provide some general sources but are otherwise tailored to the social and public policy contexts of the UK and South Korea.
In Africa and other low-income regions, the modal result of the interplay between incumbents and opposition has been the resilience of very imperfect democracies or electoral autocracies, and not a broad trend of backsliding. This represents a puzzle, since low-income states with few long-standing democratic traditions have been generally viewed as the most vulnerable to autocratization. This chapter offers some tentative hypotheses for this apparent stability, focusing on the relationship between state capacity and democracy, and disaggregating them into their different components. Institutions of vertical accountability can generally exist (or in some cases flourish) with limited state capacity. These include formal political participation, such as elections and voting, which is often incentivized and subsidized by the international community, or citizen and civil society actions that are made possible by freedom of association and freedom of the press, which do not rely on state capacity. On the other hand, the consolidation of political institutions that advance horizontal accountability will be constrained by deficient state capacity. Judicial independence and legislative power as well as other independent checks on the executive branch of government will typically be more undermined by low capacity than the incumbent regime itself.
State capacity is critical for development. Yet, the question of how states learn – that is, how they acquire and incorporate information to improve performance over time – has received little attention. In this paper, we draw from organizational theory and the political economy of knowledge and innovation to study the components of effective learning in states as organizations. We focus on three functionally simple, but well-documented early states in ancient Greece: Sparta, Athens, and Macedon. We argue that Macedon’s superior performance relied on a learning model capable of integrating both experiential and experimental knowledge within existing structures. By directing our attention away from the early modern period, where much work in economic history and historical political economy is concentrated, our account challenges the focus of the existing literature on processes of centralization. Instead, we highlight organizational factors that may promote capacity-enhancing learning even in the context of weak centralization.
Do societies with more extensive welfare states also perform better environmentally? Surprisingly, the empirical evidence for this relationship remains inconclusive. We focus on CO2 emissions in lower-income countries and argue that considering state capacity as a moderator helps achieving greater theoretical and empirical clarity in understanding when the welfare state – climate change mitigation relationship. We hypothesize that lower-income societies with more developed welfare states exhibit lower carbon emissions when they also have more state capacity. The underlying mechanism centers on the ability of the state to compensate losers from policy change and its enforcement power required for policy implementation. Using data on CO2 emissions, social protection, and labor market regulations, as well as state capacity in 66 lower-income countries since 2005, we find that carbon emissions tend to be lower in countries characterized both by a welfare state focused on reducing socio-economic inequality and high state capacity.
Research shows that meritocratic recruitment (MR) in public administration is positively related to improved government performance and developmental outcomes. However, the mechanisms behind these improvements remain understudied theoretically and empirically. This paper addresses this gap by theorising and testing two simultaneous pathways through which MR influences development outcomes. First, by prioritising competence over nepotism or political expedience, MR enhances the epistemic quality of bureaucratic personnel (the competence mechanism). Second, by creating incentive misalignment between bureaucrats and politicians, it enables bureaucrats to resist undue political influence, prioritise public interests in governance, and ultimately contribute to development (the impartiality mechanism). Applying mediation analysis to fourteen years of cross-national data, we examine whether changes in recruitment systems are associated with competence- and impartiality-laden indicators of government performance and developmental outcomes. The findings provide robust empirical support for these mechanisms, advancing theoretical understanding and empirical insights into the effects of MR.
What explains the geography and timing of contestation in civil war? We propose a theory of opportunistic rebel tactics, in which insurgent commanders react to temporary shifts in the local balance of power to attack the state. We argue that these opportunistic strikes are enabled by two jointly necessary factors: (1) negative fluctuations in local repressive state capacity and (2) the expectation of civilian compliance with rebel incursions. We evaluate this argument on data from the Colombian civil war. Leveraging exogenous variation in local state capacity caused by landslide-induced road closures, we find that short-term negative shocks to repressive capacity increase the likelihood of insurgent-state clashes. However, this effect does not hold when local communities harbor strongly anti-insurgent attitudes, suggesting that state capacity and civilian behavior jointly shape rebel strategy and that popular opposition can substitute for state strength.
Typically, neoclassical realist scholars who prioritise state capacity as an intervening variable in their studies have often implied that states directly convert increased state capacity into improved military capabilities, leading them to engage in internal balancing and, occasionally, war. This article argues that the causal chain from state capacity to military modernisation and balancing is not as straightforward as the existing literature makes it look like. Using Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a plausibility-probe study, we propose that before states move from underbalancing to balancing, the process by which state capacity is translated into improved military capabilities might depend on conditional mechanisms. This novel theoretical model is labeled ‘conditional state capacity neoclassical realism’ and provides more case-specific explanatory power than the old state capacity theory.
This paper examines the effects of state capacity on the reported Covid-19 infection (and mortality) rate and its policy implications. We analyse two dimensions of state capacity which were critical during the pandemic. The healthcare capacity acted to contain the virus outbreak (an effect we call containment). The information capacity acted to detect contagious yet asymptomatic cases (an effect we call detection). We argue that containment pushes down the reported infection rate. In contrast, detection pushes it up, thus generating a non-linear combined effect that we estimate systematically using Colombian municipality-level as well as country-level data, different data sources, and various empirical strategies. Our findings indicate that the infection (and mortality) rates were likely under-reported, especially in areas with a low state capacity level, due to their poor capabilities to detect the virus. Our study put the emphasis on the many facets of state capacity, each affecting in complex ways our understanding of important phenomena, such as the Covid-19 outbreak.
The array of countries examined in this book offers a range of cross-cutting themes and propositions. Indeed, a careful sifting of the chapters suggest important similarities and differences not only in terms of how the twelve states under examination have handled common problems and challenges in their efforts to interact with their national communities abroad but also in the underlying rationale(s) for engaging (or not) in said activities in the first place. This concluding chapter first discusses general insights concerning the motivations of states’ interactions with their national communities abroad and the reasons that explain those interactions. Next, it zooms in on specific themes and trends in some greater detail, including: the contested, and at times highly politicized, nature of defining national communities abroad; the mismatch between states’ material capabilities and their willingness to engage their communities abroad; and acts of “democratic repression” which suggest that the discussion on transnational authoritarianism needs to be complemented by a systematic examination of democratic countries’ repressive actions abroad.
In a novel contribution to the field of comparative foreign policy analysis, this book carefully delineates how states, regardless of regime, have formulated policies to deal with their national communities aboard. Some states, depending on their domestic political ideologies, cultures and capabilities, have extensive institutional mechanisms in place for coming to the aid of their nationals abroad. Others, however, have also used these capabilities in adverse ways. Chapters focusing on individual countries explore the rationale behind state policies that differentiate treatment for distinct groups, such as tourists, migrants, and diasporas. Amongst the intriguing findings is the fact that state capacity alone does not explain the ability or willingness of states to assist their nationals abroad in times of need. Furthermore, in some cases, communities abroad can also actively mobilize against their home state, thus play key roles in conflict and even regime change.
Were nineteenth century war outcomes the main determinant of state trajectories in Latin America? In this chapter I turn from examining whether and to which degree war outcomes affected comparative state capacity levels and try to determining whether war outcomes were the main factor affecting the relative position of Latin American countries in the regional state capacity ranking. Exploring the conditions that predict the rank ordering of Latin American state capacity c. 1900—which has remained virtually the same ever since—has become a standard approach in the literature. In this chapter I explore this comparative historical puzzle by replicating previously used techniques. I use qualitative comparative analysis to show that accumulated victory and defeat throughout the nineteenth century is almost a sufficient condition for states to be in the upper and lower end of a state capacity ranking, respectively. I then use simple correlations to evaluate how war outcomes were related to a broad set of state capacity indicators at the turn of the century. Finally, I discuss case-specific expectations in longitudinal data that will be explored in the case studies.
What was the effect of war outcomes on key indicators of state formation in a post-war phase? In this chapter I demonstrate that victors and losers of war were set into different state capacity trajectories after war outcomes were revealed. I do this using a set of cutting-edge causal inference techniques to analyse the gap in state capacity that was generated between winners and losers in the time-period of most stringent warfare (1865-1913). After substantiating that the outcomes of these wars were determined by exogenous or fortuitous events, I provide a short description of my treatment—i.e., defeat—and outcomes—i.e., total revenues and railroad mileage as key indicators of state infrastructural capacity. My estimator, a difference-in-differences model, shows defeat had a negative long-term impact on state capacity which remains remarkably robust even after relaxing key assumptions. Finally, I use the synthetic control method to estimate how state capacity in Paraguay and Peru would have evolved in a counterfactual world where these countries were spared the most severe defeats in late nineteenth-century Latin America.
The chapter examines the role of forced displacement in increasing the demand for state intervention and expanding the size of the state bureaucracy in West Germany. It discusses the government elites’ strategies for dealing with the needs of expellees and receiving communities and reviews expellees’ ability to influence government policy. Statistical analysis is used to demonstrate that counties with a greater proportion of expellees to population had more civil servants per capita.
The chapter examines how the size and diversity of the migrant population shaped economic outcomes in western Poland using statistical analysis. It shows that when state institutions were extractive, the composition of the migrant population played no role in shaping economic performance. Once institutions became more inclusive, however, municipalities settled by more regionally diverse populations registered higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates. The chapter then rules out a series of alternative explanations for these findings.
This chapter introduces cases motivating the book and presents a three-step argument about the effects of forced migration on societal cooperation, state capacity, and economic development. It reviews evidence from post-WWII displacement in Poland and West Germany, discusses the applicability of the findings to other cases, and highlights the main contributions of the book.