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The study of European capitalism since 1945 has revealed three key findings. First, Europe’s governance of capitalism has been marked by four main periods: : 1) embedded liberalism (1945–73); 2) global attempts at mixed capitalism (1973–92); 3) high neoliberalism (1992–2016); and 4) the return of community capitalism since 2016. Second, Europeans have invented an original system to reach compromise between both states and the three types of capitalist governance, thereby offering choice, far from the image of a neoliberal technocratic dictatorship. The European Union is a mix between the influence of many countries, including Germany, France, and Britain, in addition to Italy and many others. Third, the trinity points to three alternatives that were – and still are – present: the neoliberal free-trade area, the socio-environmental alternative and the challenge of the return of community capitalism, between protectionist tensions, Fortress Europe and the possible hollowing out of the European Union from the pressure of growing nationalism.
Which form of capitalist governance best fosters peace, prosperity, social cohesion, and environmental protection? I argue that making sense of this complexity calls for revisiting the three different principles of capitalist governance: liberty (freeing the market to unleash growth), solidarity (reining in the free market to protect the weak and the environment), and community (safeguarding the group through protectionism and military might). I contend that studying the European Union helps provide insight into how a compromise between liberty, solidarity, and community capitalisms is struck, as the Union is in a constant process of negotiation among bickering members. Dealing with community capitalism, in particular with protectionism and nationalism, has been the most pressing challenge for Europe in the past, not just today. This book will focus on the interaction between capitalism and European integration between 1945 and 2025, drawing on studies from areas of scholarship that rarely enter into dialogue with one other (history, political science, comparative political economy, international relations), as well as through new archival research.
What is the best form of governance for capitalism? It is a balance between three types of capitalist governance, namely liberty capitalism, solidarity capitalism, and community capitalism, i.e. a trinity. In any given society, leaders emphasise liberty if they believe that freeing markets will unleash plenty; solidarity if they prioritise protecting the weak (the poor, minorities, nature); and community if they emphasise the power of the group to which they belong (through protectionism and military might). Each of these three types has a radical variant, such as neoliberalism for liberty capitalism, or Nazi Germany for community capitalism. This trinity is useful in making comparisons across time and space. Capitalism is not solely based on a compromise between liberty and solidarity. Community capitalism must also be taken into consideration. Community capitalism emphasises protectionism, restrictive migration policy, cartelisation and unilateral foreign policies. The chapter examines these three types of capitalist governance one by one (including the question of neoliberalism, of ordoliberalism, of neomercantilism, of the Commons), and then explores how they have applied to various countries.
A targeted European welfare state emerged between 1950 and 1992, one that was referred to in the late 1980s as the ‘social flank to the internal market’. This chapter will begin with a chronological overview, including a first section on the slow development of this European social policy between 1945 and 1985, and a second one its heights under Jacques Delors (1985–1995). It will then proceed with a topical exploration of European measures in this area (protecting the weak, environmental policy, regional solidarity), before concluding with an analysis of the two most important alternatives that were later abandoned: planning, and comprehensive social and fiscal harmonisation. This relative weakness of social Europe can be explained by its late development, by the sheer difficulty of organising a transnational social movement, as well as by divisions among its supporters. Besides, Thatcher was a formidable obstacle, one that Delors sought to circumvent through greater use of qualified majority voting. Other important actors were European trade unions, gender and environmental activists, as well as members of the European Parliament.
Despite the neoliberal wave solidarity capitalism has remained important in Europe. Since it was impossible to tame capitalism globally, promoters of solidarity turned to the European Union, and strove to strengthen its ‘flanking’ welfare state. The early 1990s brought a first peak of international awareness regarding environmental protection and interest in social Europe, but that was shattered by a neoliberal reaction from the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s. Since then, social and environmental policies have been on the rise again, only to be challenged by the Russo-Ukrainian War. Three expressions of solidarity will be examined. The first deals with the legal regulation of globalisation through social legislation and trade regulation. The second involves financial redistribution towards the neediest, with transfers to poor regions (cohesion policy), and later with specific measures during the Covid-19 crisis (2020–21). The third addresses the rising importance of environmental regulation in general (air and water pollution, biodiversity, etc.), especially with regard to climate change (Kyoto Protocol, 2015 Paris Agreement), despite the lobbying of the ‘Merchants of Doubts’.
This chapter explores the transforming constitutional imaginary of the Scandinavian welfare states. Suggesting that the Nordic countries shared a distinctive interpretation of the democratic ideals during the heydays of the social democratic welfare state, the chapter argues that the breakthrough of neoliberalism has fundamentally transformed the Nordic constitutional imaginary. No longer connected to national and popular sovereignty, public participation, labour market arrangements or economic and social equality, Nordic democracy is today increasingly associated with rule of law, individual and human rights, as well as economic freedom. The chapter connects Nordic developments to the recent literature on the constitutional theories in neoliberal thought. Scholars like Samuel Moyn, Quinn Slobodian and Jessica Whyte have amply shown that many leading neoliberals strove to restrict or replace democratic procedures with constitutionally protected market arrangements. In a Nordic context, these ideas were put forward in the debates particularly in the 1980s, but more often than not connected to the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation since the 1990s. As a result, the Nordics ceased to represent a democratic alternative but conformed to the neoliberal mainstream that emerged with the End of History.
How have European countries coped with the challenge of industrial capitalism and the rise of superpowers? Through an analysis of European integration from 1945 to the present day, Laurent Warlouzet argues that the European response was to create both new institutions and an original framework of governance for capitalism. Beyond the European case, he demonstrates that capitalism is not just a contest between free-markeeters and their opponents, those in favour of welfare and environmental policies, because there is a third camp which defends protectionism and assertive defence policies. Hence, the governance of capitalism has three foundational principles – liberty, solidarity and community. The book explores debates among Europeans about how to address global interdependence in political, economic, and environmental terms. It is based on fresh archival evidence collected in eight countries. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
Housing issues are a growing global concern and a key topic on the European policy agenda. Across EU, challenges such as immigration, economic stagnation, inequality, and ageing populations exacerbate housing provision issues. This growing concern demands effective solutions, guided by research, data-driven insights, and comparative analysis. This study overviews and compares housing provision in the EU countries. Using OECD and Eurostat data from 2010 to 2021, we examine governments’ roles in housing provision and assess availability, affordability, and adequacy, while exploring their interrelationships. Through hierarchical cluster analysis and cartographic visualization, we identify clusters of countries with similar housing characteristics. The findings reveal significant variation, with some countries struggling with availability, others with affordability or adequacy. Our results highlight a clear divide in housing challenges between Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Europe, largely aligning with welfare state regimes.
This study examines paid and unpaid childcare distribution connected to gender relations and inequalities. We ask: what are the gender consequences of childcare distribution in Mexico? To answer this enquiry, we apply Razavi’s diamond model, examining the social dimensions of the family/household, the State, the Market, and not-for-profit (NFP) sectors. We utilise national statistics and representative surveys from the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), complemented with published studies on Latin America and Mexico.
The article is structured as follows. First, we provide a literature review on the model related to welfare and care provision. Second, we summarise important aspects of the Mexican context. Our analysis is structured in subsections following each dimension of the diamond. We discuss our findings through a graphic representation of the model applied to Mexico, and conclude with final remarks.
Our concrete application of the model shows how the distribution of – paid and unpaid – childcare has consequences in (re)producing and strengthening gender inequalities in a myriad of spaces, dynamics, and arrangements. Key findings indicate a reduction in public childcare provision, transferring responsibilities to the household and the NFP dimensions, enhancing gendered expectations. Additionally, there is an increased protagonism of market relations within the domestic sphere and unequal conditions for those with resources.
We contribute to current studies on gender inequalities connected to welfare systems – and the lack thereof – by offering conceptual elements to develop research pathways sensitive to context-specificities, closely aligned with countries and societies within the Global South.
Becoming a parent can affect the lives of men and women by introducing salient new social roles and identities, altered social networks and tighter constraints on financial resources and time. Even though modern family life has evolved in many important respects, parenthood continues to shape the lives of men and women in very different ways. Given that parenthood can change the lives of men and women in profoundly different ways, it seems that it would bring about changes in the way women and men think about politics and policy issues. Using data from the Wave 4 of the European Social Survey, this article investigates how parenthood, and the distinctions of motherhood and fatherhood, influence attitudes. The findings suggest that parenthood can have a polarising effect on attitudes, and that the polarising effect is most evident in countries where there is less support from the state for parental responsibilities.
The mass media is conventionally assumed to play an important role in welfare state politics. So far, however, we have very little systematic theorizing or empirical evidence of when and how the mass media reports on welfare state reforms. Building on news value theory and the welfare state reform literature, we develop a set of hypotheses about mass media reporting on welfare state reforms. We argue that mass media attention is conditioned not only by the direction of reforms, with cuts getting more attention than expansions, but also by the election platform that the incumbent party ran on in the last election as well as by the policy reputation of the government. Drawing on a new dataset including about 4,800 news articles in British, Danish and German quality newspapers from 1995 to 2014, we find supporting empirical evidence of our expectations.
Stagnating incomes have been a widespread concern in advanced democracies over the past decades. However, despite a turn towards dynamic frameworks, the consequences of stagnation on political support for the welfare state are still unclear. This study introduces the distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ income stagnation – that is, experiencing stagnating incomes over time (without reference to other groups) and in relative comparison to other groups – and explores how they shape citizens’ attitudes towards redistribution. I argue that absolute and relative stagnation have opposite effects on redistributive preferences. Contrary to political economy theories, I expect that low absolute income growth reduces demand for redistribution, because it reduces voters’ ability and willingness to afford welfare state policies. Support for this hypothesis is provided in an empirical analysis that combines novel estimates for absolute and relative income stagnation with longitudinal survey data on redistribution preferences in 14 advanced democracies between 1985 and 2018. The distinction between absolute and relative experiences has broader implications for comparative politics research and might contribute to explain why income stagnation and rising inequality have not led to higher political demand for redistributive welfare policy.
The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.
The huge quantitative literature on postwar social spending almost entirely neglected war as a possible explanatory factor of social spending dynamics. Given the mass carnage and the enormous social needs caused by the Second World War, this is quite astonishing. This article examines for the first time, whether, and in what ways, the Second World War affected cross‐national differences in public social spending of 18 Western welfare states over the course of the Golden Age. Using panel regressions, it is found that the war strongly affected social spending until the late 1960s. The evidence demonstrates that the Second World War is not simply a temporal watershed structuring different phases of welfare state development, but rather a crucial factor for understanding cross‐national differences in welfare efforts and social expenditure dynamics in the postwar period.
This article explores the causal effect of personal contact with ethnic minorities on majority members’ views on immigration, immigrants’ work ethics, and support for lower social assistance benefits to immigrants than to natives. Exogenous variation in personal contact is obtained by randomising soldiers into different rooms during the basic training period for conscripts in the Norwegian Army's North Brigade. Based on contact theory of majority–minority relations, the study spells out why the army can be regarded as an ideal contextual setting for exposure to reduce negative views on minorities. The study finds a substantive effect of contact on views on immigrants’ work ethics, but small and insignificant effects on support for welfare dualism, as well as on views on whether immigration makes Norway a better place in which to live.
Attitudes towards social spending and the welfare state have been characterised by one of the longest standing and widest gender gaps. Past research suggests that parenthood deepens this divide further. Yet, the exact relationship between parenthood and support for social policies – and the gendered nature of this process – has been difficult to establish because it can vary across welfare policy areas and the age of the children, which past studies, relying on cross‐sectional data, has found difficult to unravel. Using panel data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine individual level changes in fathers’ and mothers’ views towards specific welfare state policies. We find that individuals’ support for social spending fluctuates at different stages of parenthood, and that mothers’ demands differ from fathers’ in relation to care related but not in terms of educational spending. This implies that parents are not a homogeneous group that parties could target with uniform electoral pledges. As a result, building widespread electoral support for expanding a broad range of social investment policies is likely to be challenging in a context where, first and foremost, self‐interest appears to drive (or depress) individuals’ support for specific welfare state policies.
In this study we show that on different dimensions of social security (compensation level, maximum duration and eligibility criteria), respondents in Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom prefer their governments to compensate unemployed immigrants less generously than unemployed natives, even after considering potential prejudices about work ethics, job experience, etc. We add to the extant literature in several ways. Based on survey experiments, we identify a strong economic component in welfare chauvinistic sentiments across the three countries. Chauvinism is negatively related to the income level of both immigrants and the respondents. We also find that low income reinforces the effect of chauvinism, a phenomenon we refer to as ‘intersectionality’. Furthermore, by comparing the preferences in the experiments with the actual welfare schemes, we find that the respondents are more generous than their respective governments regarding the level of compensation for natives as well as immigrants. When the comparison is between respondents’ preferences and actual welfare policies rather than between treatment groups, the respondents appear to be more welfare inclusive than welfare chauvinistic.
Although the welfare state is a core theme in most national elections in Western democracies, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the causes of welfare state pledge‐breaking. This article presents an argument that explains when governments do not do what they promised and tests it using an innovative research design with data covering four decades and 18 countries. The argument is able to account for several important but, until now, undescribed phenomena. First, nowadays, governments, on average, deliver less welfare than they promised, whereas in the 1970s they used to deliver more than promised. Second, the pledge‐breaking of governments has become highly dependent on the parliamentary opposition's position on the welfare issue. When the opposition favours fiscal and economic responsibility, governments’ tendency to deliver less welfare than promised is amplified. In contrast, when the opposition emphasises the positive benefits of generous welfare, such as equality and social justice, governments become more prone to keep their promises. Third, this conditional effect of the opposition is a recent occurrence that only emerged after the number of potential swing voters increased as class‐based voting gradually declined from the 1970s onwards.
This symposium makes a first step in bridging the emerging eco-social debate and the established political science theories and concepts, indicating the mutually beneficial analytical perspectives and common research pathways that may arise. In addition to identifying several aspects in the policy, politics and polity dimensions that appear to be particularly relevant in view of the emerging eco-social policies, this collection of articles points out two cross-cutting themes, namely the transformation of the welfare state set-ups, and new cleavages and power relations, which pose new questions and open a promising research agenda for political scientists.
In The Political Economy of Human Happiness: How Voters’ Choices Determine the Quality of Life, Benjamin Radcliff considers a wide variety of data from North America and Europe and argues that, on balance, welfare state policies make people happier. In short, there is a positive correlation and a causal relationship between happiness and welfare state provisions. This is an important conclusion for anyone interested in public policy and debates about the size of government. In their reviews, Larry M. Bartels and William A. Galston take issue with Radcliff’s thesis. They challenge the relationships that Radcliff suggests exist between specific policies and happiness. Bartels challenges the way Radcliff uses his statistics to support his thesis about the relationship between happiness and specific policies as well as our ability to make generalisations from the data. Galson’s objections to Radcliff’s analysis and argument is more conceptual, and, among other things, he challenges the connection Radcliff seeks to establish between happiness and the satisfaction of human needs.