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This chapter examines the mounting unease regarding the project of public education. By the mid-1960s, technocratic, Afrocentric, and Marxist critiques articulated a growing sense of worldwide educational crisis. These critiques presented differently in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, but in both countries popular frustrations were palpable. In response, both states attempted to reform public schooling: by introducing manual training in Ghanaian middle schools and television sets in Ivorian primary schools. Both reforms failed spectacularly, ultimately confirming the state’s abdication of its promise that education would lead to a better future for all. Public education systems crumbled along with public faith in the state, creating space for the privatization of education. The erosion of the anticolonial development ideology helped pave the way for neoliberalism to take root.
The Conclusion first reiterates the three main arguments of the book. It then surveys changes and continuities in global education and development policies since the 1960s, while also touching on the present state of public education in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. It closes by reflecting on education’s double-edged nature as it relates to the problem of freedom: Does education emancipate, or oppress?
International economic law is a field of public international law that regulates cross-border transactions in goods, services, and capital, as well as monetary relations between states. This chapter focuses on the branches of international economic law that govern international trade, international investment, and international monetary law. This chapter sets out the historical background, fundamental rules, and dispute settlement systems in the areas of international trade law and international investment law, and it concludes by introducing international monetary law. International trade and international investment law share some fundamental principles, such as non-discrimination, although most favoured nation treatment and national treatment take somewhat different forms in the two bodies of law. This chapter covers the Bretton Woods institutions, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Chapter 5 focuses on Ghana, one of Africa’s most institutionalized democracies, and contrasts its relatively balanced allocation of development finance with the regional favoritism observed in Zambia. Ghana’s stable two-party system – dominated by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) – is characterized by cross-ethnic coalitions. While the NDC has traditionally drawn support from the Volta region and the Muslim North, and the NPP from the Akan-dominated Ashanti region, ethnic fragmentation has encouraged both parties to target swing regions through strategic resource allocation. Ghana’s political landscape is shaped by a commitment to ethno-regional balance in leadership and efforts to institutionalize regional equity, which curtail ethnic favoritism. Decentralization and broad-based representation further incentivize parties to compete in swing constituencies. Despite ongoing challenges such as rent-seeking and rising debt, Ghana’s independent institutions and vibrant civil society help constrain ethnic favoritism – offering a stark contrast to Zambia’s declining accountability during its democratic transition.
Chapter 4 explores Zambia’s transition to multiparty democracy and the consequent rise in political competition and regional favoritism, revealing a trend of diminishing accountability. Initially, under the United National Independence Party’s one-party rule led by Kaunda, favoritism was constrained by balanced leadership. However, the emergence of ethnic-based opposition post-1991 heightened pressures for patronage, leading to increased favoritism under subsequent regimes. Regional favoritism escalated under President Banda and peaked during the populist Patriotic Front (PF) government (2011–2021), which eroded checks and balances, appointed an ethnically imbalanced cabinet favoring Bembas and Nyanjas, and concentrated borrowed funds in strongholds. Legislative and judiciary institutions were also weakened, along with civil society organizations. Traditional financiers provided some constraints through conditionalities, while Chinese lenders aligned with elite interests, exacerbating the situation. Zambia demonstrates a case of democratization exacerbating ethnic patronage without sufficient accountability mechanisms.
This chapter lays the foundation for a theory that integrates external accountability (pressures from financiers and transparency regimes) and internal accountability (electoral competition and coalition maintenance) to explain the distributive politics of development finance. It also provides an overview of the data sources and mixed-methods research design employed in this book outlines the book’s core contribution, and offers a concise preview of the subsequent chapters to guide readers through the unfolding narrative.
This chapter analyzes the subnational allocation of development finance across forty-eight African countries from 2000 to 2021, drawing on cross-country data from Chinese, World Bank, and OECD-funded projects. It distinguishes between infrastructure-intensive and social sectors and tests how district-level political and ethnic characteristics shape allocation patterns. It also assesses whether these relationships vary by flow type-official development assistance (ODA) versus other official flows (OOF). In particular, it examines region’s electoral strategic value (stronghold, swing, or opposition), incumbent vote share, and ties to the leader’s ethnicity or birthplace. Comparing more accountable traditional financiers (World Bank and OECD donors) with less accountable Chinese financiers, the analysis finds that swing regions and coethnic or copartisan strongholds receive significantly more development finance – especially in hybrid regimes and liberal democracies – than opposition regions. Moreover, the disparity in allocation between coethnic and non-coethnic regions is largest in politically competitive environments.
Why do some communities have access to roads and schools while others go without for decades? Keyi Tang's Power Over Progress investigates how external accountability and domestic political competition shape the allocation of fund in development finance across 48 African countries. While traditional donors attempt to curb favoritism through stricter conditions, their efforts are frequently undercut by domestic political incentives. Tang reveals how development finance from China, the World Bank, and Western donors often favors political power over need. She draws on newly geocoded data of subnational electoral results and development projects, alongside case studies of Zambia, Ethiopia, and Ghana, to explain how heightened political competition can intensify favoritism, diverting funds to strongholds or swing regions rather than the most underserved areas. Offering convincing data-driven analysis, Tang challenges conventional wisdom with crucial insights for rethinking development partnerships in the Global South.
International advocacy strategies devised for the political environment in which World Bank policy is decided are often not suitable for advocacy on broader financial policy and trade issues. Advocacy in these “new” agendas challenges prevailing models, which depict NGOs as mobilizing powerful governments and international organizations to influence a government’s behavior. The patterns of international NGO political activity are diverse, sometimes restraining the power of international rules and authorities over individual governments, and require a new or broader model.
This paper explores, through a case study of the World Bank’s pursuit of universal basic education, the gulf between the Bank’s dialogue with international civil society elites and its treatment of grassroots civil society in its development practice. It argues that the World Bank is pursuing a conscious program to build a global elite governance system similar to Bank vice-president J. F. Rischard’s concept of global issues networks, in which experts from business, government, and civil society will set globally binding social and economic policies. There is a risk of co-optation of international NGOs into this autocratic global managerial system.
Examining an all-but-forgotten episode of large-scale protest at the 1970 annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in Copenhagen, Denmark, this article asks how officials at the World Bank understood and reacted to such protest. How did they characterise the protestors’ demands in the moment? Why and how did they feel the need to respond, and what strategies did they use to do so? And what does that response tell us about how officials at the World Bank understood about the relationship between development and social upheaval? Using heretofore unexamined institutional records, this article argues that already in 1970, World Bank officials were deeply concerned with public opinion about their institutions in both the developed and developing worlds—and therefore found themselves having to reckon with the riots that threatened to derail not just their meetings, but their mission.
This Element examines China's evolving relations with the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs), specifically the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group from the 1980s through 2025. Using a combination of new qualitative findings and quantitative datasets, the authors observe that China has taken an evolving approach to the BWIs in order to achieve its multiple agendas, acting largely as a 'rule-taker' during its first two decades as a member, but, over time, also becoming a 'rule-shaker' inside the BWIs, and ultimately a new 'rule-maker' outside of the BWIs. The analysis highlights China's exercise of 'two-way countervailing power' with one foot inside the BWIs, and another outside, and pushing for changes in both directions. China's interventions have resulted in BWs reforms and the gradual transformation of the global order, while also generating counter-reactions especially from the United States. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This article examines sovereign creditworthiness concerns and policies in a Latin American country that needed economic development and stabilization financing from bankers, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank during the early years of the Bretton Woods era. It underlines the significance for developing country foreign financing breakthroughs of applying sound, coherent, and sustainable macroeconomic policies; of credible and professionalized state institutions; of adhering to formal and informal rules of mainstream international finance; and the policymaking role of trustworthy economic teams coming from the local establishment who endorsed foreign financiers’ ideas and recipes. While written from the perspective of economic history, the analysis incorporates recent insights from earlier historical periods and worldwide case-studies, and of specialists in international political economy and credit rating studies.
Exploring the economic ramifications of climate change, this chapter features insights from financial experts such as Sara Jane Ahmed, Managing Director and V20 Finance Advisor of the CVF-V20 Secretariat. It discusses the adverse effects on GDP growth, inflation, debt, and credit ratings, particularly in vulnerable economies. The chapter highlights the crucial role of financial markets, insurance, and climate finance in addressing these challenges. Innovative financing solutions such as Green Bonds and pre-arranged and trigger-based financing, including loss and damage finance, are explored as means to build economic resilience. The importance of sustainable economic policies and international cooperation is emphasised, with case studies from countries successfully integrating climate resilience into their economic planning. The chapter calls for increased investment in climate adaptation and mitigation to safeguard economic stability and promote sustainable development.
International organisations (IOs) hold important governance functions and power. Yet, they are several steps detached from the constituencies that have entrusted them with functions and resources to carry them out, even as accountability expectations remain significant for their legitimacy. This article presents a broadly generalisable theoretical framework for understanding the variable accountability of IOs, seeking to advance the understanding of international accountability in three new ways. First, it elaborates on the concept of the scope of IO accountability, which can vary across organisations, over time, and across contexts. The idea of a scope of accountability moves beyond the dichotomy of accountable versus non-accountable power holders and advances an understanding of accountability as a multi-layered phenomenon, whereby both the expectations and practices of accountability can evolve over time and with respect to different audiences. Second, the article identifies three political factors – namely the formal and informal excercise of power, institutional structure, and public salience – that can shape, in important ways, the variable scope of IO accountability. Finally, it critically explores the tensions and contradictions between these political dynamics, and the implications for access to and the efficacy of accountability systems.
An intriguing question regarding the relationship between international financial institutions (IFIs) and their Latin American borrowers concerns how and why regime type influences the degree to which the parties are prepared to sign loan agreements. Some scholars highlight a ‘democratic advantage’, while others argue that, on the contrary, a ‘democratic disadvantage’ is evident. This article engages with this scholarly debate, offering a historical perspective on the World Bank’s (WB) lending patterns vis-à-vis Latin America during the Cold War, and more specifically between 1948 and 1988, a period that witnessed both democratic and authoritarian regimes in the region. Drawing on never-before-examined documents from the WB archives and additional primary sources, and analysing WB lending to its four largest Latin American borrowers – Mexico, Colombia, Argentina and particularly Brazil – the article posits a third option, arguing that neither a democratic advantage nor a democratic disadvantage was evident during the period under study. Adhering to its self-declared principle of ‘political neutrality’, as outlined in its Articles of Agreement, and emphasising economic factors, the WB exhibited a clear tendency toward pragmatism and ‘political indifference’. This approach enabled the Bank to maintain its involvement in politically unstable countries like Brazil with minimal interruptions.
Balancing theoretical and practice-oriented elements, this book introduces researchers, teachers, and students in international sustainable development law to the IFIs' safeguard policies. It also scrutinizes the case law of independent accountability mechanisms that interpret those policies and afford recourse to individuals and communities adversely affected by development projects. The book's focus on the procedural and substantive features of IFIs' safeguard systems contributes to a more concrete understanding of these organizations' participation in the international lawmaking process on sustainable development. It puts IFIs in the spotlight and provides an international legal critique of their activities to match their notoriety in popular consciousness and to enhance their accountability to those they harm. By approaching international (economic) law and sustainable development through the lens of economic, environmental, and social issues arising in development projects primarily in the Global South, the book presents a needed counterbalance to existing literature on the topic.
When Roberto Dañino, former World Bank General Counsel, arrived in the institution, he found a department perceived to be at the verge of ‘marginalization’ – a dire state he diagnosed and soon attributed to the rigid ‘culture’ of legal practice. In tracing Dañino’s efforts to ‘make the department relevant again’, we get a glimpse of the situated, material, embodied institutional life of international law: the changes Dañino instilled were not manifested in formal legal sources but in the introduction of new cultural codes, professional prototypes (the ‘how to’ lawyer) and technical routines of risk management. In the domain of international institutional law – often oriented towards abstraction, comparison, or aspiration – such prosaic legal practices tend to be underplayed. This chapter signals two productive entry points for a turn to practice: (i) a focus on the shared and contingent criteria of competence – the ‘social grammar’ – that mark professional postures and performances, and (ii) a heightened attention for the practices of relationality, translation, and materiality through which law is composed – the string of ‘people and things’ that it assembles. This methodological orientation to professional scripts and material routines also offers a perspective on ‘critique’ that differs from familiar structuralist modes of analysis and intervention.
Many studies argue that the World Bank grants favorable loan conditions to allies of its powerful principals. These studies typically use the count of conditions as a proxy for how demanding loans are on borrowers, even though some conditions are more difficult to comply with than others. We propose a new operationalization: a measure of conditionality stringency in Bank loans constructed using Latent Semantic Scaling. Using this new measure, we find little evidence of a generalizable influence of powerful principals. Instead, the stringency of loan conditions is associated with bureaucratic assessments of risk. To facilitate future research, we provide a new dataset of World Bank loan condition texts and our measure of text stringency for all loans in the dataset.
The fiscal burden of government interventions in the rural economy had created growth but led the economy to the brink of crisis. When India implemented full-blown economic reforms in 1991, many assumed these would sideline social policy. This chapter shows that liberalisation pushed social policy up the political agenda. Efforts to enable an ‘exit policy’ for ailing firms by loosening restrictions on retrenchment under chapter VB of the Industrial Disputes Act failed due to opposition from organised labour. The controversy created an opening to strengthen - or at least maintain - existing ‘social safety nets’ to support the project of economic transformation. The Government of India used a World Bank loan initially intended to support the ‘exit policy’ to maintain the rural social policies that had been introduced or expanded in the 1980s, as part of what Finance Minister Manmohan Singh described as macroeconomic adjustment with a ‘human face’. The chapter shows that political regionalisation and the intensification of multi-level electoral competition in the 1990s encouraged subnational social policy innovation and worked against the retrenchment of existing social policies.