The Feyerabend lectures on natural right is Kant’s first clear statement of a view on punishment that balances retributivist and deterrence concerns. Kant’s earlier views, shown by other course lectures on ethics, were largely focused on deterrence. As Kant developed his view of human autonomy, he shifted his reasoning about punishment to include concern for the honor and dignity of the victim as well as the criminal, including right of criminals to be treated no worse than they treated others.

The emerging awareness of self and other, especially with regard to compatible and conflicting aims, opens up dramatic new meanings for the toddler. Being able to be deliberately contrary gives the child experience with disruption and repair of the relationship and lets them explore the boundaries of appropriate behavior. The toddler also has a beginning capacity to control impulses and manage behavior, but doing this adequately requires continued scaffolding and guidance from parents. Meanings surrounding parental reliability brought forward from infancy impact how readily children now accept parental guidance. At the same time, clear, firm, and warm guidance can increase the child’s confidence regarding parents. This is how the transactional model works.

The issue of whether technology is inherently motivating for learners and teachers has often been discussed in the literature around computers and language learning. Yet, there is more to this relationship than initially meets the eye. This chapter outlines the ways in which symbolic power plays a part in both personal and institutional motivations for the adoption of technology. The chapter also looks at the way motivation is often credited as a key to success, though rarely with much empirical evidence. Finally, the article takes on a practitioner’s viewpoint to share several motivational techniques that can assist with practice and research.

Literacy is the ability to make use of visible language, and it is fundamental to language education. This chapter focuses on what teachers should know about digital technologies but begins with broad background and context related to multiliteracies, metaphors, and cultural dimensions of technology use. It then focuses on four key areas where teachers play an important role in the development of their students’ language and literacy abilities via technology: autonomy, mobility, creativity, and communities. It then discusses two controversial areas of current pedagogical research and practice: artificial intelligence and machine translation. It concludes with a call for greater attention to two additional areas highly relevant to language development: literacies related to film and digital communication in the context of study abroad.

In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the author encounters a 50-year-old woman who is requesting her arm be amputated to alleviate her complex regional pain syndrome. This is not a usual indication for an amputation, but a surgeon is willing to offer the procedure. The author attempts to bring about clarity even in the face of uncertainty. Moral distress played a substantial role in the consultation.

In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the author addresses the unassailable, sometimes unmentionable, common thread of deep-seated values and cultural or religious beliefs that serve as a core set of values that can define and certainly do surround us. In bioethics consultations, the process often serves as a deep dive into what is deeply embedded at the center of our behaviors, uncovering cultural, religious, or even family-held norms that underlie our individual sense of place and identity in the world around us. As ill health and disease destroy patients’ sense of autonomy and self-reliance, our core values become more apparent, and we cling more to them in efforts to exercise our will. This fact alone makes the reflection of these core values essential within ethics consultation process because they are defining for many of us. The commentary takes a deep dive into the chapter’s four haunting ethics cases centered around culture and religion and the ethical challenges that they reflect.

In this chapter of Complex Ethics Consultations: Cases that Haunt Us, the authors describe a 70-year-old man who is refusing all options available to him and expresses faith that his suffering must have some meaning since it was "God’s will." The team struggled with apparently inconsistent patient expressions of turning down surgery but insisting on attempted resuscitation. The case additionally highlights the uncertainty involved in medical decision making.

This chapter argues that the resurgence of strong religion has forced liberal states to find new answers to its effects on women’s rights. It discusses two examples. The first is recognition of the jurisdiction of private Muslim Sharia Tribunals to decide Muslim divorces and family disputes, and the second is intervention in Jewish divorce cases in which Jewish religious women find themselves anchored to their marriages due to their husbands’ refusal to grant them a religious divorce. The chapter offers a novel classification of religion–state relations, which sheds new light on the different solutions offered to such dilemmas and their compatibility with women’s rights and with religious freedom. It employs a comparative perspective on religion–state relations to distinguish between three approaches toward religion – nationalization, authorization, and privatization. It assesses the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches and claims that, contrary to liberal inclinations, measured state intervention that enables the liberal state to acknowledge the importance of religious belief in people’s lives, while at the same time protecting the rights of all its citizens, is required.

Good states want to increase the well-being of their citizens, and act to do this. Insofar as state efforts constrain action for the sake of well-being, however, there is a danger that these constraints will limit liberty in a way that actually undercuts the individual achievement of well-being. If we limit liberty in order to bring us to one desirable state (say, good health) that doesn’t necessarily increase well-being if the loss of liberty in itself diminishes well-being. However, when we consider the three major theories of well-being, hedonism, desire-satisfaction, and objective list theories, we see that there is nothing in the loss of liberty that necessarily diminishes well-being at all. It depends on what that loss brings about. Sometimes liberties make us better off, but it depends on the specific liberty and what it contributes. There is nothing about loss of liberty per se that does us any harm.

In law and scholarship, natural rights are associated more often with libertarian theories than theories of natural law. This chapter contrasts the two models of natural rights. Natural law-based natural rights rely on the interest theory of rights, not will theories. In natural law theories, autonomy is subordinate to rational flourishing and not a good on its own. Natural law theories make relevant the consequences on people of structuring rights in different ways. And in natural law theories political communities may accord broader rights to their members than to outsiders. The chapter illustrates the jus abutendi or right to destroy, the trespass case State v. Shack, doctrines about the acquisition of captured wild animals and whales, and the Native American property case Johnson v. M’Intosh.

The commonest view on the essential moral nature of manipulation is that manipulation is pro tanto wrong: it is wrong as such but, given countervailing considerations, can be all-things-considered morally justified. The argument in this chapter, in contrast, is that manipulation is not intrinsically morally bad. This claim has never been argued for systematically. Reviewing the most probable bad-making features associated with manipulation shows that none of them is necessarily exhibited by it. The chapter then lays out a broad phenomenological description of the many positive contributions manipulation makes to human life. This reveals manipulation as an indispensable “social lubricant” and an element of the good life for people. The main moral conclusions of this review are (a) that manipulation is (not only not necessarily bad, but) not even typically bad. And (b) that rational choosers “behind a veil of ignorance” would choose a society where certain kinds of (mutually enjoyable or prosocial) manipulation are part of the ordinary repertoire. This suggests, in turn, that manipulation does not necessarily disrespect the autonomy of persons – since they choose to be subjected to it. This constitutes a new argument against the charge that manipulation disrespects autonomy.

Karen Bauer offers a comprehensive review of the Islamic moral framework as outlined in the Qur’an, situating Islamic gender norms within this context. The chapter demonstrates how these norms support a hierarchical structure that also emphasizes fairness.