In light of progressive criticism of the managerial ‘expert’ logic dominant in the development field, the article analyses how international organizations (IOs) increasingly seek to pluralize their knowledge by adding to their toolkit certain territory-based elements of participatory approaches to data, especially from the Global South. It examines how such attempts to pluralize IOs’ expertise translate in practice, by focusing on the localization processes of the UN 2030 Agenda in six peripheral communities in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, that is, their development of territory-based targets and indicators for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The article contrasts these local practices with UN expert agencies’ approaches to data disaggregation. This comparison shows how datafying tools and processes may vary considerably, indicating important epistemological differences in how knowledge gets validated, with impacts regarding visibility and accountability. The territory-based practices analysed defy authorized forms of knowledge by making data not only for monitoring or for action but also for caring and for making live. The article concludes that localization gives the impression that IOs’ knowledge is becoming more plural, yet these changes remain at the surface only, with other knowledges becoming parts of standardized templates and merely complementing official data.

International Relations scholarship has shown that persisting epistemic hierarchies rooted in colonial domination continue to exclude, silence, or sideline alternative knowledges in global governance, even as International Organizations increasingly open up to formally marginalized groups and attempt to pluralize their expertise. While building on such accounts, this article argues that epistemic hierarchies are deeply entangled with political-economic logics, which permeate global epistemic politics in multiple ways. These intersecting epistemic and political-economic logics produce complex forms of ‘political-epistemic disciplining’, which do not simply exclude alternative knowledges, but rearticulate them. I identify three intertwined modalities of this process: de-epistemization, whereby alternative knowledge claims are recoded as social or identity concerns rather than treated as competing epistemologies. This operation recognizes the subjects of the critique but not the epistemic critique itself. Conditional recognition occurs when prevailing criteria of validity regulate the acknowledgement of such claims. Finally, transposition constitutes or reformulates alternative knowledge claims through the lenses of dominant epistemic frameworks and categories. These processes rearticulate alternative knowledges and transform them a new into ‘globalized alternative knowledges’. The argument is developed through an in-depth analysis of engagements with Indigenous knowledges in Global Mental Health governance.

This article introduces the heuristic of epistemic inertia to complicate narratives of radical rupture in global sites of expertise. In 2006, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), widely celebrated as a radical break from the medical model, which had long framed disability as an individual impairment to be treated by medical doctors. Through the heuristic of epistemic inertia, we examine how, despite adopting a more pluralised expert repertoire, the CRPD Committee retains some deep-seated (neo)liberal assumptions of the medical model. Through an analysis of General Comment No. 8, we identify three main manifestations of this persistence across both models: first, an understanding of dignity as tied to productivity and autonomy; second, the idea that individuals must ‘adapt’ to existing societal arrangements through merit; and third, the portrayal of market participation as the privileged moral horizon. What falls out of view are alternative imaginaries grounded in interdependence or collective forms of care, which exist outside prevailing economic logics. In this configuration, the figure of the rights-bearer is not a radical alternative to the medical patient, insofar as rights are still articulated through expectations of optimisation and self-reliance within prevailing market logics.

When it comes to making political decisions about religion, decision-makers often rely on the testimonies of two kinds of religious experts: religious leaders and academic experts of religion. While such religious experts have epistemic authority for questions of religious identification and religious orthodoxy, their expertise is the wrong kind in a religiously neutral state. Questions of religious identification unfairly treat religion as being uniquely special and questions of religious orthodoxy give priority to religious traditions over individuals. Instead, only the subjective importance of commitments matters for cases of religious freedom, and only the objective interpretation of religious establishment matters in cases of religious establishment. Religious experts having no epistemic advantage here, they should not be playing any special role in making decisions about religion.

Experts step into global governance most prominently in times of crisis. But if crisis governance at international organizations (IOs) involves the construction of specific temporal horizons, how do these horizons affect the constitution of expert authority? This article argues that expertise produced under such conditions – to meet a demand for ‘timely’ knowledge – differs substantively from other kinds of expertise. Crisis governance thus contributes in notable ways to the pluralization of expertise. The article examines this phenomenon in the case of the relatively recent proliferation of rapid response mechanisms (RRMs). By examining the making and implementation of RRMs at two major IOs – the World Health Organization and the World Food Programme – the article offers a new understanding for how RRMs have become part of institutional repertoires of expertise. Based on this, it contends that RRM-based timeliness claims a shift in expert knowledge production from credentialed individuals to infrastructures and standardized procedures; second, they prioritize large homogenous datasets over consultation and contestation among different experts; and third, they streamline expert selection such that experts are recruited from existing intra-institutional pools rather than third parties. Jointly, these shifts speed up monitoring and reaction capabilities, but also risk eroding important checks on expert overconfidence.

States are measured and ranked on an ever-expanding array of country performance indicators (CPIs). Such indicators are seductive because they provide actionable, accessible, and ostensibly objective information on complex phenomena to time-pressed officials and enable citizens to hold governments to account. At the same time, a sizeable body of research has explored how CPIs entail ‘black boxing’ and depoliticisation of political phenomena. This article advances our understanding of the consequences of governance by indicators by examining how CPIs generate specific forms of politicization that can undermine a given CPI’s authority over time. We contend that CPIs rely upon two different claims to authority that operate in tension with one another: i) the claim to provide expert, objective knowledge and ii) the claim to render the world more transparent and to secure democratic accountability. Analysing CPIs in the field of education, economic governance, and health and development, we theorize and empirically document how this tension leads to three distinct forms of politicisation: scrutiny from experts that politicises the value judgements embodied in a CPI; competition whereby rival CPIs contest the objectivity of knowledge of leading CPIs; and corruption, where gaming of CPIs challenges its claim to securing transparent access to social reality. While the analysis identifies multiple paths to the politicization and undermining of specific CPIs’ authority, the article elaborates why these processes tend to leave intact and even reproduce the legitimacy of CPIs as a governance technology.

Many voters support the inclusion of technocrats in government. Yet we know very little about why technocrats are considered more appealing than traditional party representatives. In particular, it is unclear which advantages and disadvantages voters attach to the defining traits of technocratic ministers: party independence and expertise. We engage with this question drawing on a pre-registered survey experiment in Austria. We examine how manipulating ministers' party affiliation and expertise affects voters' perceptions of their issue competence and bargaining competence. Findings indicate that voters ascribe lower levels of issue competence to partisan ministers than to non-partisan ministers, notwithstanding their actual expertise, and that ministers' partisanship shrinks the positive effect of expertise on perceived issue competence. However, this ‘partisanship penalty’ disappears for supporters of the minister's party. Moreover, voters perceive partisanship as an advantageous trait with regard to a minister's bargaining competence. While voters like technocrats for their expertise and independence from party politics, our findings reveal nuanced perceptions, with voters still recognizing distinct advantages in being represented by party politicians.

Based on a qualitative and quantitative research design, this article examines the implementation of a morality policy – the medical cannabis policy in Switzerland – to investigate three understudied aspects of bureaucratic entrepreneurship. First, moving away from mono‐professional studies, the focus is on a policy characterized by a dispute between two groups of bureaucrats: physicians and jurists. Second, key conditions triggering bureaucratic policy entrepreneurship are identified, with a focus on mid‐level administrative entrepreneurs. Third, vertical alliances between bureaucrats and politicians of the executive and legislative branches are examined and these processes are reflected in the wider perspective of the politics‐administration dichotomy. Results show that law obsolescence, disputes between groups of bureaucrats and the need for political arbitration are favourable conditions for bureaucratic policy entrepreneurship. The study also shows that within the traditional separation of powers, bureaucratic entrepreneurship reinforces the executive power and creates dividing lines within the different branches of government.

This research analyzes the relationship between board composition and web transparency in nonprofit organizations (NPOs). The board is conceived as a governance mechanism that not only monitors management but also gives voice to all stakeholders and considers accountability—and, more specifically, web transparency—as a key instrument for the NPO’s legitimization. To conduct this study, we manually built a database from the CVs of 793 directors of 67 Spanish non-governmental development organizations and we use fuzzy set comparative qualitative analysis (fsQCA). Our results indicate that board composition (size, independence, gender diversity, and presence of directors with financial or NPOs’ expertise) influences transparency and that, depending on the organizational size and legal form, there are different board configurations that lead to high transparency. Generally, NPOs should include experts in nonprofit sector and more female members on their boards to increase transparency.

In this paper I provide a preliminary sketch of the types of logics of evaluation in the third sector. I begin by tracing the ideals that are evident in three well-articulated yet quite different third sector evaluation practices: the logical framework, most significant change stories, and social return on investment. Drawing on this analysis, I then tentatively outline three logics of evaluation: a scientific evaluation logic (systematic observation, observable and measurable evidence, objective and robust experimental procedures), a bureaucratic evaluation logic (complex, step-by-step procedures, analysis of intended objectives), and a learning evaluation logic (openness to change, wide range of perspectives, lay rather than professional expertise). These logics draw attention to differing conceptions of knowledge and expertise and their resource implications, and have important consequences for the professional status of the practitioners, consultants, and policy makers that contribute to and/or are involved in evaluations in third sector organizations.

Resource restrictions and changes to the ways in which psychiatrists are managed threaten professional autonomy and motivation. With examples from English National Health Service practice, maintaining knowledge and expertise, involvement in education and training, supporting research delivery and developing active followership skills represent transferable and realistic strategies that can improve psychiatrists’ autonomy wherever they work.

Policymakers often consult university scientists as they design and administer policies to address issues facing contemporary democracies, including climate change and global pandemics. Subsequently, democratic theorists have become interested in how science advising generates both challenges and opportunities for democratic governance. As a work of applied political theory, this article contributes to current debates over the political implications of scientific expertise—and engages with Zeynep Pamuk’s writings, in particular—through a sustained focus on impending regulatory decisions surrounding novel gene editing technologies. I show how political decisions have created incentives for university scientists to commercialize research and develop partnerships with biotechnology corporations. In turn, the academic-industrial complex has both compromised the integrity of scientific research and also impaired scientists’ capacities to offer disinterested advice in the public interest. I conclude by recommending the development of a more robust and expansive regulatory environment that can restore public trust in scientific expertise.