Practice single-best-answer questions on primary and emergency care, representing all presentations and conditions listed by the GMC in their content map for the MLA AKT, and referred to by the keywords in this book. All questions are specifically tailored to the level of knowledge required for foundation clinical practice in the UK, and comprehensive in breadth, separating out the different conditions and presentations listed by the GMC, and covering them all. Not only are correct answers provided, but also explanations for all the available answer options. Every question is supported by an individual topic in the companion book which is specifically authored to cover the knowledge required for foundation clinical practice in the UK.

The nineteenth-century Russian poet Fedor Tiutchev rightly marvelled at his motherland’s remarkable growth: ‘Moscow, and Peter’s town, and Constantine’s city, these are the Russian realm’s cherished capitals … But where is its limit? Where are its borders? The fates will reveal them in times to come …’ Over the past 400 years an obscure principality deep in the forests on Europe’s eastern edge had expanded to become the largest continental empire on Earth – a domain whose immense territory stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean and beyond, covering one-sixth of the planet’s dry surface. Although somewhat diminished in size after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russians today still nickname their country ‘the seventh continent’.

For over half a century, discussion of the relationship between military finance, organisation, and state development has been dominated by the contested concept of a ‘military revolution’; the belief that there were one or a few periods of fundamental change that transformed both war and wider European history. More recently, this has been supplemented by the idea of smaller, but more frequent ‘revolutions in military affairs’ (RMAs) as individual military organisations respond to, or anticipate, changes made by their likely opponents. Technology is generally considered to drive both forms of ‘revolution’, as innovative weaponry and institutional practice transform war, rendering older models ineffective and obsolete. Change flows through a series of chain reactions, as states adapt to new conditions, modifying their structures to sustain and direct altered armed forces, and revising their forms of interaction with society both to extract the necessary resources and to legitimate their use in war-making.

International relations are built on the basis of popular discourse of amity and antipathy and on the social construction of friends and enemies. They reflect the work of political entrepreneurs who try to shape and promote a dominant narrative about what is the nature of the main problem confronting a nation, and what is the best solution to solve this problem. They seek publicity to mobilize popular and elite support for their favored policy, and the policy eventually chosen often reflects the relative success of their entrepreneurial skill rather than the strict merits of their proposed solutions.

Russia emerged as a European power in the early eighteenth century with a suddenness that alarmed its neighbors – and indeed some of its more distant potential supporters. Russia’s newfound prominence was in large part the outcome of a series of international conflicts often referred to as “the Northern Wars.” Conflict over the fate of the eastern Baltic littoral had entered a new phase near the middle of the sixteenth century with the decline of the Livonian Order and the growing territorial ambitions of nearby states. Aside from the crusading Order itself, which had formally disbanded by 1561, the nearby states of Denmark, Sweden, Muscovy, Poland-Lithuania, and Brandenburg persistently battled one another over the fate of the littoral, in varying configurations but with surprisingly few intermissions until 1721. The more important of these multilateral conflicts are conventionally identified as the Livonian War (1558–83), the mid-seventeenth-century conflicts among Sweden, the Commonwealth, Muscovy, Brandenburg, and Denmark that included the Thirteen-Years’ War (1654–67), and finally the “Great Northern War” (1720–21) which ended in Russian victory. While the earlier conflicts remained relatively confined, in diplomatic and military terms, to Northern and Eastern Europe, the outcome of the last Northern War not only established the Russian Empire as the dominant Baltic state; it also led to Russia’s broader recognition as a major force in the broader European diplomatic world.

Summary of the argument, implications, directions for further research.

The dominant interpretation of warfare in the Indian subcontinent before the establishment of British rule is that it was comprised of unorganised melees by forces of undisciplined militia. This stemmed from the fact that pre-British Indian states were weak polities with divisible sovereignty; they were – to use the terminology of Burton Stein – segmentary states, lacking any concept of frontiers and standing armies. The divisive caste system of India further debilitated the pre-British indigenous states and armies. The argument goes that the rise of British power in the second half of the eighteenth century resulted in a sea change in warfare. The British introduced a bureaucratic state with standing armies capable of waging decisive battles and conclusive sieges in India. This interpretation dates back to two nineteenth-century British scholars of colonial India. They argued that Indians were incapable of constructing stable states and structured armies due to their racial failings. And at the beginning of the twenty-first century, historians may have substituted a racial analysis for a cultural one, but otherwise they argue along more or less the same lines, that the limited scale of organised inter-state violence reflected the constraints upon the states of pre-British India.

Chapter 6 uses doctrinal analysis to ask what the word ‘disfigurement’ means, and whether we can justify treating disfigurement differently from the related concepts of appearance and obesity. It identifies significant gaps created by a law which only protects a small subset of people experiencing appearance disadvantage – those with severe disfigurements – and which excludes many of those disabled by social barriers because of other aesthetic differences, such as those experiencing hair loss, those whose bodies are differently sized or those with facial movement impairments (such as facial palsy or synkinesis). It doubts whether these inconsistencies and mixed messages can be justified. It also considers whether other protected characteristics – such as sex or age – can be drafted in to fill the gaps in legal protection, but concludes that this may amplify the inconsistencies within the law.

The years of the French Revolution and First Empire are remembered as much for war and imperial expansion as for the great political and social reforms they introduced. The Revolutionaries saw themselves as sons of the Enlightenment, devoted to ideals of freedom and the betterment of humanity. Yet they unleashed a long period of almost continuous warfare, fought across the European continent and beyond, in North Africa and the Near East, in North America, Asia, and the Caribbean. In Europe, France faced a succession of coalitions of other European powers, from the First Coalition of 1792–7 – an international alliance that included Austria, Prussia, Britain, Spain, Piedmont, Naples, and Sardinia – through to the final coalition, the Seventh, which wearily regrouped to defeat Napoleon after his ill-judged return to France in 1815. The other governments of Europe feared France’s political ambitions as much as its military might, and they invariably saw themselves as the victims of French aggression, forced to make war to protect their territory from attack. Britain also feared the challenge to its naval and colonial supremacy which a revitalised France would pose; for London the war was as much about Jamaica and India as the balance of power in Continental Europe, about global competition for resources as much as the ideas of the Revolution in France.

This chapter follows a logic of exposition initiated by Gibbs in 1902. On the one hand, some theoretical results in statistical mechanics have been derived in Chapter 3, while, on another hand, some theoretical/experimental results are expressed within thermodynamics, and parallels are drawn between the two approaches. To this end, the theory of thermodynamics and its laws are presented. The chapter takes an approach where each stated law is attached to a readable source material and a person’s writing. The exposition of the second law follows the axiomatics of Carathéodory, for example. This has the advantage of decoupling the physics from the mathematics. The structure of thermodynamic theory with the scaling behaviour of thermodynamic variables, Massieu potentials and Legendre transformations is also developed. Finally, correspondence relations are postulated between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, allowing one to interpret thermodynamic variables as observational states associated to certain probability laws. Applications are given, including the Gibbs paradox. The equivalence between the canonical and the microcanonical ensembles is analysed in detail.

Forgivingness is virtue, a specification of generosity, a disposition to give offenders, especially against oneself, more of good and less of evil than they deserve. It is an interconnected set of sensitivities to features of situations marked by wrongdoing. The forgiving person is responsive to these features in ways that tend to mitigate, eliminate, or forestall anger in the interest of wishing the wrongdoer well and/or of enjoying a positive and harmonious relationship with him or her. The chief considerations favoring forgiveness are (1) the offender’s repentance, (2) excuses for the offender, (3) the offender’s suffering, (4) moral commonality with the offender, and (5) relationship to the offender.

Generosity and gratitude are prime examples of gracious traits – traits of concern for the other for the other’s sake. They are virtues of direct caring. They are complementary dispositions, readying their possessors to occupy reciprocal roles in gracious transactions. Their grammar contrasts with that of virtues of requirement such as justice and the sense of duty. Gratitude and justice both involve debt and obligation, but in different senses of ‘debt’ and ‘obligation.’ Certain cases of genuine gratitude in which the subject doesn’t believe the reason for his gratitude confirm the superiority of the view of emotions as concern-based construals over judgment theories. The concepts of gratitude and generosity specify, in their grammar, reasons that are internal to (definitive of) gratitude or generosity, but they can also be incited by reasons that don’t belong to their grammar, as long as such external reasons can trigger internal ones.