The papers of Sir Edward Denison Ross (1871–1940) at the Archives of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) include a series of letters from Hungary, which thank him for his contribution in bringing the world's attention to Alexander Csoma de Kőrös (1784–1842). Some of these letters were produced collectively by learned societies and signed by dozens of male and female members, but many were also written by ordinary people expressing their admiration for Csoma, the scholar who had walked most of the way from Transylvania to India in search of the roots of the Hungarian language and people. This lively response was a result of a lecture that Ross delivered on 5 January 1910 at the Asiatic Society of Bengal in Calcutta which became a sensation in Hungary in a matter of weeks. This article therefore looks at the phenomenon of how Ross's purely academic research, to use Albert von Le Coq's words, “touched a nation's heart” and earned him a celebrity status in Csoma's homeland. It is particularly interesting to uncover the motives behind this great publicity and show how it was orchestrated by two young Hungarians in Calcutta for not entirely unselfish purposes.

This article addresses the broad question of the sense of community in traditional Chinese villages, through consideration of popular cults found throughout the most highly developed region in Late Imperial China: the Jiangnan Delta. A key clue is a large-scale tenant-farmer revolt in Zhaowen County in 1846. When the uprising was suppressed, not only were twenty human ringleaders executed, but images of four local gods from village temples, who were believed to have sanctioned the rebellion, were also seized by the authorities and exposed for one year at the gates of the Zhaowen County City God temple. All four had three characteristics in common: (1) they were anthropomorphic, with human names; (2) they had living descendants of the same surname; (3) all were associated with stories involving miraculous protection of tax grain transport to the North. The descendants of these gods, all possession-type spirit mediums, or shamans, based in the villages, created the gods in response to the needs of their clients, large-scale landlords who bore responsibility for sea transport of tax grain to the North. In the mid-sixteenth century, fundamental socio-economic changes took place in the Jiangnan Delta. The landlords disappeared from the villages, leaving only the farmers, who were turning to cottage industries for cash to supplement inadequate food crop yields. The spirit mediums responded to the changes and modified their gods for a new set of clients, resulting in the survival of these cults down to the present day.

Relying on Vietnamese internal government documents now available to scholars for consultation in the No. 3 Vietnam National Archive in Hanoi, this article examines the linkage between the escalated Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute and the increased Vietnamese mistreatment of Chinese residents and experts in northern Vietnam from 1974 to 1978 owing to state-sponsored Vietnamese anti-China/irredentist nationalism. During this period, Vietnamese leaders were seeking to forge national unity, solidify popular loyalty to the state, and mobilize domestic resources to defend the Vietnamese “fatherland” against the threat of Chinese territorial expansion. Specifically, this article demonstrates how these policies encouraged mistreatment of Chinese residents and experts, and created a climate of fear and paranoia within the Chinese community which caused the widespread flight of Chinese from northern Vietnam in 1977–1978.

This paper explores the relationship between local lineage social structure and the workings of tax registration in Qing China, through a case study providing documentary evidence of a level of precision that enables us to go beyond the findings of previous scholarship. In the first instance, it reconstructs a tax dispute where implications of the registration system come into play, based on rare records made by the taxpayers themselves. In doing so, it shows that (a) the registered “acreage” of land was in fact unrelated to any actual land whatsoever; (b) tax collection ceased to be able to rely on knowledge of the terrain and had to depend on knowing the social groups that could be held responsible for payment, while the cohesion and internal differentiation of these social groups was (in turn) underpinned by tax collection and registration; and (c) since the registration system did not permit the government to keep track of actual landholding, property rights had to be secured at the local community level. In conclusion, an attempt is made to speculate on the extent to which this specific case contributes to our knowledge of local social structure, the interactions between localities and the government, and the property regime of Qing China overall.

The paper deals with the trends of fascist and fascist-like right-wing social and political thought in colonial Korea in the early 1930s. It shows that in the 1920s, Korea's right wing, its ability to reach out to the masses being severely limited, preferred mostly conciliatory tactics in its relationship with leftist radicals, often making efforts towards inventing ‘hybrid’ ideologies which would integrate the leftist social concerns into the mainstream religious or nationalist constructions (an example of such a hybrid were various Korean versions of Christian socialism). After the Great Depression, however, Korea's nascent bourgeoisie felt more threatened and became more interested in keeping abreast with right-wing extremist trends in the mother country (Japan) and elsewhere. Such representative ideologists of the Korean propertied class as Yun Ch'iho and Yi Kwangsu were praising Mussolini and employing strong Social Darwinist language in their exhortations to the Korean people to ‘regain their vitality and develop [a] spirit of collectivism, obedience and self-sacrifice’. However, until the very end of the 1930s many of Korea's right-wing ideologues remained pronouncedly religious (Yun as Christian, Yi as Buddhist). While highlighting the religious essentials of their worldviews they often abstained from imitating the most extremist traits of European fascist ideologies (for example, anti-Semitism). In many ways, Korea's fascism continued until the end of the 1930s to be an intellectual discourse rather than a mass movement, and retained a strong aura of belonging to more mainstream religious or nationalist traditions.

This paper explores the current state of the field of Kashmir Studies and argues that, whilst scholarship on Kashmir has come a long way since the decades after Indian independence and partition, the political situation in the region continues to cast a long shadow over writings on Kashmir. Nevertheless, and despite the continued difficulties associated with research within Kashmir, a new generation of scholars has emerged at the turn of the twenty-first century, whose writings transcend geographical and political determinism as well as the discourse of Kashmiri exceptionalism, to present Kashmir as a complex, but not unique, entity, that has been shaped by multiple influences. In addition, this scholarship explores the ideas that have given Kashmir a particular shape in our imaginations, through analysis of a variety of sources, including poetry, art, film, and oral histories. A lot remains to be done, however, particularly in the field of Kashmir's medieval and pre-modern history, and in the application of theoretical approaches such as borderlands to the region's past and present.

In 1905, Viceroy Nathaniel Curzon applied well-worn principles of imperial order to reorganize northeastern regions of British India, bringing the entire Meghna-Brahmaputra river basin into one new administrative territory: the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. He thereby launched modern territorial politics in South Asia by provoking an expansive and ultimately victorious nationalist agitation to unify Bengal and protect India's territorial integrity. This movement and its economic programme (swadeshi) expressed Indian nationalist opposition to imperial inequity. It established a permanent spatial frame for Indian national thought. It also expressed and naturalized spatial inequity inside India, which was increasing at the time under economic globalization. Spatial inequities in the political economy of uneven development have animated territorial politics in South Asia ever since. A century later, another acceleration of globalization is again increasing spatial inequity, again destabilizing territorial order, as nationalists naturalize spatial inequity in national territory and conflicts erupt from the experience of living in disadvantaged places. Remapping 1905 in the long twentieth century which connects these two periods of globalization, spanning eras of empire and nation, reveals spatial dynamics of modernity concealed by national maps and brings to light a transnational history of spatial inequity shared by Bangladesh and Northeast India.