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This article reconstructs the mining practices and social activities of Chinese migrants in Maliwun, a tin-rich Burmese village on the Siam-Burma border between the 1840s and 1890s. Despite its natural resources and repeated mining attempts by various stakeholders, Maliwun could not materialise its potential and was slow in tin production and community development throughout this period. By focusing on the internal dynamics among its Chinese miners, especially around the rivalling Chinese “secret societies,” this article situates the frontier mining settlement within a larger regional network of the Southeast Asian Chinese and traces its Chinese community’s evolving relationships with fellow countrymen along the southern Siamese and northern Malayan coastlines. It argues that grassroots organisations played a crucial role in the early formation of this frontier Chinese migrant community, which was sitting at the intersection of political, labour, resource, gender, and ethnic frontiers and exhibited key features of fluid boundaries and transnational networks. Yet, these impacts should not be overstated, individually or collectively. The slow development of Maliwun calls for a careful reassessment of the limitation of roles played by porous borders, hybrid interactions, and transnational networks at a historic frontier.
In an effort to “reform” and fundamentally redefine who gets to call themselves a rights-bearing citizen of India, the BJP government introduced the National Registry of Citizens (NRC) and Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA). January and February of 2020 saw riots across India over the issue of NRC and CAA. The Indian government made a decision by passing CAA, which stated that Muslims from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh could not become citizens of India. The decision also resulted in the Shaheen Bagh protests where Muslim women organized a dharna, “sit in,” for weeks to protest this draconian decision. NRC/CAA meant that many Muslims who were born in India but could not produce proper documents of being from India would not be regarded as lawful citizens of India. Many Indians below the poverty line have limited access to resources such as literacy that safeguard documentation. These Indians are not limited to their religious backgrounds yet NRC/CAA targets only Muslim citizens. NRC/CAA has led to widespread debate about how citizenship is framed and the legality of the law itself. Leaders of the BJP made several speeches where they framed Muslims as outsiders and “takers” who drain Indian society.
Chapter 1 defines the theoretical homes of this book and shows why and how harm in language has resulted in legislative actions. The chapter creates dialogue between two broad fields: the study of meaning in language and critical studies of South Asia. The chapter provides a brief history of Hindu right in India and an overview of how the government has weaponized language against Indian Muslims in the last three decades. This chapter shows that a critical aspect of understanding the success of the Hindu right in India, a secular democracy whose inception is underlined by massive violence between different religious groups during the partition, is to understand how it slowly and with cunning use of language sowed seeds of sectarian distrust. The chapter argues that while Hindu right has been studied from multiple perspectives, a linguistic perspective is missing. Such a perspective shows how successful the Hindu right has been in taking actions that lead to long-term harm to Muslim communities in India.
By framing Kashmir as a threatened and threatening space and Indian Muslims as Pakistan sympathizers and as threats to the Indian state, the Hindu right supports an increasingly militarized nation-state and maintains the rhetoric of Muslims as the enemy within. The chapter argues that maintaining Pakistan as a perpetual enemy and Indian Muslims as supporters of Pakistan, the rhetoric of the enemy within, that is, the Indian Muslim, continues and becomes self-serving. Muslims become the perpetual other and language about Pakistan and Kashmir places Indian Muslims as outsiders and Kashmiris as an example case of what Indian Muslims could become or already are. Rhetoric and propaganda around Kashmir argues for violent treatment of any rebellion by Kashmiris and militarization of the Indian nation-state.
The book concludes with sober thoughts on how propagandist language use threatens Indian democracy. One of the primary reasons for the book is to underline the urgency of studying and identifying linguistic trickery. While each chapter does so, the conclusion highlights the consequences of linguistic trickery for Indian Muslims. Academic work on language use such as this has argued for studying not just the language but also what is actually does to people.
Hallyu has expanded significantly through digital platforms since the 2010s. While Netflix has played a crucial role in distributing Korean content worldwide, its platform-driven strategies typically favour commercially optimised and formulaic narratives. This article examines an alternative dynamic through the 2021 Netflix docuseries My Love: Six Stories of True Love, which builds upon South Korean director Moyoung Jin’s earlier independent documentary My Love, Don’t Cross That River. Produced with local teams across six countries under Jin’s executive oversight, the series preserves an aesthetic and political sensibility rooted in Korea’s minjung documentary tradition. Its sustained focus on marginalised elderly couples and the intimate relationship between camera and subject represents a significant departure from Netflix’s standard original docuseries, which often centre on scandalous crimes, sensational narratives, or planetary issues such as climate crisis. The article investigates how culturally specific narratives can achieve global resonance without diminishing local contexts. The analysis traces the culturally sensitive translation of a local independent documentary to a transnational Netflix series, arguing that such cross-cultural initiatives signal a multidirectional and inclusive reimagining of Hallyu that challenges its predominantly market-driven circulation patterns.
In 2015, China adopted “Made in China 2025” to upgrade its manufacturing sector and to engage firms in contributing to state priorities including economic growth and national security. Since 2015, the media and academics have noted that manufacturing firms of more strategic importance received more subsidies. However, firms manufacturing cutting-edge products do not necessarily mean that they are willing to meet the state’s political goals. This article argues that China grants more subsidies to manufacturing firms more connected to the party-state. Data on manufacturing firms listed in China supports the argument. Data also demonstrates that when manufacturing firms are more politically connected, the positive effects of subsidies on local manufacturing growth and on firm-level productivity tend to decrease. The symbiotic relationship between politically connected firms and the party-state may curb on the growth momentum, which contradicts one of the key goals of “Made in China 2025”: economic growth.
The rapid economic development experienced by Southeast Asia has come at the cost of considerable environmental degradation, including deforestation and land degradation, biodiversity loss, water and ocean pollution, rising greenhouse gas emissions, and increasing vulnerability to climate change. While sustainable development as a concept recognizes the fundamental importance of nature to future human well-being, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a set of policies falls far short of this ideal. The SDGs, particularly the environmental goals relating to life on land, life under water, and climate action, are essentially impossible to meet in Southeast Asia, as no country is on a sustainability trajectory, but these goals are superficial and modest at best anyway. Alternative approaches that recognize trade-offs and seek to integrate across solutions, that create spaces for inclusion, and which center equity and justice could help meet SDG goals, but face considerable challenges in implementation across Southeast Asia.
China's war against Japan was, at its heart, a struggle for food. As the Nationalists, Chinese Communist Party, and Japanese vied for a dwindling pool of sustenance, grain emerged as the lynchpin of their strategies for a long-term war effort. In the first in-depth examination of how the Nationalists fed their armies, Jennifer Yip demonstrates how the Chinese government relied on mass civilian mobilization to carry out all stages of provisioning, from procurement to transportation and storage. The intensive use of civilian labor and assets–a distinctly preindustrial resource base– shaped China's own conception of its total war effort, and distinguished China's experience as unique among World War Two combatants. Yip challenges the predominant image of World War II as one of technological prowess, and the tendency to conflate total war with industrialized warfare. Ultimately, China sustained total war against the odds with premodern means: by ruthlessly extracting civilian resources.