Russian propaganda campaigns against Ukrainian nationalism stretch as far back as the 1709 Battle of Poltava, since when Ukrainian nationalists have been viewed by the Tsarist Empire, Soviet regime and contemporary Russia as ‘traitors’ to a pan-Russian identity. During the last three centuries the myths of Ukrainian ‘betrayal’ and Western conspiracies to weaken Russia by encouraging Little Russians to believe they are Ukrainians have been at the centre of Ukrainian-Russian relations. There has been a continuity of Russian imperial nationalist thinking from the Tsarist Empire and Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia that Ukrainian nationalists have been Western puppets intent on weakening and harming Russia and dividing the pan-Russian people. In Putin’s Russia, conspiratorial and imperial nationalistic views of Ukrainians grew from the mid 2000s with the rehabilitation and diffusion of White Russian émigré writings who denied Ukrainians were a separate people and believed an independent Ukraine was a Western conspiracy against Russia. The term ‘Nazi’ has been applied to all Ukrainians who hold an identity distinct from Russians in the Soviet Union and Putin’s Russia which is, after all, ruled by the former Soviet siloviki.

Analysis of the myths underpinning the Russian Orthodox Church and its historically close ties to Russian imperial nationalism. This is analysed in four ways. The first, investigates the contemporary origins of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Moscow Patriarchate after it was revived by Joseph Stalin in 1943. The second, analyses the mythical and real size and influence of the Russian Orthodox in Ukraine. The third, analyses the manner in which the Russian Orthodox Church operated during important periods of Ukrainian history, such as the Sovietisation of Western Ukraine after 1945, the takeover of banned Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox and Greek-Catholic parishes in Ukraine, during the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state; the consolidation of a pluralistic model of society, the Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions, and its decline in Ukraine following Russian military aggression and autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The fourth, investigates the phenomenon of ‘confessional diplomacy’ within and promotion of traditional spiritual values by the Russian Orthodox Church.

This chapter examines attempts by the political opposition to ZANU-PF to modify politics in the diamond sector, particularly during the GNU government from 2009 to 2013. Many studies have focused on the failures of the main opposition, the MDC party, now CCC, to provide an effective alternative to ZANU-PF. Common arguments have been that the party has been undermined by infighting, has often been viewed as being backed by foreign governments, and has had some issues with corruption. This chapter argues that a major reason why the political opposition in Zimbabwe has been unable to make inroads politically is that the diamond sector has been wholly out of its control, even during the GNU government. Thus, this has allowed factions within ZANU-PF to gain the upper hand and has increased an already tilted playing field. Other attempts to provide critical oversight for the diamond sector from NGOs, the Kimberley Process, and foreign governments have also had difficulty. While these groups have shaped some of the policies readily available to factions within ZANU-PF and have sometimes changed their behavior, the diamond sector has remained mainly in ZANU-PF control.

This chapter defines the analytical framework of the book by examining the concept of the “Party-state” and positioning it as a unique institutional structure in which the Party (CCP) operates both inside and outside the state apparatus. The chapter outlines two central themes: the Party’s control over decision-making within state institutions and the structural roots of corruption, particularly judicial corruption. It emphasizes the opacity and institutional complexity of the Party, whose internal disciplinary and normative systems have expanded significantly but remain understudied in the English-language scholarship. The author highlights the analytical value of formal Party norms, especially in regulating elite politics and disciplining political behavior. By investigating corruption—understood not as isolated deviance but as a routine institutionalized practice—the book seeks to uncover causal mechanisms embedded in Party-state governance that can explain both rule-abiding and rule-evading conduct. Methodologically, the chapter previews an approach that combines historical institutionalism, normative analysis, and case-based empirical inquiry. It also outlines the book’s structure: Part I focuses on judicial corruption as an entry point to understanding Party-state governance, while Part II explores the Party’s disciplinary and normative architecture as instruments of the Party's self-governance.

This chapter examines the development of the “mode of exchange” in Zimbabwe’s diamond sector. Before 2006, Zimbabwe’s small diamond production mostly went to Western Europe. During an extensive boom in diamond production from 2006 to 2010, many diamonds were smuggled out of the country amid foreign sanctions and a decline in the formal sector. Since 2010, the formal sector has bounced back, and many diamonds have been sold to the United Arab Emirates. Since 2016, Western Europe has once again become an export destination. However, in all periods, smuggling around the formal economy has persisted and had significant consequences for state capacity and institutions, which are examined in this chapter. This also traces the mode of exchange for other resources, particularly gold and lithium, which have been increasingly important. However, the drastic increase in diamond production that started in 2006 has uniquely impacted the Zimbabwean state. It provided an outlet to ZANU-PF during the economic collapse and increased political scrutiny, especially after the contested 2008 election, and contributed to the party being able to survive politically.