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This chapter examines the extent of similarities between onomatopoeias representing identical or similar sound events. Since onomatopoeias are causally determined iconic images and indexes, one might expect a high degree of cross-linguistic similarity. As Akita and Imai (2022: 29) note in their model of an iconicity ring, onomatopoeias as instances of primary iconicity are characterized by early acquisition and, importantly, universality. Another factor that should contribute to the cross-linguistic similarity of onomatopoeic words is the phenomenon of sound symbolism, in particular, the existence of universal phonesthemes. Nevertheless, Chapter 6 identifies a range of factors affecting the level of cross-linguistic similarity, including psycholinguistic, sociolinguistic, language-inherent factors as well as those related to the imitated sound event. This chapter identifies onomatopoeic patterns for eighteen sound events based on the sample data. The criteria include the number and the structure of the syllables, the type of the onset, nucleus, and coda, presence/absence of iconic reduplication, and vowel/consonant lengthening. An analysis of these patterns makes it possible to draw typological generalizations.
If some human trait or capacity is innate, it would seem that there is a genetic basis for it. This chapter explores this possibility with respect to language. We start this chapter with some genetics basics, and we will learn that there is a basis for saying that the human capacity for language has a genetic grounding, although exactly what this meansy is not so easy to establish, because the relationship between the genome and specific aspects of human mental abilities and behavior is very complex. One thing is certain: There is no (single) “gene for language.” Evidence about which genes have an impact on language often comes from people whose language abilities show certain atypical characteristics that are assumed to have a genetic basis when no other conceivable cause seems to be involved. A very important topic in this chapter is epigenetics, which is the science that studies how environmental factors can impact gene expression. This mechanism may hold the key to how nature and nurture interact in general, and the lesson to be learned is that these two factors do not compete or work independently. Rather, they are two sides of the same coin.
This paper revisits the restrictive/appositive distinction with Mandarin relative clauses and argues against the commonly held view that their restrictive/appositive status directly correlates with their structural positions. We demonstrate that distinct uses of demonstratives constitute a relevant factor in establishing the correlation, such that the pre-/post-demonstrative position is relevant to the semantic status of a relative when the demonstrative is used deictically, but not when it is used anaphorically; and that this refined typology of RCs can be accounted for once existing analyses of strong definites (Elbourne 2005. Situations and individuals; Schwarz 2009. Two types of definites in natural language; Jenks 2018. Linguistic Inquiry 49. 501–536) are extended to Mandarin demonstratives.
This chapter discusses a major contribution that Noam Chomsky made to the study of human language, which was to consider human languages in terms of generative, formalized rule systems, i.e., a formal grammar. Chomsky established a hierarchy of grammar types that differ in their so-called generative capacity, which allowed him and others to locate what kind of formal grammar within this hierarchy is needed for human languages. This hierarchy also proved useful in defining the grammars that are needed for computer languages or “languages” of nonhuman species (or even imaginable artificial or mathematical “languages”), and thus found applications in many other areas. We will ask what kinds of formal grammars can be taken as models of the mental grammars that language learners construct, considering recent developments in both formal language theory and the theory of natural language syntax. We will see that the field of formal language theory is a vibrant area of linguistics that continues to develop new methods and applications not only to syntax, but also to phonology. We will also ask whether formal language theory sheds light on the hypothesized innate language capacity.
All animal species seem to have some sort of communication system that is (largely or completely) innate. What is the nature of such systems? We will only have space to look at a few examples, which will show that some species use very complex systems. We can then ask, assuming that the human language capacity consists of several cognitive submodules, whether it is the case that some of those modules are shared with the innate communication capacities of other species. As we have seen, in recent years Chomsky has argued that the language capacity that is uniquely human (being specific to the domain of language) is the ability to form recursive structure. This has led to research to find out whether other animal species can also “handle” recursive patterns either in their communication systems or in other cognitive systems.
In this chapter we enter the field of neuroscience, the study of the structure and workings of the brain. We will focus on the issue of locating brain areas that are activated when people engage in specific activities, especially those that relate to language, which includes producing and perceiving language utterances. We will briefly discuss some methods for the localization of brain functions that were established before modern neuroimaging techniques became available. We discuss instrumental techniques that can be used today to establish which parts of the brain do what. We then review some of the results in modern neurolinguistic work which has revealed very specific brain areas for very specific language functions.
People have always been fascinated by “talking animals.” Dr Dolittle could understand the “languages” of animals, but what if they could use our language? Can they? This chapter reviews various attempts to teach human language, or something close to it, to other animals. Bottom line: They can’t do it. (But we can’t do their “languages” either!)
The idea of sound symbolism as “an inmost, natural similarity association between sound and meaning” (Jakobson and Waugh 2002: 182) in onomatopoeia and, more broadly, in ideophones has a long tradition. This chapter maps different views of the role of sound symbolism in onomatopoeia and provides an overview of phonesthemes as manifested in onomatopoeias in the examined sample of the world’s languages. The objective is (i) to identify cross-linguistic similarities in the use of phonesthemes to arrive at a universally system applicable to onomatopoeia and (ii) to identify language-specific phonesthemes. Based on these findings, the classical onomasiological model of word-formation is modified to show the actual role of phonesthemes in onomatopoeia-formation. The results contribute to the discussion on the significance and extent of sound symbolism in onomatopoeia.